Unmanned surface combatant considerations for concept exploration by Cox, Patrick et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2011-06
Unmanned surface combatant
considerations for concept exploration
Cox, Patrick















UNMANNED SURFACE COMBATANT 
Considerations for Concept Exploration  
 
By 
Patrick W. Cox John C. Mitchell 
Christie N. Jordan Kevin F. O’Neill 



























































NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
Monterey, California 93943-5000 
 
 
Daniel T. Oliver   Leonard A. Ferrari 
President  Executive Vice President and 
  Provost 
 
 
This report was prepared for the Chairman of the Systems Engineering Department in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Science in Systems Engineering.  
 
This report was prepared by the Masters of Science in Systems Engineering (MSSE) NAVSEA 
Carderock/Newport Cohort 311-094S. 
 
Reproduction of all or part of this report is authorized. 
 
 
This report was prepared by: 
 
Patrick Cox  Christie Jordan 
Kate Mangum  John Mitchell 





Jeffrey Beach    John M. Green 
Project Advisor    Project Advisor 









Karl A. van Bibber, Ph.D. 


























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
  
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 
Form Approved 
OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and 
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, 
including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis 
Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA  22202-4302.  Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a 
collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.  PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)  
20-07-2011 
2. REPORT TYPE 
  Technical Report 
3. DATES COVERED (From - To) 
 27-09-2010 to 06-06-2011 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
Unmanned Surface Combatant Considerations for Concept 
Exploration 








5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 
 
6. AUTHOR(S) 
Patrick Cox, Christie Jordan, Kate Mangum, John Mitchell,  Kevin O’Neill, Kevin Seraile 
 
 











5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 
 
 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)  
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT  
NUMBER  
NPS-SE-11-007 



















9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 
  
 
 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT  
       NUMBER(S) 
  
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 
 14. ABSTRACT  
This capstone project explored the operational and design considerations/constraints for an autonomous Unmanned Surface Combatant (USC).  Using a 
USC in selected missions could lead to cost reductions and enhanced capabilities when compared with similar manned combatants by eliminating 
personnel and automating ship operations. Operations and Support (O&S) costs, which include personnel costs, are a large portion of the Navy’s total 
ownership costs (TOC) for surface combatants, and can be as high as 38 percent of the TOC. Enhanced capabilities for a USC could be derived from 
performing operational activities manned ships cannot; and automated tasks could be performed more efficiently and effectively by a computer system 
than a human. A modified waterfall systems engineering process model was used to explore a USC concept. A needs analysis was performed, and mine 
warfare and anti-submarine warfare were identified as appropriate military missions for an initial USC concept. Top level constraints for a USC concept 
and support missions were developed. Design considerations, relevant technologies, and concept risks were investigated. This capstone project concluded 
that a lower cost, higher capability autonomous USC is possible based on the current state of relevant technologies. However there are significant 
technical challenges to overcome before full autonomy is possible.  Further, more rigorous design studies are recommended. 
15. SUBJECT TERMS 
Unmanned Surface Combatant (USC), Concept Design, Autonomous, ASW, MIW 
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 
Unclassified  











c. THIS PAGE 
Unclassified  
UU  166 19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area 
code) 
 
 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) 






This capstone project explored the operational and design considerations/constraints for 
an autonomous Unmanned Surface Combatant (USC).  Using a USC in selected missions 
could lead to cost reductions and enhanced capabilities when compared with similar 
manned combatants by eliminating personnel and automating ship operations.  
Operations and Support (O&S) costs, which include personnel costs, are a large portion 
of the Navy’s total ownership costs (TOC) for surface combatants, and can be as high as 
38 percent of the TOC [Elmendorf, 2010].  Enhanced capabilities for a USC could be 
derived from performing operational activities manned ships cannot; and automated tasks 
could be performed more efficiently and effectively by a computer system than a human.   
A modified waterfall systems engineering process model was used to explore a USC 
concept. A needs analysis was performed, and mine warfare and anti-submarine warfare 
were identified as appropriate military missions for an initial USC concept. Top level 
constraints for a USC concept and support missions were developed.  Design 
considerations, relevant technologies, and concept risks were investigated.  This capstone 
project concluded that a lower cost, higher capability autonomous USC is possible based 
on the current state of relevant technologies.  However there are significant technical 
challenges to overcome before full autonomy is possible. Further, more rigorous design 
studies are recommended. 
 
 












THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ......................................................... IX 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................ XIII 
I. INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................15 
A. CAPSTONE PROJECT TEAM .................................................................................15 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT ........................................................................................16 
C. BACKGROUND .......................................................................................................16 
D. OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................18 
E. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS MODEL ....................................................19 
F.  SUMMARY ..................................................................................................................21 
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION .........................................................................................21 
A. NEEDS ANALYSIS ..................................................................................................21 
1. Autonomous USV State of the Art ........................................................................21 
2. General Autonomous Unmanned Benefits ............................................................24 
3. US Naval Mission Areas and Autonomous Unmanned Operations ......................25 
4. Military Missions Selection for USC Constraints Discussion ...............................34 
5. Interested Party Survey Results .............................................................................36 
B. TOP LEVEL SYSTEM CONSTRAINTS AND ASSUMPTIONS ............................39 
C. LOWER LEVEL OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS ...............................................42 
D. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS ..................................................................................44 
1. Users and Other Stakeholders ................................................................................44 
2. Policies and Assumptions ......................................................................................45 
3. Operations and Support Description ......................................................................46 
E. USC FUNCTIONS ....................................................................................................50 
F. FUNCTIONAL ALLOCATION ...............................................................................53 
G. SYSTEM OPERATIONAL SCENARIOS ................................................................55 
1. Scenario 1 - Mine Scenario ....................................................................................55 
2. Scenario 2 – Submarine Scenario ..........................................................................56 
3. Scenario 3 – USC Attacked and Damage Control Response .................................58 
H. SUMMARY ...............................................................................................................59 
III. CONCEPT DISCUSSION .....................................................................................60 
A. RELEVANT TECHNOLOGIES .........................................................................................60 
B. TOP LEVEL PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE DISCUSSION ...................................................78 
C. DESIGN PHILOSOPHY, MAINTENANCE, AND REFUELING .............................................80 
D. SYSTEM INTEGRATION CONSIDERATIONS ...................................................................82 
E. COST CONSIDERATIONS ......................................................................................91 
F. RISK ASSESSMENT ................................................................................................93 
G. SUMMARY ...............................................................................................................98 
IV. CONCLUSIONS....................................................................................................99 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS .........................................................................................102 
 v 
APPENDIX A – CURRENT UNMANNED SURFACE VEHICLE 
CHARACTERISTICS .....................................................................................................104 
APPENDIX B – INTERESTED PARTY SURVEY .......................................................107 
APPENDIX C – MIW TECHNOLOGIES ......................................................................114 
APPENDIX D – NAVIGATION TECHNOLOGIES .....................................................118 
APPENDIX E – ASW TECHNOLOGIES ......................................................................119 
APPENDIX F – SELF DEFENSE TECHNOLOGIES ...................................................123 
APPENDIX G – DAMAGE CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES .........................................125 
APPENDIX H – NOTIONAL USC CONCEPT BASED ON CONSTRAINTS ............129 
APPENDIX I – RISK ASSESSMENT ............................................................................158 
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................161 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ....................................................................................165 
 
 vi 
  List of Figures 
 
FIGURE 1. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS MODEL ..................................................................................... 20 
FIGURE 2. MINES HAVE DAMAGED OR SUNK FOUR TIMES MORE U.S. NAVY SHIPS THAN ALL OTHER MEANS OF 
ATTACK [PEO-LMW1,2009]. ............................................................................................................... 35 
FIGURE 3. SURVEY RESULTS .......................................................................................................................... 38 
FIGURE 4. UNMANNED SURFACE COMBATANT – OV-1 .................................................................................. 46 
FIGURE 5. CORE MODEL HIGH LEVEL FUNCTIONS FOR USC ........................................................................ 51 
FIGURE 6. CORE MODEL LOWER LEVEL FUNCTIONS FOR ASW AND MIW .................................................. 52 
FIGURE 7. POTENTIAL USC CENTRAL CONTROL ARCHITECTURE .................................................................. 62 
FIGURE 8. ENGAGEMENT SEQUENCE AFTER [HUANG, 1994] ......................................................................... 73 
FIGURE 9. USC TOTAL SYSTEM INTEGRATION DIAGRAM .............................................................................. 83 
FIGURE 10. 4C COMMUNICATIONS WITH MACHINERY AND NAVIGATION SYSTEMS ...................................... 84 
FIGURE 11. 4C COMMUNICATIONS WITH SELF DEFENSE AND DAMAGE CONTROL SYSTEMS ......................... 85 
FIGURE 12. 4C COMMUNICATIONS WITH MIW AND ASW SYSTEMS .............................................................. 86 
FIGURE 13. RISK MATRIX ............................................................................................................................... 94 
FIGURE 33. AQS-20 ..................................................................................................................................... 114 
FIGURE 34.  ALMDS .................................................................................................................................... 114 
FIGURE 35. AMNS ....................................................................................................................................... 115 
FIGURE 36. ARCHERFISH .............................................................................................................................. 116 
FIGURE 37. OASIS ....................................................................................................................................... 116 
FIGURE 38. UISS .......................................................................................................................................... 116 
FIGURE 20. ASW SENSOR SUITE .................................................................................................................. 120 
FIGURE 21. ARGC-2400 LONG-RANGE NIGHT-VISION CAMERA [ANON, 2011] ............................................ 123 
FIGURE 22. VIRAT CONCEPT DIAGRAM[ANON, 2011] ................................................................................ 124 
FIGURE 23. LRAD 1000XI™ LONG RANGE ACOUSTIC DEVICE [ANON, 2011]............................................ 124 
FIGURE 24. AMN ......................................................................................................................................... 138 
FIGURE 25. COMBAT SYSTEMS SOFTWARE DECISION TABLE ....................................................................... 140 
FIGURE 26. POWER REQUIREMENTS FOR LASER WEAPON SYSTEMS [HOFFMAN, 2010] ............................... 144 
FIGURE 27. BURN DOWN BEHAVIOR [WAGNER, 2011] ................................................................................. 146 
FIGURE 28. STRUCTURE OF SHIP DAMAGE CASE RECOGNITION SUBSYSTEM [HOU, 2010:3405] .................... 147 





List of Tables 
 
TABLE 1. SURFACE SHIP LIFE CYCLE COSTS  ........................................... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. 
TABLE 2.  ANTI-AIR WARFARE SUB-OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES .................................................................. 26 
TABLE 3. AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SUB-OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES ............................................................. 27 
TABLE 4. ANTI-SURFACE SHIP WARFARE SUB-OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES .................................................. 28 
TABLE 5. ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE SUB-OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES ...................................................... 29 
TABLE 6. COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS SUB-OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES .......................... 30 
TABLE 7. ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUB-OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES .............................................................. 31 
TABLE 8. INTELLIGENCE SUB-OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES ............................................................................ 31 
TABLE 9. MINE WARFARE SUB-OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES ......................................................................... 32 
TABLE 10. MOBILITY SUB-OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES ................................................................................. 33 
TABLE 11. NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE SUB-OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES ...................................................... 33 
TABLE 12. STRIKE WARFARE SUB-OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES .................................................................... 34 
TABLE 13. FIRE AND EXTINGUISHER CLASSES ............................................................................................... 77 
TABLE 14. APPLICABLE SURFACE SHIP DIMENSIONS ..................................................................................... 78 
TABLE 15. ASW PACKAGE DECISION TABLE ............................................................................................... 133 
TABLE 16. ASW WEAPON DECISION TABLE ................................................................................................ 135 
TABLE 17. MINE WARFARE DECISION TABLE .............................................................................................. 136 
TABLE 18. NAVIGATION DECISION TABLE ................................................................................................... 137 
TABLE 19. CIWS DECISION TABLE .............................................................................................................. 143 
TABLE 20. DAMAGE CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES ........................................................................................... 145 
TABLE 21. USC NOTIONAL CONCEPT DESCRIPTION AND TECHNOLOGIES ................................. 151 
TABLE 22: LOW COST ALTERNATIVE ........................................................................................................... 154 







Thank you to NSWC Carderock, SUPSHIP Bath and ONR for allowing us to use their 
resources to accomplish our graduate studies. 
The team would also like to thank the multiple subject matter experts who were consulted 
during the course of the project.  Without the knowledge and aid of these experts the 
team would not have been able to complete the project. 
The project team takes pride in the knowledge that this report could aid further work in 
the field of autonomous surface combatants for the US Navy. 
Most importantly, the team would also like to thank our families who have supported us 
through the Capstone project and the Master’s program for the past two years.   
  
 ix 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
 
4C Central Control Computing Center 
ABS American Bureau of Shipping  
AFFF Aqueous Film Forming Foams 
AI Artificial Intelligence 
AIS Automatic Information System 
AMR Auxiliary Machinery Room 
Ao Operational Availability 
ARCI Advanced Rapid COTS Insertion 
ASW Anti Submarine Warfare 
C2 Command And Control 
C3 Command, Control, and Communication  
C4ISR Command, Control, And Communications Information, Surveillance, 
And Reconnaissance 
CBR Chemical, Biological, Radiological 
CEC Cooperative Engagement Capability 
CIWS Close-In Weapons System 
COLREGS International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 
CONOPS Concept of Operations 
COTS Commercial Off The Shelf 
CPP Controllable Pitch Propeller 
CSG Carrier Strike Group 
DEFCON Defense Readiness Condition 
DOD Department of Defense 
DON Department of the Navy 
ECM Electronic Counter Measures 
EO/IR  Electro Optics/Infrared 
ERAD Extended Range Acoustic Device 
ESG Expeditionary Strike Group 
 x 
ESM Electronic Support Measures 
EW Electronic Warfare 
FEDS 
FLIR 
Full Engagement Demonstration Simulation 
Forward Looking InfraRed 
GCCS-M Global Command and Control System - Maritime 
GPS Global Positioning System 
GRP Glass-fiber Reinforced Plastic 
HAUV Hovering Autonomous Underwater Vehicle 
HFP Hexafluoropropylene 
IFF Identification, Friend or Foe 
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
LAN Local Area Network 
LANT Atlantic Fleet 
LCS Littoral Combat Ship 
LIDAR Light Detection And Ranging 
LRAD  Long Range Acoustic Device 
MAD Magnetic Anomaly Detection 
MCM Mine Counter Measure 
MIW Mine Warfare 
MMR Main Machinery Room 
MNS Mission Needs Statement 
MOE  Measures of Effectiveness 
MOP  Measures of Performance 
NAV Navigation 
NAVSEA Naval Sea Systems Command 
NGIPS Next Generation Integrated Power System 
NPS Naval Postgraduate School 
NSWC Naval Surface Warfare Center 
O&S Operations and Support 
ONR Office of Naval Research 
OPAREA Operations Area 
 xi 
OPNAVINST Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 
OPSEC Operations Security 
PAC Pacific Fleet 
PDA Primary Damage Area 
PEO Program Executive Office 
PKP  
PMS 
Potassium Bicarbonate (aka Purple-K-Powder) 
Preventative Maintenance System 
QDR Quadrennial Defense Review 
R&D Research and Development 
RBOC Rapid Blooming Offboard Chaff 
REMUS Remote Environmental Measuring UnitS 
RF Radio Frequency 
RMS Remote Minehunting System 
SATCOM Satellite Communication 
SG Strike Group 
SM Standard Missile 
SMCM Surface Mine Countermeasures 
SSDS Ship Self Defense System 
SSN Fast Attack Submarine 
TACTAS Tactical Towed Array Sonar 
TEWA Threat Evaluation and Weapon Assignment 
TSCE Total Ship Computing Environment 
UAV 
UGV 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
Unmanned Ground Vehicle 
UISS Unmanned Influence Sweep System 
US3 Unmanned Surface Sweep System 
USC Unmanned Surface Combatant 
USN 
USV 
United States Navy 
Unmanned Surface Vehicle 
UUV Unmanned Underwater Vehicle 
VAMOSC Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Cost 
 xii 
VDS Variable Depth Sonar 
VTUAV Vertical Take-Off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
 xiii 
Executive Summary 
Operations and Support (O&S) costs, which include personnel for a ship over its life 
cycle, account for a large portion of the Navy’s total ownership costs (TOC) for surface 
combatants, and can be as high as 38 percent of the TOC [Elmendorf, 2010] .  The use of 
Unmanned Surface Combatants (USCs) would reduce personnel costs for ships.  A USC 
offers other advantages including the elimination of many habitability systems and 
human interface features that are necessary on manned ships.  By eliminating these 
design features and their requisite space, weight, and power requirements, the ship design 
trade space could achieve more flexibility enabling an increase in speed, payload, and 
range or a decrease in ship size to further reduce total ownership costs.  Most 
importantly, an autonomous USC offers many operational advantages over a manned 
equivalent.   
 
Autonomous unmanned systems may be better suited than a manned alternative for 
certain operations that can be considered too dull, dirty, or dangerous for humans to 
perform effectively or efficiently.  As the capabilities of the automated systems improve, 
an unmanned ship could perform these actions as well as routine actions such as 
navigation more effectively. 
 
An objective of this project was to explore the concept of an autonomous unmanned 
surface combatant and identify the operational and design constraints, design 
considerations, and explore the relevant technologies that would enable a USC to replace 
a manned surface combatant for some missions.  
 
A modified waterfall system engineering process model with steps that included Needs 
Analysis, Operational Analysis, Functional Analysis, Concept Discussion, and Final 
Analysis was used to formulate the USC concept considerations.  Using interested party 
survey inputs and a needs analysis, which highlighted the potential benefits of leveraging 
autonomous unmanned operations for certain missions, the team chose Anti-Submarine 
 xiv 
Warfare (ASW) and Mine Warfare (MIW) as the two primary missions to explore. Both 
of these missions generally involve an extensive search of large areas looking for small 
signature targets. Several other mission areas identified in the needs analysis, such as 
Mobility and Command, Control, and Communication (C3), are required regardless of 
the missions a USC would perform so these mission areas were included in the concept 
exploration as well.  
  
A concept of operations (CONOPS) and high level constraints were developed to help 
identify operational activities. Following this, seven USC functions were identified as 
ASW, MIW, C3, Navigation, Self-Defense, Damage Control, and Machinery.  A 
functional allocation was then performed which allocated the low level operational 
activities to the USC subsystems and components.  This allocation helped identify what 
relevant technologies a USC would require to accomplish ASW and MIW as well as the 
general ship functions.  The functional architecture was tracked in CORE® 7.0 during the 
entire concept exploration process.   
 
While there may be many benefits of a USC, the unmanned and autonomous nature of the 
ship presents unique challenges and potential problems. The ship will be capable of self-
defense and prosecution of submarines.  These actions may result in the firing of a 
weapon that can cause loss of life.  The USN currently relies on an individual who has 
ultimate responsibility for the consequences.  The USC will rely on a computer program 
to evaluate the need for and the authorization of weapons release in the case of self 
defense and it is expected that initially, weapon firing upon manned assets may have to 
be authorized by a human.   
 
MIW and ASW lend themselves to unmanned operation, and there are many technologies 
which are close to full autonomy.  Investments in software are required to get many 
systems over the last hurdles, and in some cases, mechanical adaptation will also need to 
occur.   Once these targeted investments have been made, there is a real potential for 
significant life cycle cost savings in both acquisition and O&S for the USC as compared 
to a manned surface combatant.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The introduction section of this report presents the project team and the problem statement for 
the report.  An expanded project background and report objectives are also presented along with 
the systems engineering process model the team used to address the problem statement. 
A. CAPSTONE PROJECT TEAM 
The capstone project team was composed of 6 members of the NAVSEA Carderock/Newport 
Cohort 311-094. 
• Patrick Cox – NSWC Carderock, Code 6102 
• Christie Jordan – SUPSHIP Bath, Code 153T1 
• Kate Mangum – NSWC Carderock, Code 5300 
• John Mitchell – NSWC Carderock, Code 2410 
• Kevin O’Neill – NSWC Carderock, Code 711 
• Kevin Seraile – NSWC Carderock, Code 732 
 
Five of the team members work in the Washington, DC area for organizations that include 
NSWC Carderock, NAVSEA 05, and OPNAV.  The sixth team member works for the 
Supervisor of Shipbuilding in Bath, Maine. The project lead role was rotated among team 
members with Patrick Cox and Kate Mangum taking prominent roles.  At the project inception, 
the team had little knowledge and no expertise of the capabilities, missions, mission equipment, 
and ship design that would be necessary to identify a concept design for an autonomous 
Unmanned Surface Combatant (USC).  Many of the capstone project deliverables such as the 
Concept of Operations (CONOPS), Project Management Plan, and project schedule were team 
efforts.  The team divided into functional areas to research technologies and systems required not 
only for systems necessary for combatant operations but also for the technologies and designs 
that would enable autonomous unmanned ship operation. Patrick Cox led the CORE modeling 
and Requirements research. Christie Jordan led the Damage Control, Self-Defense, and cost 
analysis research, Kate Mangum led the MIW (Mine Warfare) and System Integration research, 
John Mitchell led the Top Level Physical Architecture and Machinery research, Kevin O’Neill 
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led the USC Central Control Architecture research, and Kevin Seraile led the Anti-Submarine 
Warfare (ASW) and Navigation research.  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
The objective of this project was to explore the concept of an autonomous USC and identify the 
design considerations, design constraints, and relevant technologies that would enable the United 
States Navy (USN) to build and incorporate a USC into naval operations.  Both current and 
developmental technologies that enable a USC concept have been investigated.  The goal of the 
USC concept is to achieve full autonomous capabilities to satisfy mission requirements.  
 
Studies aimed at significantly reducing or eliminating manning have concluded that some degree 
of manning is necessary[Erwin, 2008].  The notion of required manning is rooted in years of 
culture; legal, ethical, and political reasons; and safety [Canning, 2009].  As a result studies with 
a true “out of the box” approach to achieving a USC have not been previously attempted by the 
Navy. All of the studies investigated to date have examined boats usually of 11m or less in 
length, none have addressed a USC. 
C. BACKGROUND 
Operations and Support (O&S) costs are a large portion of the Navy’s total ownership costs for 
today’s surface combatants.  O&S costs include both personnel and maintenance for a ship over 
its total life cycle.  Surface combatants are expected to have a service life of 25 to 35 years and 
personnel costs can be as high as 38 percent of the total life cycle cost [Elmendorf, 2010].   
According to an April 2008 article in National Defense, the expense of recruiting, retaining, 
training and providing medical benefits for service members and retirees is growing faster than 
anyone had predicted.  Even though the Navy is eliminating people from the ranks, its personnel 
costs still are expected to rise by 5 percent a year [Erwin, 2010].  
 
Recent programs such as the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and the DDG 1000 have attempted to 
reduce their manning requirements, which translates to reduced O & S cost, with mixed results.  
LCS is estimated to still have approximately 15 percent of the total ownership cost as personnel 
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costs [Elmendorf, 2010].  Even with this reduced manning, the personnel cost is estimated to be 
$161M per ship (life cycle) for the LCS-1 and LCS-2 [Elmendorf, 2010]. 
 
A completely unmanned surface combatant offers expanded operational advantages including the 
elimination of many human habitability systems and interface features such as operator consoles, 
berthing, lounges, mess rooms, offices, medical spaces,  and  galleys that are necessary on 
manned ships.   By eliminating these features and their requisite space, weight, and power 
requirements, the ship design trade space could achieve more flexibility enabling an increase in 
speed, payload, and range or a decrease in ship size to further reduce total ownership costs. 
 
Most importantly an autonomous USC offers many potential operational advantages over a 
manned equivalent.  Autonomous unmanned systems may be better suited than a manned 
alternative for certain operations that can be considered too dull, dirty, or dangerous for humans 
to perform effectively or efficiently.  As the capabilities of the automated systems improve, 
unmanned ships could perform these actions as well as routine actions such as Navigation more 
effectively. 
 
An unmanned system is also less susceptible to environmental and man-made hazards than a 
manned alternative.  An autonomous USC could enter operational areas whose environments are 
too extreme for a manned ship to enter.  For example, the USC would be able to enter toxic or 
radioactive areas to gather intelligence.  A USC would be ideally suited for an environment that 
would be potentially deadly for personnel onboard a manned ship and would keep sailors out of 
harm’s way.  
 
Operations where vigilance is paramount, such as area monitoring, may be better performed by 
autonomous unmanned systems.  The autonomous system can be present in areas longer and 
maintain the monitoring operation at a higher fidelity than human counterparts who become 
fatigued.  The USC systems could perform missions without having to consider the health and 
morale of the crew. 
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Arguably the most valuable benefit to having an unmanned USC may be removing USN 
personnel from dangerous situations.  Even beyond specific operations, an unmanned surface 
combatant shifts the paradigm of naval operations.  Instead of being risk averse to prevent loss of 
life, the Navy can use the USC in higher risk ways because the consequence of damage or 
destruction is much less severe than using a manned alternative.  
 
While there may be many benefits of a USC, the unmanned and autonomous nature of the ship 
presents unique challenges and potential problems. The ship will be capable of self-defense and 
prosecution of submarines.  These actions may result in the firing of a weapon that can cause loss 
of life.  The USN currently relies on an individual who has ultimate responsibility for the 
consequences.  The USC will rely on a computer program to evaluate the need for and the 
authorization of weapons release in the case of self defense and it is expected that initially,   
weapon firing upon manned assets will have to be authorized by a human.  Unless there is real-
time monitoring of the USC sensors and situation, using the ship as part of a shield may 
introduce latencies that affect the safety of the defended asset.  Using a computer to fill the 
human role will require programming that is able to process and react to every situation with 
complete confidence that the proper action is taken.  The USC also introduces a “fear of the 
unknown” factor in its operation to both adversaries and allies alike.  Operating around a 
relatively large unmanned ship will present operational challenges for the other ships until the 
USC is proved capable of safe operation.  Even then, an unmanned ship will always cause some 
doubt as to its ability to react as a human would react. 
D. OBJECTIVES 
During initial formulation of the problem statement, five objectives were identified that served to 
measure progress towards evaluating the USC concept.  
 
1. The first objective was to define the problem and scope of the project.  To achieve this 
objective, the missions and top level system requirements for the USC were determined 
and a USC Capabilities Matrix was developed. 
 
2. The second objective was to perform an operational analysis.  The analysis was based on 
an assessment of the current relevant technologies for a USC and an exploration of 
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considerations required to fully automate the USC.  Lastly, a CORE model and Concept 
of Operations was developed for the USC. 
 
3. The third objective was to analyze USC functions.  The relevant technologies were 
examined and the USC functions were analyzed using three autonomous stressing 
scenarios.   
  
4. The fourth objective was to evaluate the USC relevant technologies and identify potential 
design issues.   The result was relevant technologies that addressed USC requirements. 
 
5. The fifth and final objective was to evaluate the USC considerations and provide 
recommendations for further study.  The evaluation was performed by comparing the 
USC concept to current manned ships. 
 
E. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS MODEL 
 
The project team chose a modified waterfall systems engineering process model because of the 
streamlined approach of the model.  The vast scope and relatively limited time for completion of 
this project precluded the project team from selecting an iterative process model.   The five steps 
of the waterfall process as modified are: Need Analysis, Operational Analysis, Functional 
Analysis, Concept Discussion, and Final Analysis.  A diagram of the process used is shown 




Figure 1. Modified Systems Engineering Process Model 
 
The process began with the need.  The need for this project was originally derived from the 
project assignment provided by the capstone advisors. This need was further articulated by the 
team (see Background) based on research and discussions with interested parties.  Each process 
step had two resultant components - deliverables and validation.  The deliverables drove the 
requirements for the subsequent step.  All process step deliverables were assimilated and resulted 
in the last deliverable, this final report. 
   
The validation process ensures that the deliverables produced met the requirements that began 
the process step.  Validation was performed by comparing the deliverables at the end of process 
step with the beginning requirements of that step.  If the new deliverables could be traced back to 
the requirements then the validation was successful.  If changes were necessary because results 
were not validated, modifications to previous deliverables and the project management plan were 
made accordingly. The project team used CORE, a systems engineering and architecture 
software package, to track the USC concept operational and functional architecture throughout 
the systems engineering process.  
 
All data, research, and technology information was collected from publicly available sources.  
No sensitive or classified material was used to develop the report.  In some limited cases in the 
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report, the team had access to sensitive data of higher quality.  For the most part, the project team 
was able to find comparable data publicly as well. The project team chose to use only publicly 
available information because it would allow for a wider distribution of the report and enable all 
readers to verify reference information.    
 
F.  SUMMARY 
Section I of the report described the unmanned surface combatant need and the background for 
developing an autonomous USC.  Cost savings, improved efficiency, and expanded capabilities 
are all reasons to investigate an autonomous USC. This section also included the report 
objectives for exploring the USC concept and the systems engineering process model used to 
achieve the objectives and complete the report.  Validation and deliverables were part of each 
step in the systems engineering process model.  The next section will define the USC concept 
problem and discuss the high level requirements and functions of the USC concept. 
 
 
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
This section of the report analyzes the need for an autonomous USC and identifies the military 
missions for the USC concept.  Once the military missions are identified, those choices are 
confirmed by interested party survey results.  The top level system constraints and lower level 
operational constraints are defined.  A Concept of Operations for a notional USC is presented 
and functions are identified.  The operational constraints are allocated to the functions, and 
several operational scenarios are presented to show actions which would stress the capabilities of 
an autonomous USC.   
 
A. NEEDS ANALYSIS 
1. Autonomous USV State of the Art 
 
While there are currently no unmanned surface combatants, there are a number of unmanned 
surface vehicles (USV’s) under development that are projected to accomplish a variety of 
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missions.  USV’s are envisioned as mission packages to be carried to the field by a manned 
platform such as LCS.  Once in theater, they are sent out to accomplish short duration missions 
with controls and monitoring being accomplished from the manned platform.  Although these 
USV’s are useful to keep the manned platform out of harm’s way, they do not contribute to 
reducing manning or eliminating the platform. 
 
The largest class of USV as defined by the Navy Unmanned Surface Vehicle Master Plan [PEO 
LMW, 2007] is the Fleet Class (11m).  The requirements for this class include providing 
adequate power, speed and payload for ASW, power and tow force for MCM Sweep, and 
endurance for these and other missions.  This class of USV is to be deployed by LCS.  Some of 
the USV designs are mature, but the USV’s are limited in scope (limited missions, one mission at 
a time), and are mostly line-of-sight, remotely monitored and controlled.  Hull, sensors and 
limited weapons are mature technologies for USV’s. 
 
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is also funding the ASW 
Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV) program which has the goal of sending an 
unmanned vessel for long term submarine tracking on its own (concept design has a 30 day loiter 
followed by 30 day maximum energy trail mission).  This project is in its preliminary stages, 
currently completing phase 1.  This phase explores development and at-sea demonstration of 
USV autonomous algorithms for submarine tracking, and “rules of the road” compliance [Jane’s 
Unmanned Maritime Vehicles and Systems1, 2011]  
 
Appendix A summarizes the state of current USV technology, including the Fleet Class USV 
previously mentioned.  Most USV’s are in the 4-11m range in length, can operate in Sea State 3, 
survivable to Sea State 5, with a payload capacity of around 2500kg and endurance of less than 
48 hrs.  The Piranha is an exception to the above, it is a Fleet Class with composite hull, 54 ft in 
length with a 15,000 lb max payload, an endurance of 40 days and survivable to Sea State 6 
[Jane's Navy International1, 2011].  Generally, the size of the USV limits its payload and the 
missions it can accomplish, as well as the amount of fuel it can carry and associated range and 
endurance, and survivability in high sea states.  The X-3 is partially solar powered and can be 
deployed for 60 days, but is not currently suitable for other than ISR functions [LaGrone, 2011]. 
 23 
 
Leveraging USV Designs for USC needs 
The goal of a USV is usually single mission, close to shore or other manned platform, whereas 
the goal of a USC is to take the place of a surface combatant such as LCS, and replace the 
platform itself.   
 
As the requirements indicate, the main concerns of the USV design tradeoffs are adequate power 
and speed, payload, tow force for ASW and MCM Sweep, endurance, as well as fit and 
transportability, which are all constraints of its small size.  Extrapolating from the Piranha 
performance indicates that these constraints are reduced with a larger platform.   USV 
technologies that can be leveraged for the USC program include navigation, collision/obstacle 
avoidance, and onboard C4I, such as resident on the Silver Marlin, which is based on UAV 
technology [Jane's Unmanned Maritime Vehicles and Systems2, 2011].  Autonomous navigation 
is a complex field which is being extensively researched by SIS, Inc. and JPL for the AMN and 
ACTUV project and is described in the article “The Autonomous Maritime Navigation (AMN) 
Project: Field Tests, Autonomous and Cooperative Behaviors, Data Fusion, Sensors, and 
Vehicles” in the Journal of Field Robotics, August 2010.   However, adapting this technology 
will have to take into consideration the larger size of the USC. 
 
Other USV developments that can be used on a USC include winch deployment of tow fish 
which can be deployed remotely by many USV’s;  the FAST has an unmanned influence sweep 
system in the capability concept demonstrator phase [Jane's Unmanned Maritime Vehicles and 
Systems3, 2011]; the Inspector Mk2 has a patented dedicated keel to carry acoustic sensors such 
as multi-beam echo sounder, swath bathymetric sonar, sub-bottom profiler or acoustic Doppler 
current profiler [Jane's Unmanned Maritime Vehicles and Systems4, 2011];  the Venus-9 USV 
has a Weapon of Mass Destruction Detector System which successfully demonstrated its 
capabilities to detect radioactive materials and targets [Jane's Unmanned Maritime Vehicles and 
Systems5, 2011].    ACTUV is also exploring a C2 system to enable global operations of 
remotely supervised systems, de-fouling and other self-maintenance capabilities, and unique 
payload systems that could benefit from the extended periods of uninterrupted operations [Jane’s 
Navy International2, 2010].  These technologies can be adapted to the USC.  Software and 
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autonomous controls are currently not mature technologies in the U.S. 
 
Some of the risk areas for the USC which cannot leverage development of USV’s include 
navigation in crowded shipping lanes with a large hull, docking, refueling at sea, self defense and 
possibly autonomous use of lethal weapons.  Some USV’s are equipped with small guns but they 
are remotely controlled.  Because of its longer range and endurance, non line of sight 
communications and data transfer are a major factor for the USC which is generally not the case 
for USV’s.   
2. General Autonomous Unmanned Benefits 
 
The USC concept was worth exploring because it offers three distinct potential advantages over a 
manned combatant:  cost savings, improved performance on some current capabilities and 
missions, and expanded capabilities and missions, with no risk to the crew.  A successful 
autonomous unmanned surface combatant design would perform current missions more 
effectively, more efficiently, and less costly than a manned combatant.  Also, there are some 
areas where a USC could perform beyond the limits of a manned alternative. 
a) Cost Savings 
Potential savings for eliminating manning is high.  Manning accounts for approximately 15 
percent to 39 percent of a ship’s total life cycle cost.  Current ship manpower costs give a rough 
idea of what potential savings could be realized [Elmendorf, 2010]: 
 
Table 1 shows that fielding an (equivalently capable) unmanned ship can affect an average 
savings in manpower of about $18 million per year per ship.  This value does not include other 
costs for human systems and support indirectly incurred to sustain and provide for manning.  .  
At 286 ships currently in the fleet [US Navy3, 2011], the savings would be substantial even if 







Table 1. Surface Ship Life Cycle Costs 
MCM 1 FFG 7 DDG 51 CG 47 LCS 1
39% 34% 29% 29% 15%
$243M $510M $897M $1156M $161M
$8M $17M $26M $33M $6M
$3042M $4031M $1063M
Ship Class
Total Life Cycle Cost         
per Ship
Personnel Cost per Year 
for Life Cycle
Total Personnel Cost for 
Life Cycle





b) Improved Performance for Current Capabilities and Missions 
Use of machines to do certain US Navy ship tasks should be exploited where those tasks are 
more suitable for machines than humans.  These tasks are generally monotonous and/or difficult 
for sailors to perform vigilantly.  Numerous USN tasks fit this description such as round-the-
clock surveillance and submarine hunting.  These tasks are monotonous and difficult for sailors 
to focus on and can theoretically be accomplished more efficiently by machines and can be 
automated.  By automating these machine suitable tasks, the manned combatants are deployed 
fewer times, and only to pursue other important missions where a human presence is necessary.  
c) Expanded Capabilities and Missions 
An unmanned surface combatant would allow the Navy to operate in dangerous waters without 
endangering sailors’ lives.    The USC can be sent into harm’s way to carry out surveillance and 
reconnaissance missions in hostile water, perform MIW, and verify Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological (CBR) environments, without having to consider crew safety.  Incidents such as the 
USS Cole and numerous other attacks on US ships could be less costly if the same missions 
could be carried out by an unmanned surface combatant. 
 
3. US Naval Mission Areas and Autonomous Unmanned Operations 
 
Navy surface combatant missions are described in OPNAVINST C3501.2H, (Naval) Warfare 
Mission Areas and Required Operational Capability/Projected Operational Environment Statements.  
The OPNAVINST divides each mission area into operational capabilities, which are further divided 
into sub-operational capabilities. Each capability and mission area was examined from the 
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prospective of being accomplished by an unmanned surface combatant and assigned a rating of red, 
yellow or green. The color indicates the team’s judgment of the possibility a capability can be 
performed autonomously.  A much more rigorous evaluation would be required for selecting USC 
attributes. Red indicates the mission cannot be done or is not beneficial to be done autonomously; 
yellow indicates it can be done but may be limited, too complicated or of marginal benefit to be done 
autonomously; and green indicates it can be done and it is beneficial to do so autonomously. 
OPNAVINST C3501.2H’s eleven Naval Warfare Mission areas are defined below while sub-
operational capabilities are highlighted with a brief discussion of each Mission area to show the 
overall USC applicability.  
 
Anti-air Warfare (AAW) is the destruction or neutralization of enemy air platforms and airborne 
weapons, whether launched from air, surface, subsurface, or land platforms. The sub-operational 
capabilities shown below range from ship self defense which is rated green and considered a 
requirement, to overall control of combat air patrols, which is rated red and considered too much to 
automate. The former is much more conducive to performance by an unmanned combatant than the 
latter. An assessment was conducted and it was determined that most of the capabilities were 
beneficial to automate. Of the ten sub-operational capabilities, six were rated green, three yellow and 
one red. Overall, this mission area was rated green and it was determined that most of the capabilities 
were beneficial to automate but his was not selected as a priority mission.  
Table 1.  Anti-air Warfare sub-operational capabilities 
 
 
Amphibious Warfare (AMW) involves attacks, launched from the sea by naval forces and by 
landing forces embarked in ships or craft, designed to achieve a landing on a hostile shore.  This 
AAW 1 (U) Provide anti-air defence in cooperation with other forces. G
AAW 2 (U) Provide anti-air defense of a geographic area (zone) in cooperation with other forces. G
AAW 3 (U) Engage air targets during BG operations in cooperation with other forces. G
AAW 4 (U) Provide for air operations in support of airborne anti-air operations. Y
AAW 5 (U) Conduct airborne anti-air operations. Y
AAW 6 (U) Detect, identify, and track air targets. G
AAW 7 (U) Control Combat Air Patrol (requires full allowance of Air Intercept Controllers (AICs). R
AAW 8 (U) Engage air targets using installed air-to-air weapons systems. G
AAW 9 (U) Engage airborne threats using surface-to-air armament. G
AAW 10 (U) Coordinate the overall conduct of AAW operations with all other warfare 
requirements of the Amphibious Task Force (ATF) Commander.  Allocate air assets as required to 
counter threats to the ATF.
Y
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includes fire support of troops in contact with enemy forces through the use of close air support 
or shore bombardment. The sub-operational capabilities shown below range from troop and 
equipment transport to evacuation of casualties. Of the eighteen sub-operational capabilities, four 
were rated green, one yellow and thirteen red. Overall this mission area was rated yellow and it was 
determined that most of the capabilities were not beneficial to automate. This mission area was 
people and cargo intensive and not well suited to an unmanned combatant. 
Table 2. Amphibious Warfare sub-operational capabilities 
 
 
Anti-surface Ship Warfare (ASU) is the destruction or neutralization of enemy surface 
combatants and merchant ships. Of the thirteen sub-operational capabilities shown below, nine were 
rated green, two yellow and two red. Overall this mission area was rated green and it was determined 
that most of the capabilities were beneficial to automate. 
AMW 1 (U) Load, transport and land combat equipment, material and supplies with attendant 
personnel in an amphibious assault.
R
AMW 2 (U) Load, transport, and land elements of a landing force with their equipment and 
supplies in an amphibious assault. R
AMW 3 (U) Reembark and transport equipment, materials, supplies, and personnel. R
AMW 4 (U) Serve as primary control ship in ship-to-shore movement. R
AMW 5 (U) Conduct landing craft or amphibious vehicle operations in support of amphibious 
assault. R
AMW 6 (U) Conduct helicopter operations in support of amphibious assault. R
AMW 7 (U) Provide amphibious assault construction support for ship-to-shore operations and 
beach clearance. R
AMW 8 (U) Provide for surface/subsurface defenses of an AOA. R
AMW 9 (U) Conduct pre-assault cover and diversionary actions. G
AMW 10 (U) Conduct beach party operations in support of an amphibious assault. R
AMW 11 (U) Conduct amphibious cargo handling operations. R
AMW 12 (U) Provide air control and coordination of air operations in an AOA. Y
AMW 13 (U) Provide the naval element of the shore party to facilitate the landing and movement 
over the beaches of troops, equipment, and supplies, and to assist the evacuation of 
casualties/Prisoners of WAR (POW).
R
AMW 14 (U) Support/conduct Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS) against designated targets in 
support of an amphibious operation. G
AMW 15 (U) Provide for air operations in support of amphibious operations. R
AMW 16 (U) Conduct close air support in support of an amphibious operation using air launched 
armament. G
AMW 17 (U) Conduct Vertical Short Take-Off and landing (VSTOL) flight operations in support 
of amphibious assault. R
AMW 18 (U) Conduct Inshore Undersea Warfare (IUW) operations. G
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Table 3. Anti-surface Ship Warfare sub-operational capabilities 
 
 
Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW) is the destruction or neutralization of enemy submarines. Of the 
eight sub-operational capabilities shown below, six were rated green, one yellow and one red. 
Overall this mission area was rated green and it was determined that most of the capabilities were 
beneficial to automate. This mission area is well suited to an automated mission since it is tedious 
and time consuming and an autonomous system is not going to become tired or bored and this was 
selected as the first of two primary missions for the USC. 
  
ASU 1 (U) Engage surface threats with anti-surface armaments. G
ASU 2 (U) Engage surface targets during BG operations in cooperation with other forces. G
ASU 3 (U) Support anti-surface ship defense of geographical area (e.g. zone or barrier) in 
cooperation with other forces. G
ASU 4 (U) Detect, identify, localize, and track surface ship targets. G
ASU 5 (U) Conduct Acoustic Warfare (AW) against surface contacts. G
ASU 6 (U) Disengage, evade, and avoid surface attack. G
ASU 7 (U) Conduct coordinated air attack (including the functions of Tactical Air Coordinator 
Airborne (TAC (A)) on targets. Y
ASU 8 (U) Provide for air operations in support of antisurface attack operations. R
ASU 9 (U) Conduct attacks on surface ships using air launched armament. G
ASU 10 (U) Conduct airborne operations in support of anti-surface attack operations. Y
ASU 11 (U) Perform duties of Aircraft Control Unit (ACU) for aircraft involved in ASU operations. R
ASU 12 (U) Support/conduct independent ASU operations. G
ASU 13 (U) Conduct pre-attack deception operations. G
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Table 4. Anti-submarine Warfare sub-operational capabilities 
 
 
Command, Control and Communications (CCC) is providing communications and related 
facilities for coordination and control of external organizations or forces and control of unit's 
own facilities. Of the sixteen sub-operational capabilities shown below, nine were rated green, four 
yellow and three red. Overall this mission area was rated green and it was determined that most of 
the capabilities were beneficial to automate. This capability was considered a basic requirement for 
any surface combatant and crucial to the success of an USC. 
  
ASW 1 (U) Provide ASW defense against submarines for surface forces, groups and units. G
ASW 2 (U) Provide ASW defense of a geographic area. G
ASW 3 (U) Conduct independent ASW operations. G
ASW 4 (U) Conduct airborne anti-submarine operations. Y
 ASW 5 (U) Provide for air operations in support of airborne anti-submarine operations. R
ASW 6 (U) Engage submarines in cooperation with other forces. G
ASW 7 (U) Engage submarines with anti-submarine armament. G
ASW 8 (U) Disengage, evade, avoid, and deceive submarines. G
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Table 5. Command, Control and Communications sub-operational capabilities 
 
 
Electronic Warfare (ELW) is the effective use by friendly forces of the electromagnetic spectrum 
for detection and targeting while deterring, exploiting, reducing, or denying its use by the enemy. 
Of the seven sub-operational capabilities shown below, six were rated green, one yellow and none 
red. Overall this mission area was rated green and it was determined that most of the capabilities 
were beneficial to automate but that the determination of how to handle EW was best left to 
individuals to assess the diplomatic and BG or SAG impacts and not well suited to a USC. 
  
CCC 1 (U) Provide command and control facilities for a task organization commander and staff. R
CCC 2 (U) Coordinate and control the operation of the task organization or function force to carry 
out assigned missions. R
CCC 3 (U) Provide own unit's command and control functions. G
CCC 4 (U) Maintain Navy Tactical Data System (NTDS) or data link capability. G
CCC 5 (U) Provide airborne capability to relay command and control communications to strategic 
forces. Y
CCC 6 (U) Provide communications for own unit. G
CCC 7 (U) Implement Operations Security (OPSEC) measures and conduct military deception 
actions. G
CCC 8 (U) Provide a reliable and survivable communications relay capability to deploy strategic 
forces. R
CCC 9 (U) Relay naval communications. G
CCC 10 (U) Provide special communications. G
CCC 11 (U) Provide capability to conduct one or more of the five control functions: MPACU, Air 
Raid Reporting Control Ship, Aircraft Control Unit (ACU) for varios Anti warfare capabilities, 
PIRAZ/Strike Support Ship,  and NTDS Link 11 Net Control Ship/Station (NCS).
G
CCC 12 (U) Maintain capability to super encrypt cryptographically covered communications 
circuits. G
CCC 13 (U) Provide communications support for tactical surface, submarine, and air units. G
CCC 14 (U) Provide DCS connectivity/circuitry. Y
CCC 15 (U) Maintain and operate a Fleet Telecommunications Operation Center (FTOC). Y
CCC 16 (U) Function as the Navy Satellite Communication Network Area Control Activity. Y
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Table 6. Electronic Warfare sub-operational capabilities 
 
 
The Intelligence (INT) capability is the collection, processing, and evaluation of information to 
determine location, identification and capability of hostile forces through the employment of 
reconnaissance, surveillance, and other means.  With the exception of the Navy intelligence 
vessels (i.e. T-AGM Class), all Navy surface combatants are required to have limited amounts of 
this capability to carry out its mission.  Of the eight sub-operational capabilities shown below, all 
were rated green, no yellow or red. Overall this mission area was rated green and it was determined 
that most of the capabilities were beneficial to automate. However, since there are only two Navy 
intelligence vessels currently deployed, this did not appear to be a good primary function for an 
unmanned vessel due to the high technology cost for a small ship class.  Additionally, an 
unmanned intelligence ship would push the envelope on the overall TRL level of the ship design 
due to the amount of man-in-the-loop decisions that would need to be replaced.  
Table 7. Intelligence sub-operational capabilities 
 
 
The Mine Warfare (MIW) capability is the use of mines for control/denial of sea or harbor areas, 
and mine countermeasures to destroy or neutralize enemy mines.  Of the eleven sub-operational 
ELW 1 (U) Conduct Electronic Warfare Support Measures operations. G
ELW 2 (U) Conduct Electronic Countermeasures operations. G
ELW 3 (U) Conduct Electronic Counter-Countermeasure operations. G
ELW 4 (U) Conduct Electromagnetic/Acoustic Emission Control operations. G
ELW 5 (U) Conduct coordinates electronic warfare operations with other forces in support of a BG 
or SAG. G
ELW 6 (U) Conduct counter-targeting through electronic and/or acoustic means. G
ELW 7 (U) Plan/conduct Command, Control, and Communication Countermeasure (C3CM) 
operations via physical, technical, and administrative means. Y
INT 1 (U) Support/conduct intelligence collection. G
INT 2 (U) Provide intelligence. G
INT 3 (U) Conduct surveillance and reconnaissance. G
INT 4 (U) Provide the capability to conduct ocean surveillance operations against targets of 
interest. G
INT 5 (U) Provide the capability to process ocean surveillance information. G
INT 6 (U) Conduct surface reconnaissance. G
INT 7 (U) Support/conduct airborne reconnaissance. G
INT 8 (U) Process surveillance and reconnaissance information. G
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capabilities shown below, seven were rated green, one yellow and three red and this overall mission 
area was rated green. This mission area, like ASW, is well suited to an automated mission since it is 
tedious and time consuming. It was determined that most of the capabilities were beneficial to 
automate and this was selected as the second of two primary missions for the USC. 
Table 8. Mine Warfare sub-operational capabilities 
 
 
The Mobility (MOB) capability is the ability of naval forces to move and to maintain themselves 
in all situations over, under, or upon the surface.  All vessels are required to have this capability 
regardless of mission selection. Of the fifteen sub-operational capabilities shown below, four were 
rated green, no yellow and eleven red and this overall mission area was rated red.  Mobility would 
ultimately be identified in the design as a derived requirement. 
  
MIW 1(U) Conduct moored mine countermeasures. G
MIW 2 (U) Conduct influence mine countermeasures. G
MIW 3 (U) Conduct mine neutralization/destruction. G
MIW 4 (U) Conduct mine countermeasures (MCM). G
MIW 5 (U) Support/conduct offensive/defensive mine-laying operations. Y
MIW 6 (U) Conduct magnetic silencing (degaussing, deperming, etc.). G
MIW 7 (U) Assemble, test, maintain, and issue mines. R
MIW 8 (U) Conduct precise navigation. G
MIW 9 (U) Conduct airborne mine countermeasures. R
MIW 10 (U) Provide for air operations in support of mine warfare operations. R
MIW 11 (U) Conduct Route Survey Operations. G
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Table 9. Mobility sub-operational capabilities 
 
 
The Naval Special Warfare (NSW) capability requires naval operations generally accepted as 
being unconventional--in many cases clandestine--in nature.  NSW includes special mobile 
operations, unconventional warfare, coastal and river interdiction, beach and coastal 
reconnaissance and certain tactical intelligence operations. The sub-operational capabilities were 
considered for evaluation but due to the mandatory personnel involved and this mission area was 
rated red. Of the eight sub-operational capabilities shown below, four were rated green, no yellow 
and four red and this mission area was rated red.   
Table 10. Naval Special Warfare sub-operational capabilities 
 
 
The Strike Warfare (STW) capability requires the destruction or neutralization of enemy targets 
ashore through the use of conventional or nuclear weapons.  This includes, but is not limited to, 
MOB 1 (U) Steam to designed capability and in the most fuel efficient manner. G
MOB 2 (U) Support/provide safe, flyable aircraft for all-weather operations. R
MOB 3 (U) Prevent and control damage. G
MOB 4 (U) Transfly on short notice. R
MOB 5 (U) Maneuver in formation. G
MOB 6 (U) Refuel in the air. R
MOB 7 (U) Perform seamanship, airmanship, and navigation tasks. G
MOB 8 (U) Operate from a ship. R
MOB 9 (U) Maintain nuclear propulsion readiness. R
MOB 10 (U) Replenish at sea. Y
MOB 11 (U) Maintain mount-out capabilities. R
MOB 12 (U) Maintain the health and well-being of the crew. R
MOB 13 (U) Maintain reserve unit mobilization readiness (inactive reserve units only). R
MOB 14 (U) Conduct operations ashore. R
MOB 15 (U) Conduct parachute operations. R
NSW 1 (U) Conduct hydrographic reconnaissance. G
NSW 2 (U) Clear the seaward approaches to amphibious landing beaches. G
NSW 3 (U) Conduct maritime sabotage. G
NSW 4 (U) Conduct combatant craft operations. R
NSW 5 (U) Conduct Unconventional Warfare operations. G
NSW 6 (U) Conduct counterinsurgency operations. R
NSW 7 (U) Support raiding parties. R
NSW 8 (U) Conduct limited local security defensive combat operations. R
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strategic targets, building yards, and operating bases from which the enemy is capable of 
conducting air, surface, or subsurface operations against U.S. or allied forces.  This mission area 
was given some consideration. Of the ten sub-operational capabilities shown below, seven were 
rated green, three yellow and no red. Despite this, it was deemed too risky to have an unmanned 
vessel firing ashore and this mission area was rated red. 
Table 11. Strike Warfare sub-operational capabilities 
 
 
Based on the above evaluation the team selected ASW and MIW as the two primary military 
missions and CCC as the primary support mission to pursue. Three operational areas were 
eliminated MOB, NSW and STW. The remaining five areas were determined to be less than 
optimal for the USV but some of the sub-operational capabilities would be required for a USC to 
conduct self defense, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and electronic warfare 
tasking. 
 
4. Military Missions Selection for USC Constraints Discussion  
The team chose ASW and MIW as the two military missions to pursue based on the high 
potential to leverage the benefits of autonomous unmanned operations for these missions.  This 
decision was also supported by the interested party survey results. Both ASW and MIW missions 
generally involve an extensive search of large areas looking for small signature targets. This is 
tedious, and tests the patience of human operators. USC’s can be programmed to perform 
detailed searches that would otherwise be frustrating to the human operator.  
STW 1 (U) Maintain readiness to deliver ballistic missiles on assigned targets. G
STW 2 (U) Conduct operational tests of ballistic missile weapons system. G
STW 3 (U) Support/conduct multiple cruise missile strikes either independently or in support of 
other strike forces. G
STW 4 (U) Support/conduct air strikes. G
STW 5 (U) Conduct coordinated air strikes/attacks (including the functions of TAC (A)) on 
targets. G
STW 6 (U) Support/conduct airborne operations in support of other strike forces. G
STW 7 (U) Conduct airborne operations in support of air strike operations. G
STW 8 (U) Provide for air operations in support of air strike operations. Y
STW 9 (U) Conduct attacks on targets using air launched armament. Y




MIW is a mission ideally suited for unmanned operations. A USC using onboard and offboard 
sensors (e.g. UUVs or sonobouys) and working with other USCs or manned ships can synthesize 
sonar data and tirelessly mine it for information. Using GPS and computerized pattern searching, 
the USC could optimize the area to be searched and cleared. Mine clearance is a dangerous but 
necessary task for the US Navy.  “Since the end of World War II, mines have seriously damaged 
or sunk four times more US Navy ships than all other means combined…The principal objective 
of the Navy’s Mine Countermeasures Vision is to decrease significantly the time required to 
conduct countermeasures operations, while ensuring low risk to naval and commercial vessels, 
and to remove the man from the minefield [PEO-LMW1,2009].” The design and deployment of 
an unmanned mine countermeasures ship fits well with these plans.  The USC can be sent into 
harm’s way to carry out mine countermeasure missions without fear of human casualties and, 
with the right planning, without constant remote operation or manned support. 
 
Figure 2. Mines have damaged or sunk four times more U.S. Navy ships than all other 
means of attack [PEO-LMW1,2009]. 
 
The casualties listed above include human lives as well as ships.  Figure 2 clearly indicates the 
need to pursue the safer unmanned alternatives to accomplish the unenviable and dangerous task 




A single submarine poses a threat that can have an adverse effect on our sea-based operations 
and US Navy sea control and power projection strategies.  “We must recognize that in today’s 
and tomorrow’s conflict scenarios, the submarine is an underwater terrorist, an ephemeral threat. 
It will force us to devote a great deal of resources and time, which we might not have…The near-
shore regional/littoral operating environment poses a very challenging ASW problem. We will 
need enhanced capabilities to root modern diesel, air-independent, and nuclear submarines out of 
the “mud” of noisy, contact-dense environments typical of the littoral...” [Morgan, 1998].   
 
ASW is another military mission where autonomous unmanned attributes will enhance the ability 
of the ship to perform the mission.  In the US Navy’s current environment, the number of SSN’s 
is expected to decrease.  Use of an unmanned ship with automated sensors to gather data and 
perform 24 hour surveillance is a viable approach for the task of essentially looking for needles 
in a haystack.  Conducting detailed searches can be monotonous and unrewarding for human 
operators and human vigilance will decrease as task time increases.  Additionally, the USC 
performing ASW will free up the SSN’s for more important missions.  Several USC’s working 
together could use organic or air dropped sonobouys and dipping sonar to create a multi-static 
sonar network to acquire and prosecute a contact. The US Navy is already shifting to more 
unmanned systems:  “…the networking of self-aware, autonomous sensor fields coupled with 
manned and unmanned kill vehicles will shift ASW from “platform-intensive” to “sensor-rich” 
operations. Sensors and networks will enable effective employment of weapons and platforms to 
a greater degree than ever before.” [ASW Taskforce, 2011] 
 
5. Interested Party Survey Results 
The project team identified interested parties based on who the team felt would influence design 
decisions for the US Navy, had expertise in the required technical areas, and would be reviewing 
the Capstone project when complete.  Some of these interested parties completed a survey 
ranking the importance of USC missions, while others provided significant guidance and 
resources throughout the research portion of the project.  Interested parties are listed below: 
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• Dr. Jeffrey Beach – NPS - Project Advisor 
• Professor Mike Green – NPS - Project Advisor 
• Dr. Bob Brizzolara – Office of Naval Research 
• Mr. Scott Littlefield – NSWC Carderock Division 
• Mr. Bill Glenney – Strategic Studies Group  
• Professor Chuck Calvano – NPS 
• Professor Fotis Papoulias – NPS 
• Dr. Jack Price – DDR&E/NSWC Carderock Division 
• Mr. Jeff Koleser – NAVSEA 05D  
• Mr. Matt Garner – NAVSEA 05D 
• Mr. Brian Wolfe – NAVSEA 05D  
• Mr. Tim Jones – NSWC Port Hueneme Division 
 
Interested parties were each given a survey explaining the project and were asked for a relative 
comparison of the 11 possible combatant missions as they applied to a USC. The purpose of this 
survey was to determine whether the team mission choices of ASW and MIW were also accepted 
by a wider community as appropriate for a USC. A score of “5” indicated that the person 
considered that mission extremely important as compared to the other mission, where as a score 
of “1” indicated that both missions were of equal importance.  A comment area helped explain 
the context for the person’s choice.  Below is an example question from the survey.  The full 
survey is given in Appendix B. 
Which Mission do you consider to be more important for the USC to support? 
Anti-Air Warfare                Strike Warfare  
                    5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 






Once the surveys were completed, scores were entered into a pairwise comparison matrix and 




Figure 3. Survey Results 
 
The top three ranked mission areas were Command, Control and Communications (C3); MIW; 
and ASW.  Two of the top three choices confirmed the team’s assessment that MIW and ASW 
were appropriate missions for a USC.  In addition, C3 was determined to be important for a USC 
to perform regardless of chosen mission area, since knowing what the USC is doing and 
communicating orders and intent are critical to USC acceptance and success.  Some sub-
operational capabilities from Mobility were adopted in order to ensure precise navigation, and 
some sub-operational capabilities from Anti-Air Warfare and Anti-Surface Ship Warfare were 





B. TOP LEVEL SYSTEM CONSTRAINTS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
 
Below is a list of top level constraints for the USC.  The list includes Operational Constraints and 
System Wide Constraints. 
 
1. Top Level Operational Constraints 
1.1. The USC should perform Anti-Submarine Warfare.  This constraint was chosen by 
soliciting stakeholder input and performing a needs analysis and confirming with 
stakeholder input.  ASW was determined to be a primary military mission for the USC 
Concept.   
 
1.2. The USC should perform Mine Warfare.  This constraint was chosen by soliciting 
stakeholder input and performing a needs analysis and confirming it with stakeholder 
input.  MIW was determined to be a primary military mission for the USC Concept. 
  
2. Top Level System Wide Constraints 
2.1. Speed - The USC should be able to travel out ahead of a Carrier Strike Group (CSG) or 
Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) to reach an assigned mission area.  While the ASW 
and MIW mission speeds are not a driving constraint, the speed of the Strike Group 
should be considered as a primary factor in the choice of maximum speed. It is estimated 
the USC should have a maximum transit speed of 30 knots at maximum displacement to 
be able to transit to a mission area. 
 
2.2. Range - The range of the USC should be sufficient for it to deploy to the theater of 
operation (e.g., traverse the Atlantic Ocean) without refueling, plus have additional fuel 
to reroute in case of emergency.  This range is estimated to be at least 4500 nautical 
miles  and is similar to other surface combatants. 
   
2.3. Operational Availability - Reliability for an unmanned autonomous ship is extremely 
important because there will be no on board maintenance to fix any systems that fail.  
With no continuous onboard maintenance and the complex autonomous nature of the 
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USC, the Operational Availability (AO) of the USC should be similar to the AO of 
manned  ships.  It is estimated the USC should have a total system AO of 0.95. 
 
2.4. Survivability - The survivability level as defined in, OPNAVINST 9070.1 
‘SURVIVABILITY POLICY FOR SURFACE SHIPS OF THE U.S.”, was chosen for 
the USC because it is the lowest level required for a combatant ship to sustain operations 
in the immediate area of an engaged strike group.  Because the USC will be a combatant 
and operate as part of strike group, Level II is estimated to be appropriate [OPNAV2, 
1988]. 
 
2.5. Operational Sea State - Continuous operations through Sea State 5 (Beaufort scale) are a 
constraint for other surface combatants and it was chosen as the operational limit for the 
USC as well.   While the ship is capable of operating at this sea state, there may be some 
mission capability degradation. The USC should operate through Sea State 5. 
 
2.6. Survivable Sea State - The USC should survive through Sea State 8 (Beaufort scale) 
Surviving through Sea State 8 is a constraint for other surface combatants, and it was 
chosen as the survival limit for the USC as well. 
 
2.7. Temperature Range - The USC will be used in similar environments as other surface 
combatants.  MIL-STD-1399 Section 302 [US Navy, 1988] defines an operating 
temperature range of -29°C to +50°C for those combatants.  Since the USC will be 
operating in similar environments it is estimated it will require a similar temperature 
range constraint of -29°C to +50°C.  
 
2.8. Maintenance Cycle - Manned surface combatants currently in the fleet have availabilities 
scheduled approximately every 25 months in accordance with OPNAVNOTE 4700 
[OPNAV3, 2010].  Because no Preventative Maintenance System (PMS) actions can be 
performed onboard the USC, the availability cycle needs to be shorter than that of 
manned ships.  It is estimated that 12 months will allowed the USC to participate with a 
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strike group for a sufficient time period before needing to cycle out for maintenance. The 
USC should operate for 12 months between major maintenance availabilities.   
 
2.9. Service Life - The USC should have a minimum service life of 25 years.  This 25 year 
service life constraint is based on the LCS, which is a comparable surface ship [CBO, 
2010].   
 
2.10. Underway Replenishment - The USC should receive fuel resupply while 
underway so that it can maintain its pace with a strike group, or continue a persistent 
presence in a desired operational area.   
 
2.11. Docking/Undocking - The USC should be able to dock and undock in the same 
manner and under the same conditions as other naval combatants.   
 
3. Key Assumptions 
a) The necessary rules of law, operating rules, and operating procedures are developed 
to allow for an unmanned, autonomous ship capable of firing weapons. 
 
b) Technology for Fleet Class USV is mature enough to be applied to USC concept for 
target recognition, autonomous navigation, and weapons release [PEO- LMW2, 
2007]. 
 
c) The USC should have an Initial Operating Capability (IOC) of 2020.  The year 2020 
was also chosen to limit the technologies that were considered for the USC concept.  
The intent is to leverages current technologies that may be able to be modified for 
fully autonomous operation. 
 
d) The USC is a capital asset that should be capable of performing extremely dangerous 
missions.  The technologies onboard will be state of the art, extremely capable, and 
valuable.  The USC will be designed to withstand damage, control the damage and 
return to a safe operating area for assessment and repair.  The ship is not considered 
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expendable at this time; however future detailed tradeoffs may result in an 
expendable concept. 
e) The USC can operate as part of a battle group or strike force.  The USC will have the 
alternate capability for remote control by a human for missions that are not possible 
or allowed to be done autonomously, such as use of lethal force against a manned 
craft.  Human control can be assumed from a manned surface combatant or from 
remote station, with protocol for transfer of control in place. 
f) The USC can operate alone without support for up to 60 days. 
C. LOWER LEVEL OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS 
The following list of operational constraints was derived from the top level constraints listed 
above.  The list includes lower level constraints for the ASW and MIW missions as well as those 
for the USC ship system. The USC should be capable of supporting the following functions and 
sub-functions that are extracted from OPNAVINST 3501.2K [OPNAV1]: 
 
1. Detect, localize, classify, identify, and track subsurface contacts 
1.1. Conduct area searches for subsurface contacts 
1.2. Provide capability to collect, store, retrieve, and process ASW contact data 
2.  Destroy or neutralize submarines with anti-submarine armaments 
2.1. Engage submarines 
2.2. Perform assessment of neutralization attempt 
3. Disengage, evade, avoid, and deceive submarines 
4. Detect, localize, and identify mines 
4.1.  Conduct Route Survey Operations by SMCM ships/craft 
4.2.  Provide collect, store, retrieve, & process MIW contact data capability 
5. Destroy or neutralize mines 
5.1. Directly engage mines 
5.2. Perform area neutralization of mines 
5.3. Perform assessment of neutralization attempt 
6.   Navigate precisely in MCM environment 
7.   Provide own unit’s command and control functions 
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7.1. Process orders into executable actions 
7.2. Recognizes situations based on preset conditions 
7.3. Respond to situations by changing actions  
8.   Provide communication for own unit 
8.1. Receive and interpret orders from command 
8.2. Send reports to command 
8.3. Communicate and interact logistics support vessel/facility 
9. Receive and relay naval communications 
10. Implement Operations Security (OPSEC) measures and conduct military deception actions 
11. Maintain a precise global navigation system 
12. Maneuver in formation 
13. Perform anti-air self-defense 
13.1. Detect, identify, and track air targets 
13.1.1. Provide capability to collect, store, retrieve, and process air contact data 
13.2. Destroy or neutralize airborne threats 
13.2.1. Engage airborne threats 
13.2.2. Perform assessment of neutralization attempt 
13.3. Disengage, evade, and avoid air attack 
14. Perform anti-surface self-defense 
14.1. Detect, identify, and track surface targets 
14.1.1. Provide capability to collect, store, retrieve, & process surface contact data 
14.2. Engage surface threats 
14.2.1. Engage airborne threats 
14.2.2. Perform assessment of neutralization attempt 
14.3. Disengage, evade, and avoid surface attack 
15. Conduct electronic warfare 
16. Assess self-health/damage 
17. Control or minimize damage 
18. Reconfigure systems to minimize performance reduction due to damage 
19. Assess damage control measure success 
20. Steam to designed capability and in the most fuel efficient manner 
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D. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report of February 2010 stated that there are 
growing threats from a number of states that have acquired sophisticated anti-ship cruise 
missiles, quiet submarines, and advanced mines that threaten naval operations.  The Navy needs 
to exploit advantages in subsurface operations by developing unmanned underwater vehicles 
capable of a wide range of tasks.  The capability to maintain Operating Areas clear of submarine-
delivered and floating mines remains crucial.   
 
The report also stated that confronting sophisticated anti-access challenges and threats posed by 
nuclear-armed regional adversaries presents a difficult problem.  In addition, the globalization of 
the world’s chemical industry, coupled with scientific breakthroughs, increases the possibility of 
non-traditional chemical agents being used against the U.S. and allied forces.   
 
Faced with these threats, it is highly desirable to develop a means of threat response that limits 
human exposure such as using unmanned assets.  Furthermore, new approaches for projecting 
power must be developed to meet these threats while considering the current budget constrained 
environment and push towards minimization of personnel as one way of reducing costs.  The 
scale and duration of operations overseas are placing a strain on service members and 
Department of Defense (DoD)’s ability to reset and reconstitute its All-Volunteer Force. 
 
1. Users and Other Stakeholders 
Program Executive Office (PEO) Ships would be the responsible acquisition agent for the USC, 
and would ensure that there is adequate testing, logistics support, and training for the successful 
operation, maintenance, replenishment, organic maintenance, and shore based or strike group 
based control and monitoring of the USC. 
The USC would be part of the Atlantic (LANT) Fleet or Pacific (PAC) Fleet and commanded by 




The following policy documents apply:  
• Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010 
• Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) Strategic Business Plan, 2009-2013 
 
The USC would comply with all Federal Codes of Regulations, environmental, emissions, safety 
and navigational regulations in all US ports and abroad, including but not limited to: 
• Article III of the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at 
Sea (COLREGS), 1972 (72 COLREGS) 
• Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (Public Law 92-532, October 23, 
1972) 
• Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (APPS), January 2009 (MARPOL Annex VI) 
• International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974 
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3. Operations and Support Description 
Operational Description 
 
Figure 4. Unmanned Surface Combatant – OV-1 
 
The Operational View-1, Figure 4 above, shows the USC in a notional operational area.  The 
USC would have direct control and communication with potential unmanned auxiliary units that 
could be launched from the USC or other strike group members.   
The USC would have tactical communication with the rest of the strike group and shore 
command through Satellite Communications (SATCOM).  Shore command or a command ship 
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would take direct control of the USC only when necessary.  Otherwise, shore command will only 
be monitoring the USC or giving orders for the USC to carry out. 
The USC should expect to encounter both primitive and advanced threats.  Primitive threats 
include mines and pirate artillery.   Advanced threats include aircraft and attack submarines.  
Missions 
The USC initial concept would be a two mission autonomous combatant that will be deployed in 
similar situations as other surface combatants.  It will be able to act as part of a strike group or 
individually.  The USC would have complete situational awareness, be able to transfer data and 
information to and from other assets, and perform some command and control functions.  
 
The first flight of the USC would complement the integrated Joint warfighting force by gaining 
initial entry, ensuring access and defeating enemy anti-access and / or area denial strategies in 
the areas of MIW and ASW.  The majority of the missions is expected to be in littoral waters and 
are well suited for an autonomous USC concept due to the high risk of damage from mines, and 
persistence necessary for ASW missions. 
 
The USC would perform mine hunting and mine sweeping functions.  Using an unmanned ship 
removes the potential for loss of life during mine hunting and mine sweeping operations.  In 
order to perform the mine warfare mission, the USC would have state-of-the-art sensors with 
data analysis and processing capabilities.  The USC would have precise navigation and a high 
level of maneuverability.   Lastly, the USC would engage potential mines with an effective mine 
neutralization system and assess the effect of those measures. 
 
The USC would perform hold at risk, protected passage and maritime shield functions.  By using 
an unmanned ship to perform ASW functions, a persistent naval presence can be maintained 
longer and possibly at a higher vigilance than a manned ship.  In order to perform the anti 
submarine warfare mission, the USC would have state-of-the-art sensors and data analysis and 
processing capabilities.  The USC would track, follow, engage, and evade a subsurface contact.  
If the contact is engaged, the USC would assess the success of the neutralization attempt.   
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Employment Modes   
The following modes of operation would apply: 
Transit:  The USC would be able to navigate to the Operating Area (OPAREA) with or without 
escort, autonomously, with minimal oversight by shore base or manned ship based monitoring 
and control station. 
Peacetime Mission:  The USC would be involved in training missions in concert with Allied 
Forces.  Navigation would be in autonomous mode with orders to be provided by the Theater 
Commander, and control of USC weapons potentially from other manned assets.   
Wartime Mission:  The USC would be able to perform ASW and MIW missions in hostile 
waters.  The USC would carry out these missions autonomously, with remote settings/orders and 
some control by manned ship based control and monitoring by Theater Command and Control. 
Maintenance:  The USC’s Self-defense would be able to be disabled remotely for boarding by 
maintenance personnel. 
 
Scheduling and Operations Planning   
The USC is envisioned to be available to support fleet missions on a continuous basis, with 
fueling and operational maintenance conducted by a support ship monthly when in theater, and 
availabilities every two years for hull maintenance in US or Allied port. 
Operating Environment 
The following is the projected operational environment as stated in Chief of Naval Operations 
Instruction (OPNAVINST) C3501.2K: 
• At sea in war time. 
• Capable of performing all offensive and defensive functions simultaneously while in 
Readiness Condition I (i.e., Defense Readiness Condition (DEFCON) 1, War is 
imminent). 
• Capable of performing other functions which are not required to be accomplished 
simultaneously. 
• Continuous Readiness Condition III (i.e., DEFCON 3, increase in force readiness above 
that required for normal readiness) at sea. 
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Geographic Areas  
The USC should be able to operate on any navigable ocean/sea in the world, including the 
Margin Ice Zone (MIZ), up to 50% ice concentration, including but not limited to the Indian and 
Pacific Ocean coastal areas. 
Environmental Conditions  
The USC should be fully operable under all but the most extreme environmental conditions.  At a 
minimum the USC should be operable in the same environmental conditions as other surface 
combatants.   
 
Threats and Hazards 
The USC is likely to encounter the following hazards:   
• Difficult navigation (high traffic areas, rocky coasts) 
• Hostile environment (hurricanes, high seas, corrosive salt) 
• Marine mammals 
The following threats are expected: 
• Hostile forces with surface, air and underwater weapons 
• Hostile intrusion and capture 
• Hostile electronic warfare and ISR 
• Hostile intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
Interoperability with Other Elements  
The USC should be interoperable with other fleet assets and other USCs.  Because the USC will 
be unmanned, interoperability is a major consideration in the concept formulation.  
Communication between the autonomous ship and remote control stations need to be 
comprehensive, and remote control and monitoring functions should be highly reliable.  
Interoperability needs to be considered for operations that are currently manned such as fueling 
at sea, docking, and parts ordering, and may impact more than the USC design.  
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Mission Support Description 
Primary fuel replenishment would be provided by support ships during transit to and from areas 
of operation.  The USC would also be capable of being refueled while in port for maintenance. 
All routine or specific maintenance would be conducted by support ship or command ship 
personnel.  Training would need to be provided, as well as support and repair parts, either 
onboard the support ship or onboard the USC.  Onboard maintenance would be limited because 
the configuration would leverage the design trade space that an unmanned ship affords.  The 
concept would minimize human access points to the ship components while underway.   
The USC would monitor and diagnose its failed parts and provide a report to home base or the 
support ship, and would be able to order replacement parts or modules.  Support ship, command 
ship and home base would have the ability to disable the USC’s self-defense mechanisms and 
verify disarmament prior to boarding.  The USC concept would strive toward redundant systems 
and modular parts which can be easily replaced at the organizational level. Some systems, such 
as damage control, machinery, C3, and navigation, should be designed with high reliability.  At a 
minimum, the USC should be designed to stay afloat after a single hit, communicate with the 
home base, and navigate back to port if mobile. 
The maintenance cycle would consist of 12 months of operational availability followed by 
maintenance availability.  The length and scope of the availability would vary depending on the 
status of the USC.  Additionally, low level interim maintenance would be performed on the USC 
while underway.  All maintenance would be scheduled and coordinated by the USC’s home base.   
 
E. USC FUNCTIONS 
Through a review of the needs analysis, system requirements, and CONOPS the project team 
identified the following functions for the USC concept.  The functions include the military 
missions of ASW and MIW that were identified in the needs analysis as well as the general ship 
functions that must be performed to support the USC.   
 
Military Mission Functions 
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1. Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) 
2. Mine Warfare (MIW) 
 
General Ship Functions 
3. Command, Control and Communication (C3) 
4. Navigation 
5. Self defense 
6. Damage control 
7. Machinery 
 
Figure 5. C shows the functions displayed in the CORE Model. The CORE software is a model 
based system engineering tool used to organize and document requirements, functions, inputs 
and outputs while providing traceability of the information back to its source. 
 
Figure 5. CORE Model High Level Functions for USC 
 
These high level functions were further decomposed into twenty three lower level functions.  An 
example of this functional decomposition for the two military mission functions is shown in 












F. FUNCTIONAL ALLOCATION 
After the seven high level functions of the USC were determined, the lower level operational 
requirements were allocated to each functional area.  A review of the needs analysis, system 
requirements, CONOPS and OPNAVINST 3501.2K identified the functions for the USC concept 
and decomposed them to a lower level. The allocation is shown below and was tracked using the 
CORE model.  
 
Functional Requirements 
1.1. Perform ASW 
1.1.1.  Detect, localize, classify, identify, and track subsurface contacts 
1.1.1.1. Conduct area searches for subsurface contacts 
1.1.1.2. Provide capability to collect, store, retrieve, and process ASW contact data 
1.1.2.  Destroy or neutralize submarines with anti-submarine armaments 
1.1.2.1. Engage submarines 
1.1.2.2. Perform assessment of neutralization attempt 
1.1.3. Disengage, evade, avoid, and deceive submarines 
1.2. Perform MIW 
1.2.1. Detect, localize, and identify mines 
1.2.1.1.  Conduct Route Survey Operations by Surface Mine Countermeasures 
(SMCM) ships/craft 
1.2.1.2.  Provide collect, store, retrieve, & process MIW contact data capability 
1.2.2. Destroy or neutralize mines 
1.2.2.1. Directly engage mines 
1.2.2.2. Perform area neutralization of mines 
1.2.2.3. Perform assessment of neutralization attempt 
1.2.3.   Navigate precisely in a Mine Countermeasures (MCM) environment 
1.3. Perform C3 
1.3.1.   Provide own unit’s command and control functions 
1.3.1.1. Process orders into executable actions 
1.3.1.2. Recognizes situations based on preset conditions 
1.3.1.3. Respond to situations by changing actions  
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1.3.2.   Provide communication for own unit 
1.3.2.1. Receive and interpret orders from command 
1.3.2.2. Send reports to command 
1.3.2.3. Communicate and interact logistics support ship/facility 
1.3.3.   Receive and relay naval communications 
1.3.4.   Implement OPSEC measures and conduct military deception actions 
1.4. Perform navigation 
1.4.1.  Maintain a precise global navigation system 
1.4.2.  Maneuver in formation 
1.5. Perform self defense 
1.5.1. Perform anti-air defense 
1.5.1.1. Detect, identify, and track air targets 
1.5.1.1.1. Provide capability to collect, store, retrieve, and process air contact 
data 
1.5.1.2. Destroy or neutralize airborne threats 
1.5.1.2.1. Engage airborne threats 
1.5.1.2.2. Perform assessment of neutralization attempt 
1.5.1.3. Disengage, evade, and avoid air attack 
1.5.2. Perform anti-surface defense 
1.5.2.1. Detect, identify, and track surface targets 
1.5.2.1.1. Provide capability to collect, store, retrieve, & process surface 
contact data 
1.5.2.2. Engage surface threats 
1.5.2.2.1. Engage airborne threats 
1.5.2.2.2. Perform assessment of neutralization attempt 
1.5.2.3. Disengage, evade, and avoid surface attack 
1.5.3. Conduct electronic warfare 
1.5.4. Perform pierside self defense 
1.6. Prevent and control damage 
1.6.1. Assess self health and damage 
1.6.2. Control or minimize damage 
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1.6.3. Reconfigure systems to minimize performance reduction due to damage 
1.6.4. Assess damage control measure success 
1.7. Perform machinery functions 
1.7.1. Steam to designed capability and in the most fuel efficient manner 
 
G. SYSTEM OPERATIONAL SCENARIOS 
The following operational scenarios were designed in order to determine which USC actions 
would stress the autonomous systems of the ship.  Three scenarios were developed, one for each 
mission area, and one for non-normal operations such as self defense.  Steps in the scenarios that 
were especially stressing to an unmanned ship (i.e., capabilities that are undeveloped for 
autonomous completion) are noted with **.  These scenarios and stressing steps were used to 
guide the USC concept discussion. 
1. Scenario 1 - Mine Scenario 
A  USC is navigating in formation with the Strike Group (SG).  The USC sprints ahead to the 
littoral area and performs mine search and clearance.  The USC detects and identifies mine like 
objects. The USC neutralizes the mine like objects. Once the area is clear the USC reports the 
results to the area command, and rejoins the SG.  Once the USC has rejoined the SG, the USC 
determines it requires refueling.  The USC and the refueling ship perform this operation after 
both dropping slightly behind the SG.  Once refueling is complete, the USC rejoins the SG. 
Mine neutralization in both mine hunting and mine sweeping is similar.  Mine hunting was used 
in this scenario because more complex sensors are required and the sensor processing is more 
stressing to a USC. 
1. USC navigates in formation with SG** 
2. USC receives orders to perform mine search and clearance in littoral area in SG path 
3. USC sprints ahead of SG to assigned littoral Op area  
4. USC uses NAV and sensor data to calculate Op area for search and clearance** 
5. USC performs mine search/threat detection using MIW module package 
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6. USC processes sensor data onboard in order to identify mines**  
7. USC neutralizes mine threats using MIW module package** 
8. USC scans area to verify threat neutralization 
9. USC reports “all clear” for OPAREA. 
10. USC continues navigation, rejoins SG 
11. USC reaches low fuel level trigger and requests refueling 
12. Replenishment oiler responds affirmatively to USC 
13. USC initiates refueling routine, drops behind SG 
14. USC recognizes and rendezvous with replenishment oiler and enters refueling mode** 
15. USC disarms self defense measures as necessary for refueling 
16. USC monitors refueling 
17. Refueling is complete, replenishment oiler severs connections, navigates away 
18. USC restores self defense measures and rejoins the SG 
2. Scenario 2 – Submarine Scenario 
A USC is navigating with a SG.  During transit, the USC is performing protected passage 
operations.  Once the strike group arrives at the operating area the USC performs maritime shield 
operations.  After the maritime shield operation is complete, and the SG begins to navigate away 
from the Op area, the USC requests routine maintenance, and the request is granted.  The USC 
navigates to the maintenance area, and receives maintenance.  Once the maintenance is complete, 
the USC rejoins the SG. 
Hold at risk operations and maritime shield operations are similar. Maritime shield operations 
were chosen because they are more complex than hold at risk operations. 
 
1. USC navigates with SG 
2. USC receives orders to perform protected passage for SG 
3. USC initiates protected passage routine 
4. USC navigates to area front of the SG 
5. USC uses ASW package to monitor for submarines** 
6. USC processes data and sends report to SG 
7. USC ends protected passage routine when SG reaches target destination 
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8. A pre-set trigger is tripped or remote signal is received by the USC 
9. USC initiates maritime shield routine 
10. USC increases onboard submarine sensing 
11. USC determines placement of sensor field for submarine detection 
12. USC navigates to calculated locations and places sensors 
13. USC monitors sensors for contacts 
14. USC detects, localizes, and identifies contact using ASW module** 
15. USC determines threat level of contact** 
16. USC navigates to threat 
17. USC engages threat using ASW module** 
18. USC verifies threat neutralization 
19. USC continues to monitor sensors 
20. A pre-set condition is tripped or remote signal is received by the USC 
21. USC ends maritime shield routine. 
22. USC resumes navigation with SG 
23. USC reaches maintenance trigger, generates report, and requests maintenance** 
24. USC receives communications that maintenance request is granted 
25. USC navigates to maintenance site and moors for maintenance, enters maintenance mode 
26. USC disarms self defense measures as necessary for maintenance 
27. USC will continue to monitor performance during/after maintenance to ensure proper 
maintenance is completed, tested, and reported 




3. Scenario 3 – USC Attacked and Damage Control Response 
 
A USC is navigating alone to a rendezvous with a CSG.  During transit, the USC encounters 
multiple small crafts.  The USC attempts to avoid the small crafts and warn them to exit the area.  
The crafts attack the USC and causes damage.  The USC neutralizes the small craft and performs 
damage control.  The USC sends an incident report and navigates to home base. 
 
1. USC is navigating alone and heading to rendezvous with CSG 
2. USC senses small crafts heading towards USC 
3. USC attempts to identify small crafts, concurrently sends info to command 
4. USC determines that small crafts are not friendly by lack of  Identification, Friend or Foe 
(IFF) personal identifier and intercept course 
5. USC changes course to avoid encounter** 
6. Small crafts change course to intercept 
7. USC issues warning to small crafts 
8. USC shoots warning shot off the bow of one of the small crafts** 
9. Small crafts respond with firing missiles 
10. USC defends self with maneuvering and attempted shooting down of small missiles 
11. USC determines lethal force is acceptable** 
12. USC engages attacking small crafts 
13. USC assesses neutralization of small crafts 
14. One missile from small crafts impacts USC, damage to port side auxiliary machinery space 
15. USC assesses damage from missile impact** 
16. USC engages damage control measures 
17. USC reconfigures to minimize damage impact on ship systems** 
18. USC assesses effectiveness of damage control measures, condition of equipment, once 
damage control is complete 
19. USC completes an incident report and transmits to command 
20. USC receives orders to return to home base for repairs 
21. USC navigates to home base 
22. USC docks at home base 
 59 
23. USC receives maintenance 
**Stressing situation for USC.  These are steps where the autonomous capabilities will be tested 
as people are normally involved during these steps. 
H. SUMMARY 
The problem definition phase investigated the need for an autonomous USC and selected ASW 
and MIW as the military missions for the USC to perform.  This section also developed 
constraints, a CONOPS, and functions for the system.  The constraints were then allocated to the 
functions.  Three operational scenarios (ASW, MIW, and self defense / damage control) were 
developed to identify actions that would stress an autonomous USC.   
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III. CONCEPT DISCUSSION 
This section of the report discusses several areas of consideration for an autonomous USC 
concept. Relevant technologies for each functional area are addressed.  Additionally, some top 
level physical architecture, design philosophy, and integration considerations are presented.  
Lastly, cost and risk considerations for USC construction and implementation are presented.  The 
considerations in this section are presented as items to note in the future when a USC design 
occurs.  
A. Relevant Technologies 
a) USC Central Control Architecture 
A USC should be an unmanned autonomous vessel that will be able to perform functions of all 
the elements of the Command, Control, And Communications Information, Surveillance, And 
Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems.  The C4 system should be comprised of the Command, 
Control, and Communication systems and by definition should include the facilities, equipment, 
communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a commander for planning, directing, 
and controlling operations pursuant to the missions assigned [DOD, 2011].   Since there will be 
no personnel or commander onboard a USC, C4 functions involving them will be performed as 
part of the autonomous, Artificial Intelligence (AI) function of the USC. 
 
The ability of a USC to perform Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) functions 
autonomously will be integral to achieving effective execution of its assigned missions. 
According to a study done on USC capabilities:  
 
“Intelligence is characterized as the collection, correlation, processing, and exploitation 
of data from various intelligence sources. Surveillance and reconnaissance are defined as 
the observation of airborne, surface based, or subsurface objects through visual, 
photographic, electromagnetic, or acoustic means. ISR will include the detection and 
monitoring of threat resources and their activities, as well as securing data concerning the 
meteorological, hydrographic or geographic characteristics of areas of operation. 
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Intelligence operations can rely on clandestine means to search for and detect emissions; 
and to identify, localize and characterize their sources. Data will be exploited and 
intelligence derived through off-board processing systems in distributed collaboration 
with other intelligence systems and users. 
 
Surveillance and reconnaissance operations will use passive acoustic and electromagnetic 
sensors to collect data across a broad frequency spectrum. Signal processing of these 
emissions will provide the means for selecting, geo-locating, and tracking targets/objects 
of interest. The Unmanned Naval Surface Combatant (UNSC) will depend on a variety of 
sensors in this process, including sensors on UNSC-deployable unmanned 
vehicles.”[Brady, 2004] 
 
Figure 7 presents a high level architecture of the control functions that a USC should perform.  
This architecture is based on the DDG 1000 Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE) 
[Anon17, 2006]. The Central Control Computing Center (4C) should perform many of the 
Command and Control (C2) functions and control the Ship Control functions, the Mission 
Systems Control functions, the Weapons Control functions, the External Communications 





Figure 7. Potential USC Central Control Architecture 
 
Central Control Computing Center 
The Central Control Computing Center (4C) for a USC is the centralized processing unit for all 
actions the ship performs.  In order to seamlessly accomplish required missions as well as keep 
the ship functioning for extended periods of time without human intervention, a high level of 
operational complexity will need to be developed and integrated into the 4C software.  The 
development and testing of this enabling technology will be the most challenging aspect of 
achieving an actual USC design.  
 
4C leverages a modern open system architecture and that architecture provides a scalable 
platform for cost-efficient delivery of new mission capability.  In order to implement this 
architecture, 4C is divided into the following control and monitoring modules: 
• Ship Control 
• Mission Systems Control 
• Weapons Control 
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• External Communications Control 
• External Sensors Control 
 
Ship Control 
A USC Ship Control module will control and monitor all systems associated with Navigation, 
the Machinery Plant, Damage Control, and Internal Ship Sensors.  
 
The Machinery Plant Control system will monitor, start, stop, and reconfigure all aspects 
associated with the propulsion plant, the electric plant and various other auxiliary machinery and 
systems.  
 
The Bridge and Navigation system will provide the ability to receive and execute ship 
maneuvering actions.  The system will perform all functions currently executed by the bridge 
crew on a manned combatant by employing a variety of sensors including cameras, navigation 
radar, Light Detection And Ranging (LIDAR), Global Positioning System (GPS), AIS, and 
environmental sensors (including but not limited to wind speed and direction, temperature, and 
weather radar). 
 
Mission Systems Control 
A USC Mission Systems Control module will be needed in order to control the command 
activity of the various MIW and ASW systems (both for shipboard sensors and deployed 
sensors/systems, if appropriate). The Mission Systems Control system will need to interface with 
the 4C system to provide the precise maneuvering required for any launch and recovery 
operations for MIW and ASW sensors, if so incorporated. Position, heading, depth, and speed of 
any offboard sensor would need to be strictly controlled to successfully conduct unmanned 
launch and recovery operations. A mine hunting towed body would need to be deployed via 
commands from this module, and any required detection/classification information would need 
to be downloaded to the module for processing and further assignment/upload to the mine 




The USC will need to operate as part of a SG, or autonomously where it may be required to act 
defensively or offensively.  The USC should have the ability to defend itself against above-
surface, surface, and below-surface threats by using evasion, seduction, or hard-kill systems.  
This self-defense capability is needed because a fully capable USC is likely to be a costly asset, 
and it will often be operating without other forces which could normally provide defense.  
Offensive capabilities should include the ability to engage the same threats mentioned above.  
While no unit commander would be onboard the USC, at some point in the mission planning, 
implicit or explicit permission may need to be given to fire weapons.  It is assumed that any 
weapons fire would have concurrence of the command and control authority located off-board.  
This authority may either be given as part of the mission plan that the USC is executing or part 
of the real-time commander’s permission to fire. The move to fully autonomous lethal weapon 
employment would constitute a major change in naval policy, doctrine, or tradition, and would 
ultimately have to be addressed by high Department of the Navy (DON) and DoD commanders. 
 
External Communication Control 
This system is intended to allow a USC to transmit and receive information.  Most of the 
communications would be used to perform the following: 
• Receive Control Orders                                                     
• Receive material status traffic inquiries 
• Receive operational status inquiries  
• Receive local, automated ISR data 
• Transmit/Receive tactical SA data (Link-11, Link-16) 
• Transmit ship operational status 
• Transmit radar, sonar, and EO/IR sensor data 
• Transmit ship material status 
• Perform navigation operations 
• Control off board vehicles (e.g., other UV’s) 
 
External Sensor Control (ISR function) 
The sensor suite should include onboard and offboard sensors and a data processing center that 
detects, classifies, and characterizes all objects and RF emissions within sensor range.  The 
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sensors should monitor sub-surface, surface and above surface activity.  Any type of unmanned 
vehicle networked with the USC would extend the range of the ship’s sensors beyond line of 
sight.   
 
Information from these sensors would be used to collect, process, and exploit data to enable the 
USC to accomplish its assigned missions.  The sensors should include sonars capable of 
operating in both deep water and littoral water for subsurface threat detection as well as EO/IR 
imaging sensors for surface and above-surface threat detection.   
 
A USC should be capable of performing autonomous ASW missions (tracking submarines) and 
MIW missions (mine hunting and mine clearing operations) in order to be effective.  These two 
missions would require at least two distinct sonars.  Mine hunting would require a high 
frequency sonar that provides high resolution for object identification. The ASW mission could 
use mid or low frequency sonar for detection of submarines.   These could be towed, hull 
mounted or retractable over the side.  
 
Significant programming would be required to enable a near term USC to use an autonomous 
external sensor suite.  An additional consideration is the magnitude of data that would be 
collected, analyzed, sent and received by the USC.  Keeping the data transmissions within 
bandwidth limits would require data analysis and reduction onboard the USC. 
 
b) Anti-Submarine Warfare 
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) is one of two missions that was chosen as appropriate for a 
USC. Submarines, especially quiet diesel submarines, are a current and growing threat to US 
Naval Forces.  Currently over 40 countries operate submarines [Anon, 2011], predominately 
diesel-electric, which are relatively cheap, quiet when running on battery power, and operate in 
the littorals. In October 2006 a Chinese 160ft Song Class diesel-electric attack submarine 
surfaced within five miles of the US aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk (CV 63) in the Pacific Ocean 
near Okinawa Japan. [Anon, 2011].   This incident is one reminder of why ASW is a critical 
mission area for the US Navy in general, and a notional USC in particular. 
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The purpose of ASW is to detect, localize, classify, track and engage subsurface targets. An 
effective ASW system must perform all of these tasks.  In order to accomplish this it will require 
a group of components working together to resolve the ambiguities of underwater contacts. 
There is no single commercial system that performs all of these activities and no navy systems 
which perform all these activities autonomously. The complete spectrum of activities can be 
handled by a single vessel under the right conditions but usually is handled by several platforms 
working together.  For instance, a US Navy surface combatant can deploy a towed array to detect 
a hostile underwater contact, a helicopter can subsequently be deployed using a dipping sonar, 
Magnetic Anomaly Detector (MAD), or an air-launched-sonobuoy to confirm and localize the 
contact, and a P-3 ASW aircraft can be brought to use its ASW sensor suite to obtain bearing and 
heading information. All the data obtained can then be assembled, synthesized, and analyzed; 
based on prevailing circumstances a decision is made as to which platform and what weapons are 
used to neutralize the contact.  
 
Implementing an autonomous system requires synthesizing all the data generated by the various 
onboard and offboard sensors into a decision making software system (e.g. artificial intelligence) 
that would inform future ASW actions. The complexities of the underlying systems, the amount 
of data, and the data rate of the sensors all ensure that automating an ASW system would require 
a significant software development program. In addition, before allowing an unmanned vehicle 
to fire lethal weapons, the targeting and weapons release authority procedures must be 
developed, tested, approved, and certified and rules of engagement developed. These 
components will also interface with navigation, self defense and mine warfare. The major 
components required for an ASW system are described below. Details of these component 
technologies are in APPENDIX E – ASW TECHNOLOGIES. 
 
Visual Detection 
Visual detection by a human aboard a surface ship is the oldest detection technique and remains 
a viable option for submarine detection. Visual detection usually results from a submarine 
surfacing, or coming to periscope depth where the periscope or periscope wake is visible. 
However, under the right conditions, a submarine at shallow depth can be tracked even at night 
by the blue green glow of bioluminescence in its wake, light emitted from certain species of 
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dinoflagellate plankton when disturbed by a moving vessel. Submarines can also be detected by 
aircraft when the periscope or periscope wake, called a scar, is visible on the surface. Also, when 
submarines are submerged against a light colored bottom surface and are in clear water, they can 
be spotted by aircraft, even those not engaged in ASW. Therefore, an electro-optical, Forward 
Looking InfraRed (FLIR) or other system which can recognize these visual cues could be used 
on a USC in place of a human presence.  
 
Hull Mounted Sonar 
A USC performing ASW operations will require a hull mounted sonar with both active and 
passive capability in order to detect, localize, classify and track subsurface contacts. The 
preferred ASW system should utilize Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) components and open 
architecture to the maximum extent possible. This would avoid locking the USC into a 
proprietary architecture that limits the ability to incorporate advances and increased computing 
power. A good example of this approach is the AN/BQQ-10 Advanced Rapid COTS Insertion 
(ARCI) combat system used on SSN submarines. It is able to receive more frequent scheduled 
updates to system capabilities as well as quick delivery of advanced functions to the fleet at a 
reduced cost. 
 
A modular sonar system would also allow for rapid upgrades and customization of the ship for 
specific missions. Since a USC is unmanned by definition, critical systems must demonstrate an 
extremely high reliability, which infers utilization of simple, redundant, and mature technologies.  
 
Towed Array 
A towed array can be both active and passive and is used to detect, localize, classify, and track 
submarines. There are two types of towed arrays: a linear array that is towed behind a ship at a 
single fixed depth related to the buoyancy of the array, and a variable depth sonar that can be 
controlled such that it can be towed at various selected depths. In the ocean the main factor 
affecting sonar performance is temperature, which varies with depth.  This temperature change 
called the thermocline refers to the water layer that divides the warm surface water and the cold 
deep waters. A sound originating from one side of the thermocline tends to remain on that side 
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since it is reflected off the boundary layer.  A very loud noise like active sonar, firing weapons, 
explosions etc. can cross the boundary layer.  Seabed terrain and composition, pressure, salinity, 
and water turbulence can also affect sound propagation. A towed array would allow a USC to 
listen below the thermocline while the hull mounted array would listen above it.  
 
Linear Array 
A linear array is towed well behind the ship which provides an opportunity to get beyond ship 
noise and listen more effectively. However, since most arrays have no directivity built in, it is 
difficult to distinguish where sounds are coming from (i.e., left or right).  
 
Variable Depth Sonar  
To overcome the difficulty of hunting or listening for submarines that take advantage of hiding 
in thermoclines, a variable depth sonar (VDS) can be used. A VDS is designed for active or 
passive operation. It is designed to detect, classify, and localize submarines at safe stand-off 
distances. The transducer array, digital transceiver and various sensors are integrated into a 
towed body which transmits data to the ship for processing. Most VDS’ are designed for deep 
ocean use but newer models are available with higher frequencies better suited to littoral uses. 
 
Sonobuoys 
A sonobuoy is another device used in conjunction with towed arrays to detect, localize, classify, 
and track a submarine. A sonobuoy is a relatively small expendable sonar system that can be 
dropped or ejected from aircraft or ships. Upon entering the water, the sonobuoy activates, 
performs its function and then the device scuttles itself. The sonobuoys provide a deployable 
acoustic signal source and they collect underwater signals of interest. These received signals are 
transmitted to monitoring unit(s) that process the signal for analysis, classification of target, and 
recording for replay and post event analysis. Sonobuoys allow for short and long range detection 
of surface ships and submarines. There are three categories of sonobuoys: active, passive and 
special purpose. Sonobuoys are expendable devices and due to their low cost and ease of 
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deployment, all existing sonobuoy types could be used by a USC based on mission requirements. 
Minimal development would be needed to autonomously eject these devices from the ship. 
 
c) Mine Warfare 
Mine Warfare was the second military mission chosen to be appropriate for the USC.  Mines are 
a serious threat to US Naval Forces, and in light of current world enemies they are particularly 
concerning because they are relatively cheap to field and can cause severe damage. 
 
Before the advent of sonars and other advanced technologies, explosive ordnance teams were the 
only method of searching out and defusing or detonating mines.  This was a very time 
consuming and dangerous operation.  Marine mammals were eventually trained to perform 
missions faster and with less harm to humans.  While both of these methods are still used in 
certain cases, technology has allowed mine operations to go much faster without as much danger 
to people. 
 
Mine warfare today ideally consists of mine hunting (detect, classify, and identify mines) 
coupled with mine neutralization.  A mine hunter will generally be launched from a vessel and 
towed by an Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) or towed behind a helicopter.  Sonars on the 
mine hunter will detect the mine and then an onboard processor (or a processor on the towing 
platform depending on chosen towing system) will classify and identify the mine.  At that point, 
the mine hunter will be recovered and a neutralizer pod will be deployed and towed by a 
helicopter. The neutralizers are launched from the pod and guided by a human to the mines, at 
which point they are neutralized.  When hunting is not feasible (i.e., the terrain is too rocky or 
littered with debris), a mine sweeper will be towed by a helicopter or USV, depending on the 
system, and will generally use acoustic influence to neutralize the mines.  Besides being a very 
important mission capability area, mine warfare is apt for integration with a USC since it takes 
people directly out of harm’s way and technologies are now maturing which are already partially 
autonomous. 
 
MIW Relevant Technologies 
 70 
Several current fielded or developmental technologies in the areas of mine hunting/neutralization 
and mine sweeping were researched.  Descriptions of each technology are listed in APPENDIX 
C – MIW TECHNOLOGIES.  These technologies were considered to be a baseline upon which 
more research and development could take the systems to full autonomy for use onboard a USC.  
Some enabling technologies apply across the board to mine hunting, neutralization, and 
sweeping.  These are: 
- Automatic target recognition – algorithms that make decisions.  The mine 
hunting/sweeping/neutralizing systems have to know what environment they are in – this 
technology is close but not there yet. 
- Post mission analysis – this is all manual right now and it could/should be automated. 
- Automated mission planning – the systems need to be able to re-plan in real time. 
- None of these systems have obstacle avoidance right now 
o Planned vs. unplanned (2 types of avoidance) 
o Remote Minehunting System (RMS) did obstacle detection, but not avoidance 
- Launch and recovery 
o The Remote Environmental Measuring UnitS (REMUS) has done docking 
underwater  
o Launch and recovery systems exist but this is a major challenge in a totally unmanned 
environment 
Required relevant technologies which are specific to mine hunting, neutralization, or sweeping 
are described in the following sections:  
 
Mine Hunting 
Current systems are able to provide full mine reconnaissance capability including detection, 
classification and identification. Systems currently fielded are towed from a helicopter or UUV. 
Newer systems which are actually fixed to the helicopter have been developed, leveraging the 
height of the helicopter above the water to provide a broad swath view, which allows the system 
to cover more surface area in a shorter period of time.  However, this also means it will need to 
remain an airborne system so it will need to be deployed via an unmanned platform such as the 
Vertical Take Off and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV).  Adding an 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) to a USC would add complexity, cost and weight, but also 
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increase capability. Another aspect of mine hunting which needs significant work to become 
fully autonomous is environment classification.  Mines are difficult to identify in cluttered 
environments and mine sweeping is often used as a backup. 
 
Mine Neutralization 
Mine neutralization systems can either be deployed by ship or helicopter, so they would not need 
excessive physical adaptation to a USC.  As with any system deployed autonomously, launch 
and retrieval will be a significant challenge.  Neutralizers are self-propelled but guided by a 
person and then detonated once the mine comes into view. In order to have a fully autonomous 
system, the neutralizer would need to be able to navigate itself to the target and correctly identify 
the mine prior to detonation. 
 
Mine Sweeping 
Influence mine sweeping systems can be towed at high-speed from helicopters or USVs. Since 
the host in this case is unmanned, this system may already have some mechanisms which would 
aid launch and retrieval, though autonomous operation still presents additional challenges.  Of 
the three systems, it is the closest to full autonomy. 
 
Note that there is some preliminary work on a system which would combine the hunting and 
neutralizing functions into a “one-pass” mission system.  If this system is successfully 




Navigation is critical for any ship but there is a difference between navigation in the traditional 
sense and tactical navigation required for a combatant ship. A USC will need to maintain precise 
navigation and maneuver in formation. Traditional navigation is primarily focused on safely 
maneuvering the ship while in transit from point A to point B. Absolute position is required to 
guide the ship. On the other hand, tactical navigation is not focused on simply maneuvering the 
ship in navigable waters by determining its absolute position. In this context, a USC must also be 
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able to determine its location relative to the locations of friendly or hostile contacts, whether they 
are on the surface, below the surface, or in the sky. Autonomous navigation requires a highly 
integrated navigation system that fuses data for surface, subsurface and air contacts and presents 
a unified picture of the situation including identification of the relative locations of all contacts. 
 
With the large amount of data generated by the various sensors, the processor must monitor the 
stream of data, prioritize required actions and monitor changes to determine subsequent action 
needed on a continuous basis. Several enabling technologies are fundamental to successful 
autonomous navigation (further details provided in APPENDIX D – NAVIGATION 
TECHNOLOGIES).  These include:  
• An Automatic Information System (AIS) similar to Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) 
used in aircraft. AIS provides ship to ship identification and additional information that 
can be used to prevent collisions, although this is required only for larger ships. 
• Obstacle avoidance (in accordance with COLREGS) and collision avoidance.  The USC 
must be able to maneuver both in concert with the fleet and independently, while 
adhering to the nautical rules of the road to avoid stationary and moving objects. 
• Day/Night all weather vision – without humans aboard, the visual system must be able to 
identify contacts 24/7 especially in adverse weather when wave height and ship pitch and 
roll could degrade sensors. 
 
Several currently fielded or developmental autonomous navigation technologies were researched 
and are presented in Appendix D.  
 
e) Self Defense  
One assumption is that a fully capable USC would be a naval platform of considerable cost and 
usage, and as such, must have the capability to defend itself against attack for self preservation as 
well as to defend other allied forces, should the occasion arise.  Self defense requirements for a 
USC should include detecting, identifying, tracking and engaging air targets and surface targets 
in defense of the USC with anti-air, anti-surface, and soft kill weapons.  Self Defense 
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requirements for a USC should be similar to surface combatants, but aimed more at protecting 
property only and not personnel.   
 
Figure 8. Engagement Sequence After [Huang, 1994] 
Figure 8 is a typical threat identification and engagement sequence, taken from “An Autonomous 
Optimal Weapon Assignment Algorithm for Ship Self Defense” [Huang, 1994]. 
The following Detect to Engage description is derived from Naval Academy training information 
posted by the Federation of American Scientists website [Anon7, 2011]. 
“Detecting the Target 
There are three phases involved in target detection by a weapons system. The first phase 
is surveillance and detection, the purpose of which is to search a predetermined area for a 
target and detect its presence. This may be accomplished actively, by. ..radar, and/or 
passively, by receiving energy being emitted by the target, as by ESM ... The second 
phase is to measure or localize the target's position more accurately and by a series of 
such measurements estimate its behavior or motion relative to own ship... Finally, the 
target must be classified, that is, its behavior must be interpreted so as to estimate its 
type, number, size and most importantly identity… 
Tracking the Target 
… To successfully engage the target and solve the problem, updates as to the target's 
position and its velocity relative to the weapon system must be known or estimated 
continuously. This information is used to both evaluate the threat represented by the 
target and to predict the target's future position and a weapon intercept point so the 
weapon can be accurately aimed and controlled…  
Search and 
Detection Track Identification
Threat Evaluation and 
Weapon Assignment
Engagement Planning Engagement Execution Kill Assessment
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… The modern "battlefield" is one in which sensors are detecting numerous contacts, 
friendly and hostile, and information is continually being gathered on all of them. The 
extremely high speed, precision, and flexibility of modern computers enable the weapons 
systems and their operators to compile, coordinate, evaluate the data, and then initiate an 
appropriate response. Special-purpose and general-purpose computers enable a weapons 
system to detect, track, and predict target motion automatically. These establish the 
target's presence and define how, when, and with what weapon the target will be 
engaged. 
Engaging the Target 
Effective engagement and neutralization of the target requires that … a warhead, 
be delivered to the vicinity of the target. How close to the target a warhead must be 
delivered depends on the type of warhead and the type of target…” 
Solving the fire control problem from target detection to neutralization requires a complex 
integration of numerous components. Weapon system software is needed to perform this 
integration. 
 
Attributes of Self Defense Capabilities 
Attributes of Self Defense capabilities are discussed below.  Detailed technology descriptions are 
included in APPENDIX F – SELF DEFENSE TECHNOLOGIES. 
 
Identification of Surface Targets – It will be difficult for a USC to identify friend or foe and 
subsequently make decisions regarding whether and when to employ deadly force.   
 
Identification of friendly forces should be, in most cases, simple and is aided by current systems 
such as AIS (Automatic Identification System) and LRIT (Long Range Identification and 
Tracking system).  However, AIS can also be easily reprogrammed to ID merchant vessels vice 
naval vessels.   
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Identification of hostiles will be difficult for a USC. Currently, visual surveillance and verbal 
interrogation/communication are used.  A USC would need visual input from long range, all 
weather day and night video cameras with panning and zooming capabilities.  Software would 
then interpret data from the video camera in order to identify known pirate ships or the presence 
of weapons, etc.  The USC would need methods of long range communication, at least one-way 
with translation using radio or a long range acoustic device. 
 
Once a hostile is identified, the USC could choose between evasion, issuing a warning, attack 
with a non-lethal weapon, or warning shot off the bow.  Due to ethical issues of unmanned 
systems, lethal weapons should be used only as a last resort and only when remotely ordered by a 
strike group commander. 
 
Air Threat Evaluation and Weapons– A USC will need guns or missile systems to defend against 
air targets.  The weapons system needs to be able to assess incoming threats based on speed and 
heading.  The ship should also be equipped with ESM, electronic countermeasures (ECM), chaff, 
and decoys.  Software should choose the optimum weapon since chaff and decoys are much less 
expensive than offensive rounds, which would also be limited by automated magazine capacity. 
Since this is an unmanned ship, the extra risk taken in not engaging with hard kill weapons may 
be warranted based on predicted effectiveness of the soft kill weapons.     
 
Lethal Weapons – A USC should have lethal weapons such as guns and missile launchers to 
defend against all lethal threats targeted at itself or allied forces in its vicinity.  The best choice 
of weapon would be short to medium range, lightweight (to fit a compact and fuel efficient 
design), and able to be self loading or pre-loaded with automatic rounds or use replenishable 
ammunition such as laser weapons with a continuous energy supply.  
 
Non-Lethal Weapons – Since a USC needs to act autonomously, it is crucial that there are non-
lethal weapons alternatives, such as acoustic devices and tear gas, which can and should be used 




f) Damage Control  
The approach to damage control for a USC would be similar to damage control for a manned 
surface combatant, but the lack of shipboard personnel presents advantages and disadvantages 
that affect the material solution selection process.   
 
For example, there is no need for a fire party to set damage conditions.  Since there is normally 
no need for personnel access to the different compartments on the unmanned ship, watertight 
closures can be kept secured at all times to maximize ship safety and integrity, and prevent the 
spread of flooding or fire.  Vent dampers can be closed immediately and automatically by ship 
controls to prevent fire spread, should one occur, without the risk of endangering personnel.   
 
On the negative side, the lack of personnel will require more system sophistication to monitor, 
detect and react appropriately to damage control scenarios.  A tactical approach to fighting small 
fires without using portable extinguishers and hose reel stations may need to be devised using 
telerobotic nozzles (as used on DDG1000), to keep space fire fighting such as AFFF sprinkling 
to a minimum and avoid water intrusion, corrosion issues, and discharge of AFFF especially 
close to shore.   
 
Attributes of Damage Control Capabilities 
A USC will need to implement the following automated damage control functions should there 
be damage to the ship caused by internal or external factors: 
• Fire Prevention and Control 
• Flooding Control 
• Ship Damage Recognition and Prediction 
• Under hull Monitoring 
• Intrusion Control 
 
Detailed technology descriptions are included in APPENDIX G – DAMAGE CONTROL 
TECHNOLOGIES. 
  
Fire Prevention and Control 
 77 
A USC will need to prevent, detect, and extinguish the following classes of fires common on US 
Navy ships: 
 
Table 12. Fire and Extinguisher Classes 
Class Source Normal Extinguisher 
A Ordinary Combustibles Water (firemain, mist) 
B Flammable liquids or gases CO2, Halon, FM200, AFFF 
C Electrical Equipment FM200, CO2, PKP 
 Table based on Standard Fire Classes 
 
Flooding Control 
Consistent with other Navy ships, a USC will need to be designed for flooding control with 
physical watertight boundaries.  Flooding sensors will need to be installed, and the USC will 
need to have an automated means of dewatering should there be a hull breach and water 
ingestion.  
 
Ship Damage Recognition and Prediction 
Because there would be no damage control party to restore the ship to its normal operating 
condition, the USC would need to have a method for damage assessment and damage recovery.  
Damage assessment includes monitoring sensors of all critical equipment, and cameras for 
remote general assessment of damage.  Damage recovery, such as starting standby equipment, 
will need to be automated and enabled with emergency power.  Damage recovery will also 
depend greatly on designing the ship electrical and Local Area Network (LAN) systems to be 
reconfigurable with redundant equipment and paths. 
 
Underhull Monitoring 
Underhull monitoring will be required to ensure the security of a USC, especially in port, and 




Security at the pier (as well as at sea) will need to be taken into account to avoid unwelcome 
entry, and can be accomplished with cipher locks and/or smart card entry.  Because it is an 
unmanned ship, cameras with facial recognition could be used in case of tampering, along with 
methods of dealing with perpetrators (such as tear gas or retracting floors).  Secure spaces will 
need extra security measures such as secure data protection and, if necessary, destruction. 
 
B. Top Level Physical Architecture Discussion 
 
The scope of this project was limited by time, resources (ship design tools/software) and the skill 
sets of the Capstone Group participants (i.e. lack of naval architecture expertise), therefore, 
various physical architectural options were not seriously considered or designed for evaluation.  
However, based on the selected USC operational constraints and functions, some physical 
architecture considerations can be discussed to offer some perspective if further design and 
evaluation in this area were to occur: 
• Draft - The vessel draft will need to be limited to adequately operate in littoral waters and 
perform MIW.  Typical drafts for similar vessels with this operational constraint have 
drafts that are less than 15 feet. 
• Length - The vessel length will need to be limited to permit adequate maneuverability of 
the vessel during MIW operations.  Typical lengths for similar vessels with this 
operational constraint have lengths ranging from 188 to 378 feet. 
• Hull Material - The hull will need to have a low magnetic signature thus affecting the hull 
material selection and/or requiring a degaussing system. 
• Propulsor - The propulsor will need to have high maneuverability and low noise 
performance characteristics to perform MIW and ASW operations.  
Table 13. Applicable Surface Ship Dimensions 
Ship Class Hull Form Length Draft Beam 
MHC 51 Monohull 188 ft 11 ft 38 ft 
LCS 1 Monohull 378 ft 12.8 ft 57.4 ft 
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VISBY Monohull 236 ft 7.9 ft 34 ft 
 
Since the proposed USC concept is a multi-mission platform required to perform a multitude of 
functions autonomously and unmanned, this will require a number of supportive systems with 
high redundancy and reliability in order to execute the primary missions.  The trade-off of 
payload (for primary mission packages) versus the draft and length limitations will present some 
challenges to the design of the overall physical architecture.  The hull material and propulsor 
selections will potentially present design and cost issues since they will probably require the 
design integration and production of material solutions that are not typical of the U.S. Navy ship 
industrial base. 
It should be noted that a notional physical architecture concept in Appendix H was created based 
on considerations above and functionally similar vessels (i.e. LCS, MHC, and Visby) to create 
some additional context when evaluating the USC technologies and to show a possible material 
solution albeit one with a minimum of applied ship design practices.  
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C. Design Philosophy, Maintenance, and Refueling 
  
Expanding on the previous discussion of Top Level Physical Architecture, additional design 
considerations, maintenance and refueling will be discussed here to offer further perspective if a 
future USC design effort were to be undertaken.   
 
a) Design Considerations 
The design of all vessels could benefit from an open architecture design approach.  Open 
architecture permits the addition, replacement and swapping of system components with relative 
ease.  This is extremely beneficial to a USC and should be leveraged as much as possible during 
design to minimize maintenance downtime and to allow for mission planning flexibility.    
 
Maintenance will be a challenge for a USC since personnel will not be onboard the vessel during 
operational periods, therefore periodic maintenance will be severely or critically limited.  An 
emphasis on an open architecture design will permit system components to be swapped out so 
that maintenance and repairs can be done without unnecessarily delaying USC operational 
availabilities. 
 
Mission planning flexibility can be accomplished with an open architecture design approach.  
For example, a USC could have a Modular Mission Area arranged so that ISO container sized 
modular mission packages can be placed in various locations throughout.  This offers the 
advantage of flexible mission planning and allows for future technological upgrades as it is very 
difficult to predict what weapon, combat and ISR systems will look like in 2020.  Particularly 
with the dramatic advances in electronics, and the increased reliance on electronics in weapon, 
combat, ISR and even auxiliary systems, it would be difficult to develop ship concepts for this 
timeframe without making potentially highly inaccurate assumptions regarding the 
characteristics of these systems.  Also, because a USC will support a variety of missions, a 
common platform capable of being rapidly reconfigured to support any of these missions 
provides operational flexibility as well as logistics and support simplicity.  Accommodating 
“true” plug and play modularity will have a variety of benefits. 
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Another example where open architecture would be particularly beneficial to a USC would be 
the possible usage of fuel cell technology which is very adaptable due to its modular design.  The 
US Navy Shipboard Fuel Cell Program is currently developing an Advanced Full Scale Modular 
Fuel Cell System Design for multi-platform applications.  All the major fuel cell technology 
components (i.e., fuel cell stacks, fuel reformers and sulfur removal) will be modularized, 
making the system adaptable to ship platform mission needs.  The goals are that fuel cells are 
able to operate in all Navy environmental conditions and fuel cell system modules are 
reconfigurable to meet various ship space considerations. 
 
b) Maintenance 
As discussed above, a more effective maintenance plan for a USC will require an open 
architecture design to allow quick and complete replacement during port availabilities.   
For example, repairs to a disengaged module can occur after the USC has re-launched.  Areas 
that are not modular, such as the hull, will need urgent maintenance during the availability.  
However, the interior modular components would be entirely removed from the critical path of 
the port availability. 
 
Another potential benefit to modular repair outside of the scheduled availability is the balance of 
the workload for the maintenance personnel.  Maintenance schedules would become more 
balanced as work that must occur during the availability decreases while work in between 
availabilities increases.  For the majority of ship availabilities, the US Navy does not operate as 
described above.  Additional planning and training on the part of the maintenance personnel 
would be necessary to successfully carry out this potential USC maintenance concept. 
 
Additionally, maintenance while underway would be less extensive than in port maintenance.  
For example, a logistic support vessel could moor with the USC while underway.  Maintenance 
crews from those vessels could access a workshop and spares area on the USC to get parts for 
repair.  The workshop spares area could prioritize space for unique components for the USC ship 
because common components could be kept on the support vessel.  That said; maintenance crew 
access to ship areas could be very limited since the USC design may not have a general 
arrangement that has the accessibility of a typical manned vessel design.  The modules onboard 
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the USC would need to be arranged such that less robust components are situated in areas that 
the maintenance crews can access while a USC is underway.  Lastly, redundant systems could 
reduce the need to perform urgent maintenance if a single system failed.   
  
c) Refueling 
Refueling while underway is a stressing capability for a USC concept.  Technologies for 
unmanned ship refueling have not reached an acceptable TRL.  It is quite possible that the 
Navy’s Standard Tension Replenishment Alongside Method (STREAM) will not be adaptable 
for an unmanned vessel and that refueling will have to be performed by a manned crew from a 
replenishment oiler once the oiler has moored with the USC.   
 
Another possible refueling option to consider, if the risks involved with mooring two ships 
wanted to be averted, fuel hose could be unreeled from the a USC and allow the replenishment 
oiler to secure the hose and initiate refueling.  However, if a USC has achieved the capability for 
mooring with other ships due to a requirement to receive maintenance while underway, then 
opting for a simple connection on the USC exterior will likely suffice.  Therefore, the likelihood 
of risk of failure during refueling due to a USC issue would be extremely low.  Because of the 
importance of underway refueling, the reduction of risk for this capability is paramount when 
considering design alternatives. 
 
D. System Integration Considerations 
Up until now, the USC subsystem characteristics have been discussed separately.  In reality, 
there will need to be integration between all of the subsystems.  The team decided to use an 
integration philosophy similar to the DDG-1000 where the Central Control Computing Center 
(discussed in III.A.a)) subsystem is central and communicates with all of the other physical 
subsystems.  The following is the total ship integration diagram showing relationships between 
the Central Control Computing Center subsystem and the rest of the major subsystems. The faint 
lines between each of the subsystems denote a back-up communication system, and fail safe and 
graceful degradation mode, should the central system become inoperable.   
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Figure 9. USC Total System Integration Diagram 
 
Some effort was made to look at the communication paths between the Central Control 
Computing Center and the rest of the components, based on the USC operational scenarios.  The 
following series of diagrams (figures 10 through 12) show these communications.  Arrows 
denote which system is sending/receiving the information. 
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While the communications expressed in the above figures are general, more specific 
communications paths can be expressed for each of the USC operational scenarios to show 
subsystem linkages.  One example of this is shown below in the Mine Warfare operational 
scenario: 
 
1.    USC navigates in formation with SG** 
• Communication between 4C and Navigation system:  USC coordinates with respect 
to battle group and obstacle detection and avoidance 
• Communication between 4C and Machinery system:  Required propulsion/engine 
output, and system status 
2. USC receives orders to perform mine search and clearance in littoral area in SG path 
• Communication from battle group commander to USC (outside of system boundary): 
Permission to break formation 
• Communication from 4C to MIW Module:  Ready MIW systems for deployment 
3.  USC sprints ahead of SG to assigned littoral Op area  
• Communication between 4C and Navigation system:  Coordinates for littoral Op area 
• Communication between 4C and Machinery system:  Required propulsion/engine 
output, and system status 
4. USC uses NAV and sensor data to calculate Op area for search and clearance** 
• Communication between 4C and Navigation system:  Coordinates for MIW clearance 
• Communication between 4C and Machinery system:  Required propulsion/engine 
output, and system status 
5. USC performs mine search/threat detection using MIW module package 
• Communication between 4C and Navigation system:  Coordinates and obstacle 
avoidance 
• Communication between 4C and Machinery system:  Required propulsion/engine 
output, and system status 
• Communication from 4C to MIW Module:  Deploy and retrieve MIW 
minehunting/minesweeping systems 
6. USC processes sensor data onboard in order to identify mines**  
 88 
• Communication between 4C to MIW Module:  Download of classification data 
minehunting/minesweeping systems 
7. USC neutralizes mine threats using MIW module package** 
• Communication between 4C and Navigation system:  Coordinates and obstacle 
avoidance 
• Communication between 4C and Machinery system:  Required propulsion/engine 
output, and system status 
• Communication from 4C to MIW Module:  Deploy and retrieve MIW neutralizing 
systems 
8. USC scans area to verify threat neutralization 
• Communication between 4C and Navigation system:  Coordinates and obstacle 
avoidance 
• Communication between 4C and Machinery system:  Required propulsion/engine 
output, and system status 
• Communication between 4C to MIW Module:  Upload target pictures and 
neutralization coordinates 
9. USC reports “all clear” for OPAREA. 
• Communication from USC to battle group commander (outside system boundary):  
Mine field cleared 
10. USC continues navigation, rejoins SG 
• Communication between 4C and Navigation system:  Coordinates and obstacle 
avoidance 
• Communication between 4C and Machinery system:  Required propulsion/engine 
output, and system status 
11. USC reaches low fuel level trigger and requests refueling 
• Communication from USC to oiler (outside system boundary):  Refueling required 
12. Replenishment oiler responds affirmatively to USC 
• Communication from Machinery system to 4C:  Low fuel status 
• Communication from oiler to USC (outside system boundary):  Refueling Request 
Accepted 
13. USC initiates refueling routine, drops behind SG 
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• Communication from oiler to USC (outside system boundary):  Refueling Request 
Accepted 
• Communication between 4C and Navigation system:  Coordinates and obstacle 
avoidance 
• Communication between 4C and Machinery system:  Required propulsion/engine 
output, and system status 
14. USC recognizes and rendezvous with replenishment oiler and enters refueling mode** 
• Communication between 4C and Navigation system:  Coordinates and obstacle 
avoidance 
• Communication between 4C and Machinery system:  Required propulsion/engine 
output, and system status 
• Communication between oiler and USC (outside system boundary):  Mooring status 
15. USC disarms self defense measures as necessary for refueling 
• Communication from 4C to Self Defense system:  Disarm self defense measures 
• Communication from Self Defense system to 4C:  Self defense disarmed 
• Communication between oiler and USC (outside system boundary):  USC ready for 
refueling 
16.  USC monitors refueling 
• Communication between 4C and Machinery system:  Fuel status 
17.   Refueling is complete, replenishment oiler severs connections, navigates away 
• Communication between 4C and Navigation system:  Coordinates and obstacle 
avoidance 
• Communication between 4C and Machinery system:  Fueling complete 
• Communication between oiler and USC (outside system boundary):  Ships un-moored 
18. USC restores self defense measures and rejoins the SG 
• Communication between 4C and Navigation system:  Coordinates and obstacle 
avoidance 
• Communication between 4C and Machinery system:  Required propulsion/engine 
output, and system status 
• Communication from 4C to Self Defense system:  Arm self defense measures 
 90 
• Communication from Self Defense system to 4C:  Self defense armed 
 
Identifying communication paths also helps with the integration of the various functional 
systems. Overlaps across subsystems are identified as well as potential gaps in capability (i.e., 
should torpedoes be assessed as part of anti-submarine warfare or as part of self-defense).  
Developing the systems integration diagrams clarifies the interactions between each of the 
functional areas, and assures a consistent level of abstraction across subsystems.   
As previously stated, a notional physical architecture concept in Appendix H was created based 
on these integrated functions and this provides some additional context for evaluating USC 
functional integration.  For example, this highlights which systems could be eliminated as a 
result of having no people onboard, and which systems would need the most access while 
underway or in port.  
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E. COST CONSIDERATIONS 
In evaluating the cost of a USC, considerations need to be made for reduced costs from manning 
reductions, as well as increased costs from automation and additional reliability requirements of 
software as well as hardware from a lack of onboard maintenance. 
 
Current US Combatant Costs: 
The current R&D (total R&D divided by number of ships in the class), Procurement and 
Personnel costs of US surface combatants is represented in the table below (based on 2010 




Below is the personnel make-up of each ship, calculated by CBO using 5-year average numbers 









Life-Cycle Cost (Lifetime cost per ship in Million Dollars)
Ship Class MCM-1 FFG-7 DDG-51 CG-47 LCS-1   
(Years) 30 30 35 35 25
R&D ($M) 3 2 72 8 20
Procurement ($M) 274 662 1484 2014 680
Personnel ($M) 243 510 897 1156 161
Personnel makeup 
(average per Ship) MCM-1 FFG-7 DDG-51 CG-47 LCS-1
Officers 8 11 24 24 11
Enlisted 76 170 254 340 43
Total 84 181 278 364 54
Ship Class MCM-1 FFG-7 DDG-51 CG-47 LCS-1
Average Personnel Cost Per Ship 
Per Year (Million Dollars) 8 17 26 33 6
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The personnel costs in the table above include current and future pay and benefits (including 
withholding taxes paid by the government, housing benefits, tax advantages, and veterans’ 
benefits) of an average officer and average enlisted crew member, multiplied by the average 
number of officers and enlisted personnel in a ship’s crew [Elmendorf, 2010].  
 
For the five classes of ships listed here, personnel costs amount to an average of 18 million 
dollars per year, a significant expenditure for the Navy.   Considering this cost on current surface 
combatants, an opportunity exists to save life cycle costs if personnel can be eliminated from the 
ships .   
 
USC Savings: 
A full multi-mission capable USC has the potential to replace some of the less capable surface 
combatants and save part of the personnel costs above.   Actual cost savings will depend on how 
many personnel are needed to remotely monitor and control the USC, as well as potentially, 
additional support personnel who can maintain the USC’s in each applicable region.  If the USC 
does not need constant monitoring and only limited human interference (such as when there is 
need for use of lethal weapons), there could be one operator to monitor numerous USC’s, further 
reducing cost per ship. 
 
In addition to manning, the cost of the hull and outfitting will be less because of the deletion of 
offices, berthing, galley, recreation and other human services.  Some of the machinery and piping 
such as potable water, Vacuum, Collection, Holding and Transfer (VCHT) systems, Collective 
Protection System (CPS) can potentially be eliminated.  Berthing and office deletions include 
ventilation, air conditioning as well as lighting and LAN connections for personal computers.  
Equipment such as hot water heaters, self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) compressors, 
refrigeration, decontamination stations, cargo elevators, kingposts, rescue boats, internal 
communications and announcing systems, manned consoles, displays and associated wiring 
would not need to be installed.    
 




A project headed by Dr. Richard Bucknall at the University College of London, UCL estimated 
that manpower is about 40 per cent of the cost of operating ships and that building crew 
accommodations and machinery is 30 per cent of the new build cost for a ship (based on 
commercial ships) [the digital ship, 2004]. 
 
USC Additional Cost Considerations 
The major additional costs for the USC will be in the development of the required additional 
automation, and software and hardware costs to automate launch and recovery of USV’s and 
UUV’s (if deemed appropriate), refueling stations and docking processes.  An initial cost 
estimate can be developed by leveraging current designs of USV’s as well as capitalizing on 
current programs, such as the use of smart valves, automated damage control systems, and 
Voyage Management systems.   
Reliability issues will be a factor.  Cost to monitor the ship from a remote station needs to be 
included, including manpower, facilities and equipment necessary.  Redundancy, reliability, and 
ease of depot maintenance need to be part of the USC design in order for it to realize the 
necessary lifecycle manpower savings.  
Cost for testing of the USC may be higher than those for a conventional surface combatant due 
to the need to instrument and monitor a ship not built for manning. 
Most of the high costs of a USC will be in design and development of automation, and setup of 
operations and support for this new class of ship.  Once design is proved out and problems 
corrected with the first couple of ships, follow ship costs should decrease.  If a USC can take the 
place of a manned surface combatants, as more are built, the potential for savings increases. 
F. RISK ASSESSMENT 
As with any unproven concept there are many risks associated with the proposed USC concept.  
Risks were identified in the Design Phase, Acquisition Phase, and Operations Phase of the USC 
life cycle.    To properly assess the USC concept the team identified the risks in each phase and 
assigned each one a risk level.    The team used the figure below to assess the levels of different 




Figure 13. Risk Matrix 
The two factors that influence the risk level are the likelihood that the risk will occur, and the 
consequence or impact of the risk if it does occur.  For the USC concept in this report Low, 
Medium, and High rankings for each factor were determined to be acceptable.  As the concept is 
further refined the risk list should be updated, and a larger number of discrete sections for each 
factor should be used. 
Mitigation strategies were developed for all USC risks that were identified.  The Medium and 
High level risks for each phase and the mitigation strategies are discussed below.  The full risk 
assessment can be found in APPENDIX I – RISK ASSESSMENT. 
 
Design Phase Risks 
The Design Phase is comprised of the Research and Development associated with each 
individual technology as well as the USC concept design as a whole.  The Design Phase had 
lower risk levels compared with other phases.  While low technology maturity in this phase 
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might drive higher risk for the likelihood factor, there is lower impact of technical failure in this 
phase as compared to the impact of acquisition or operations failures, when a substitute 
technology is less likely to be available. As a result, no Design Phase risks had an overall High 
rating.  The one Medium Design Phase risk was that the system components could not be 
modified for fully autonomous operation.  The likelihood and impact of this risk are both 
Medium resulting in a risk level score of Medium.   
 
The mitigation strategy for this risk was for alternative technology options to be investigated.  
Identifying more than one technology that can perform a function will not only allow for 
secondary options to be chosen, but could also help guide modification of the primary option to 
become autonomous.  A second mitigation strategy is to track the constraining design features 
that do not allow for autonomous operation and to change these features to allow for the primary 
option to be used autonomously. By tracking the integration of the separate systems into the 
whole USC design, modifications to or swapping of different technology options becomes easier. 
 
Acquisition Phase Risks 
The Acquisition Phase is comprised of USC production and testing.  This phase has many of the 
high risks for the USC because this phase is where the concept design is proven.  An unproven 
concept will likely result in both appreciable cost and schedule delays.  Therefore the likelihood 
of these risks is higher than other phases, and the impact is higher than in the Design Phase.  
There were four High level risks identified in this phase.  The high level risks involved sub-
system integration, component interoperation, C3 programming complexity, and C3 
programming sufficiency.   
 
The one mitigation strategy for all of these High level risks was to allow extended programming 
time, and additional and enhanced system and component testing.  Time must be budgeted in the 
schedule for the extreme amount of programming necessary to allow the USC to function 
autonomously.  Because of the autonomous nature of the USC concept, and the fact that this is a 
completely new design, the developmental and operational testing for the USC should be 
thorough.  Testing of critical components and operations should be meticulous and have 
extremely high standards of success. 
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Additional time for programming and testing operations will also be needed because of the 
iterative nature of the two operations.  If testing uncovers a deficiency in the USC programming, 
there must be sufficient time and resources to correct the programming and re-test.  Fortunately, 
much of the USC programming can be tested by running simulations directly on the USC.  The 
USC AI can be tested without having to perform live operational testing by simulating sensor 
data instead of actually collecting it.  In order for these simulations to be effective, they will have 
to include realistic sensor data the USC would receive in live operational testing.  Additionally, 
the simulations must be varied enough to cover the wide range of possible scenarios the USC 
could face. 
 
Operational Phase Risks 
The Operational Phase is when the USC is actually fielded and in service.  Risks during this 
phase have a higher impact because the USC is in the operational environment instead of testing 
or design.  There were four High and Medium level risks in this phase including: USC losing 
communication with command, USC being unable to process sensor data or processing sensor 
data incorrectly, USC incorrectly performing IFF and taking subsequent action, and USC not 
recovering from damage sufficiently.      
 
Should the USC lose communication with Command (shore/ship), it can still function in a rogue 
state.  The impact of this risk would be high.  As a mitigation strategy for this risk, the USC 
could be programmed to “reset” or return to home base if communication from command is not 
received on some regular time interval.  The communication from command would confirm the 
orders for the USC.  If this communication were not received, then the USC would abort its 
current mission and reset and wait for further orders, or return to home base.  This fail-safe 
mechanism would prevent the USC from performing an unwanted operation due to lack of 
communication with Command. 
 
If the USC encounters some unanticipated condition or conflicting data that it cannot process or 
cannot process correctly while operating, the impact would be high.  This risk is a continuation 
of the adequate programming and testing risks from the acquisition phase.  If the same issue 
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occurs during actual operations the USC could be vulnerable or perform an incorrect action in 
response to the data.  Ideally these items should be discovered and resolved in the previous 
phase.  However, simulations are not 100% reliable and this situation could occur. A mitigation 
strategy for this risk during the Operational Phase is to program the system to recognize signs of 
erroneous or conflicting data, and default to some basic action for the USC.  An example of this 
situation would be if the USC were performing mine sweeping and received conflicting data on a 
mine like object.  Instead of neutralizing the object the USC might only note the location and 
continue on the sweep if the sensor data is conflicting.   
 
The highest impact risk for the USC was the incorrect identification of friend or foe.  If the 
friend is incorrectly identified as a foe, the USC could engage the friendly force and either the 
USC or the friendly unit could be damaged or destroyed.  If a foe was incorrectly identified then 
the USC could be damaged or destroyed.  The loss of a USC is less severe than the loss of 
human life; therefore the desired outcome in these scenarios is for the USC to be damaged or 
destroyed instead of an incorrect IFF contact.  In order to mitigate IFF errors rigorous testing of 
the IFF system should be performed throughout the acquisition phase.  Additionally, two 
separate systems for lethal weapons use could operate in parallel pulling information from 
common and unique sensors.  If and only if the analysis from the two independent lethal 
weapons systems matched could the weapons be used. 
 
The final risk of the Operational Phase was the risk that the USC does not recover sufficiently 
from damage or system failure.  This risk has an aggregate medium level, but the impact could 
vary widely depending on the amount of damage taken or the exact system that fails.  Additional 
testing is again a mitigation strategy that should be used.  Testing the USC systems in different 
damage and failure configurations will demonstrate what level of damage or failure is fatal to the 
USC.  If fatally damaged the USC should have a self-destruct sequence so that enemy forces are 





There are many items to consider when discussing an autonomous USC concept.  Many of the 
relevant technologies require only software or programming changes; however several 
technologies would require mechanical adaptation to be used aboard an unmanned ship.  The 
physical architecture considerations are based on the primary military missions of ASW and 
MIW.  Design philosophy, maintenance, refueling, and system integration were considered as 
well.  This section found that preliminary cost discussion shows potential for a large cost 
savings.  Lastly, the risks associated with an autonomous USC were considered, and high level 
mitigation strategies were suggested.  The next section contains the final analysis.       
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
As the US Navy fleet ages and several assets are retired, there is an opportunity to develop 
unique solutions for critical missions.  An autonomous USC could provide significant cost 
savings in a declining budget environment while also taking US sailors out of harm’s way.  The 
NPS Capstone project team investigated the potential for employment of an autonomous USC by 
using a modified waterfall systems engineering process model to step through USC concept 
constraints and considerations.   
 
First the team conducted a Needs Analysis.   The state of the art for USVs demonstrates 
successful implementation of several technologies including autonomous navigation.  A logical 
next step in the USV evolution is to scale up the implementation of unmanned vessels from small 
boats to ships.  There are several potential benefits to an autonomous USC including cost 
savings, improved performance for current capabilities, and expanded capabilities and missions.  
The eleven current US Navy missions were reviewed and the team determined that ASW and 
MIW are logical primary missions for an initial USC concept.  The mission areas of MIW and 
ASW lend themselves to unmanned operation – they are vital but have very limited use of lethal 
force, which is mostly in self defense.  The largest concern with an autonomous concept is the 
use of lethal force with no human left accountable.  MIW does not typically involve lethal force, 
and the majority of the ASW operations are ISR, not engagement.   In addition, there are many 
MIW and ASW technologies which are close to full autonomy.  MIW is dangerous to perform, 
while area monitoring for ASW requires a high level of vigilance that a computer system could 
handle better than a human counterpart. Lastly, both systems rely heavily on sensor readings and 
data analysis that, if programmed correctly, a computer could perform more effectively and 
efficiently than a human.  A survey of interested parties confirmed the decision to investigate 
design considerations and constraints for these two mission areas.   
 
Second, during Operational Analysis, top level system constraints and lower level operational 
constraints were developed.  These constraints were used to guide the development of the 
Concept of Operations.  Next, a Functional Analysis was performed where functions for a USC 
concept were developed based on operational activities from the CONOPS. These functions were 
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used to evaluate the lower level constraints, and operational scenarios were used to validate the 
results. 
 
During the Concept Discussion, relevant technologies that met the concept constraints were 
researched for each functional area.  Enabling technologies as well as technology gaps were 
identified, and constraints and considerations for the physical architecture, design and operations, 
and system integration were discussed. 
 
The argument for pursing a USC concept must contain cost considerations as well as technical 
considerations.  Creating an autonomous USC will not only eliminate the cost for personnel 
onboard the ship, but would eliminate the cost of the ship systems that involve humans such as 
habitability systems, mess, quarters, work stations, etc.  This cost reduction must be balanced 
against the costs associated with automating the ship functions, hardware and software 
development, and increased system test and evaluation.  Even with the additional research and 
development costs of pursuing an autonomous USC, there is potential for significant cost savings 
over the life cycle of a USC. 
 
The last section of the Concept Discussion was the risk assessment.  The project team developed 
considerations for risks in three phases of the lifecycle for a USC: Design Phase, Acquisition 
Phase, and Operational Phase.  There are many technical risks to the successful operation of a 
USC.  The highest impact risk for the USC was the incorrect identification of friend or foe (IFF). 
This risk is mitigated slightly by the mostly non-lethal missions areas of ASW and MIW selected 
for consideration in this report.  Other mitigation techniques include rigorous testing of the IFF 
system throughout the acquisition phase.  In fact, a longer than average and more rigorous  test 
and evaluation period for a USC and USC sub-systems is a mitigation technique for many of the 
technical risks for a USC concept. 
 
As a result of the project analyses, the team determined that a USC can be realized by 2020.  
Investments in software are required to get many relevant technology systems over the last 
hurdles, and in some cases, mechanical adaptation will also need to occur.   Specific areas which 
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require increased development are: mine neutralization, damage mitigation, C3 ship control 
system, weapons control and electronic warfare.  
 
Once these targeted investments have been made, significant savings associated with a USC as 
compared to a manned combatant over the life cycle of the ship are possible.  Most increases in 
cost for a USC would be in the design and development phase.  Once the design issues are 
resolved and appropriate technologies demonstrated, follow on USCs should decrease in cost.  A 
USC will also leverage the personnel costs savings over its lifecycle. The cost considerations 
presented in this report justify further exploration of a USC as a solution for some of the Navy’s 
more challenging missions. 
 
An initial USC concept is an excellent first step into the transition to autonomous unmanned 
combatants.  Appropriate missions for this initial USC have been chosen to leverage current 
semi-autonomous systems, and minimize the occaision to use lethal force.  Promising baseline 
technologies have been selected and areas for further reasearch and development have been 
identified.  Regardless of budget environment, a strong cost case has been made for the USC as 
compared to peer ships.  The considerations and constraints discussed in this report can provide a 




The project team recommends the following areas for future study: 
 
Future work should focus on the details of the ship configuration.  Ship architectures and 
arrangements should be explored. Details beyond a notional general arrangement should be 
considered such as the configuration of the mission modules, the mechanical components for the 
mission systems, and the storage capacity for ammunition, fuel and other supplies.  Component 
integration into the full ship system and interoperability between sub-systems is an area that will 
need to be carefully considered. 
 
A more in depth analysis of the relevant technologies should be performed with the goal of 
acquiring cost and performance data to allow for a rigorous system trade-off analysis.  In 
addition, investigation of required modifications to these technologies is needed to evaluate what 
development will enable a fully autonomous USC.     
 
The Central Control Computing Center and the total software integration of the USC is the most 
crucial element of the USC.  Much more in depth analysis must be done in this area as an 
autonomous ship of this size, with these capabilities, has not been successfully fielded yet.  This 
further effort should focus on scaling up some similar technologies and modifying those 
technologies to enable autonomous operation.  Component interoperation should also be 
investigated.  In the USC concept, all systems are controlled through the 4C; however the 
physical interoperation of components should be addressed as well.   
 
Additionally the communication between the USC system and other Navy systems needs further 
study.  Translation between human communication and computer (electronic) communication 
will need to be established.  Communications must focus on allowing humans at a command 
station to understand messages from the USC as well as communicate back to the USC in a way 
the USC can understand.  As more unmanned ships and vehicles are developed, the 
communication paths between unmanned vehicles must be investigated as well.  
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In order to fully evaluate the USC concept, a quantified concept evaluation, an engagement 
analysis, and a cost validation must be done.  A quantified evaluation and an engagement 
analysis will identify the weaknesses of the design, such as susceptibility to EMP attacks, and 
allow for redesign to address the deficiencies.   
 
Lastly, further study should include a look at the larger scope of naval operations, and how the 
USC concept presented in this report would change how the US Navy operates.  The study 
should focus on the unique capabilities of the USC concept and the projected global environment 
in 2020.  The study should address how the unique USC capabilities will enable the Navy to 
evolve new tactics, perform new functions, and change operations to overcome current and 
future challenges. 
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APPENDIX B – INTERESTED PARTY SURVEY 
Unmanned Surface Combatant (USC) 
Approach to Establishing Consensus Regarding Ship Mission Priorities 
December 1, 2010 
 
Purpose  
Students enrolled in the Capstone Project course as part of the Systems Engineering Masters 
program at the Naval Postgraduate School were tasked to consider how a truly unmanned surface 
combatant (USC) can be defined and how the surface combatant missions can be satisfied 
without people.   
As a first step, the team needs to choose mission areas to be performed by the USC – potential 
missions have been researched and a subset is described later in this document.  Mission 
priorities need to be established in order to further investigate associated capabilities, and to 
develop system requirements.  The team wishes to solicit and combine multiple stakeholder 
inputs via the included survey in order to choose top mission areas on which to focus.  
 
Project Background  
Operations and Support (O&S) costs are the largest portion of the Navy’s total ownership costs 
for today’s surface combatants. Surface combatants are designed and built to have a service life 
of 30 to 35 years, and manning costs are a major portion of the Navy’s budget.   Recent 
programs have reduced their manning requirements with mixed results.   
Studies aimed at significantly reducing or eliminating manning have concluded that some degree 
of manning is necessary.  This notion of required manning is rooted in years of culture; legal, 
ethical, and political reasons; and safety.  As a result, studies with a true “out of the box” 
approach to achieving an unmanned surface combatant (USC) have not been attempted by the 
Navy. 
Besides the elimination of high manning costs, achieving a design for a completely unmanned 
surface combatant offers other advantages including the elimination of many human interface 
features and habitability systems currently required on surface combatant designs.  By 
eliminating these design features (i.e., operator consoles, berthing, lounges, mess rooms, offices, 
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medical spaces, galleys, etc) and their requisite space, weight and power allowances, the ship 
design trade space will achieve more flexibility and overall ship size may be reduced as well.  
Therefore, the objective of this project is to identify the enabling technologies that would allow 
for a USC to achieve full capabilities and be implemented for production and use.  In addressing 
this problem the project group will first define the surface combatant design domain by 
identifying the capabilities associated with current and projected future missions.  Secondly, the 
project team will attempt to quantify the constraints for development and use, and determine 
potential solutions.  Thirdly, if a limited human presence aboard the USC is mandated due to 
concerns noted above, the project team will investigate the optimal way to include that presence 
as a space and weight reservation in the USC design. Lastly, the project team will attempt to 
quantify the reduction in total ownership costs for the USC vs. a manned surface combatant.   
 
Survey Methodology 
The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) will be used to prioritize USC missions from the 
responses of a group of interested parties to a survey instrument.  The AHP structures a decision 
problem as a hierarchy, or tree, starting from a goal at the top level and working downwards 
through progressive levels of criteria.  Interested parties are asked to make pair-wise 
comparisons of two criteria at a time, and this information permits a ranking and weighting of all 
criteria to be synthesized using the AHP.  The AHP permits participants to use all information 
available to them as they respond to the survey instrument, indicating the relative importance of 
one criterion over another.  This process focuses thinking, and makes one criterion (or 
alternative) effectively the unit of measure for another.  It accepts that stakeholder preferences 
and priorities may not be linear with quantifiable data and permits this to be expressed and 
considered in the process and prioritization.  The AHP mechanics permit inconsistencies to be 
measured and pointed out for further discussion and corrected as needed by participants.  The 
AHP also permits synthesizing preferences from multiple stake-holders, and may be used to help 
establish a consensus. 
Missions 
The team has identified the following Missions as potentially feasible for a USC to perform: 
1. Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) - The destruction or neutralization of enemy air platforms and 
airborne weapons, whether launched from air, surface, subsurface, or land platforms. 
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2. Amphibious Warfare (AMW) - Attacks, launched from the sea by naval forces and by 
landing forces embarked in ships or craft, designed to achieve a landing on a hostile 
shore.  This includes fire support of troops in contact with enemy forces through the use 
of close air support or shore bombardment. 
3. Anti-surface Ship Warfare (ASU) - The destruction or neutralization of enemy surface 
combatants and merchant ships. 
4. Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW) - The destruction or neutralization of enemy submarines. 
5. Command, Control and Communications (CCC) - Providing communications and 
related facilities for coordination and control of external organizations or forces and 
control of unit's own facilities. 
6. Electronic Warfare (ELW) - The effective use by friendly forces of the electromagnetic 
spectrum for detection and targeting while deterring, exploiting, reducing, or denying its 
use by the enemy. 
7. Intelligence (INT) - The collection, processing, and evaluation of information to 
determine location, identification and capability of hostile forces through the employment 
of reconnaissance, surveillance, and other means. 
8. Mine Warfare (MIW) - The use of mines for control/denial of sea or harbor areas, and 
mine countermeasures to destroy or neutralize enemy mines. 
9. Mobility (MOB) - The ability of naval forces to move and to maintain themselves in all 
situations over, under, or upon the surface. 
10. Naval Special Warfare (NSW) - Naval operations generally accepted as being 
unconventional--in many cases clandestine--in nature.  NSW includes special mobile 
operations, unconventional warfare, coastal and river interdiction, beach and coastal 
reconnaissance and certain tactical intelligence operations. 
11. Strike Warfare (STW) - The destruction or neutralization of enemy targets ashore through 
the use of conventional or nuclear weapons.  This includes, but is not limited to, strategic 
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targets, building yards, and operating bases from which the enemy is capable of 
conducting air, surface, or subsurface operations against U.S. or allied forces. 
Survey 
The questions that follow refer to the missions described previously.  A series of comparison 
questions are presented asking you to indicate whether one Mission is more or less important 
relative to another for the purpose of developing requirements for a USC.  When responding to 
the questions, please consider the importance of performing each mission in an unmanned 
environment.   
When performing your survey, please use the five point scale presented below. 
Circle (or BOLD, or change text color of) the choice representing the alternative you consider to 
be more important.  For example: 
 
Which mission do you consider to be more important for the USC to support? 
Mission 1                                                                Mission 2  
                     5  4  3  2  1  2  3  4  5  
In the example above, Mission 2 is judged to be moderately more important than Mission 1. 
 
INTENSITY DEFINITION  EXPLANATION 
       1  Equal Importance  Two activities contribute equally to the objective 
       2  Moderate   Experience and judgment slightly favor one 
       3  Strong   Experience and judgment strongly favor one 
       4  Very Strong  An activity is favored very strongly over another 
       5  Extreme Importance The evidence favoring one activity over another is  
     of the highest possible order of affirmation 
  
Space is provided for you to briefly explain your rationale for the judgment provided and/or how 
you would use unmanned devices, if available, to perform the mission.   
 
1) Which Mission do you consider to be more important for the USC to support, and 
how much more important? 
Anti-Air Warfare       Amphibious Warfare  






2) Which Mission do you consider to be more important for the USC to support, and 
how much more important? 
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Anti-Air Warfare      Anti-Surface Ship Warfare 






3) Which Mission do you consider to be more important for the USC to support, and 
how much more important? 
Anti-Air Warfare      Anti-Submarine Warfare 





4) Which Mission do you consider to be more important for the USC to support, and 
how much more important? 
Anti-Air Warfare    Command, Control, and Communications 








5) Which Mission do you consider to be more important for the USC to support, and 
how much more important? 
Anti-Air Warfare      Electronic Warfare 






6) Which Mission do you consider to be more important for the USC to support, and 
how much more important? 
Anti-Air Warfare      Intelligence 







7) Which Mission do you consider to be more important for the USC to support, and 
how much more important? 
Anti-Air Warfare       Mine Warfare 






8) Which Mission do you consider to be more important for the USC to support, and 
how much more important? 
Anti-Air Warfare       Mobility 






9) Which Mission do you consider to be more important for the USC to support, and 
how much more important? 
Anti-Air Warfare     Naval Special Warfare 







10) Which Mission do you consider to be more important for the USC to support, and 
how much more important? 
Anti-Air Warfare       Strike Warfare 









APPENDIX C – MIW TECHNOLOGIES 
MINE WAREFARE CURRENT TECHNOLOGIES 
 
Mine Hunting 
AN/AQS-20A: The AQS-20, a system which has been in 
development for several years, is the follow-on to the 
AQS-14 (a detection and classification sonar).  It 
provides full mine reconnaissance capability including 
detection, classification and identification by scanning 
the water in front and to the sides of the vehicle as well 
as the sea bottom for mines. The system uses sonar and 
electro-optical sensors to provide high-resolution images 
of mines and mine-like objects as well as high-precision 
location information [Anon, 2007]. 
 
The AQS-20 can either be towed from a MH-60S or from a Remote Minehunting Vehicle 
(RMV), so it has some further development required in order to be towed directly from the USC. 
The AQS-20 can be towed in both deep-ocean and 
littoral waters and it can detect, classify and localize 
bottom, close-tethered and volume mines. 
 
AN/AES-1 ALMDS: The Airborne Laser Mine 
Detection System (ALMDS) is another detection, 
classification and localization system which looks for 
floating and near-surface moored mines using pulsed 
laser light and streak tube receivers housed in an 
external equipment pod.  ALMDS is capable of day or 
night operations, and the design uses the forward 
motion of the aircraft to generate image data [Anon, 
Figure 14. AQS-20 
Figure 15.  ALMDS 
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2011].  
Unlike the AQS-20, this system is fixed to the helicopter and not towed from the platform.  
Leveraging the height of the helicopter above the water to provide a broad swath view, the 
ALMDS is able to cover more surface area in a shorter period of time.  However, this also means 
it will need to remain an airborne system so it will need to be deployed via an unmanned 
platform such as the VTUAV.  Adding a UAV to the USC would add complexity, cost and 
weight, but also increase capability. 
 
Mine Neutralization 
AMNS: The Airborne Mine Neutralization System 
(AMNS) is a mine neutralization system which was 
originally deployed by ship and then adapted to the 
MH-60S.  It consists of a SEAFOX vehicle which is 
deployed once a mine-like object has been 
identified.  This vehicle is a self-propelled, 
unmanned, wire guided munition with homing 
capability that expends itself during the mine destruction process. The system is guided by a 
person and then detonated once the mine comes into view.  According to Lockheed Martin, the 
developer, the AMNS has the following characteristics: 
• Certified warhead capable of destroying sea mines by detonation of mine explosives, including 
insensitive PBX. 
• High degrees of operator-controlled maneuverability, including hovering, backing, and precise 
pitch and yaw control  
• Vehicle tracking by host platform sonar activation of dorsal-mounted transponder. 
• Acquisition, homing, and classification sonar system capable of horizontal mechanical 
scanning with a resolution down to 0.9 degrees. 
• Control and guidance system, including attitude, heading, depth, and altitude sensors. 
• Video camera and headlight for visual identification. 
• High endurance battery power supply. 
• Free spooling fiber-optic cable for high rate video, data transfer and control. 
• Operator-selected method of warhead detonation [Anon, 2011]. 
Figure 16. AMNS 
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Archerfish Mine Disposal System: The Archerfish has 
similar maneuvering characteristics to the AMNS and is 
also guided by wire to the point where it is detonated.  The 
main difference between the Archerfish and the AMNS is 
that four Archerfish are contained in a pod and so the 
system can detonate four mines before another system has 
to be deployed.  Also, the archerfish is designed to be 
deployed from the MH-60S so it will need more modification to deploy off of a USC, or need 
use of a VTUAV or other similar UAV[Anon, 2011].    
 
Mine Sweeping 
OASIS: The organic airborne and surface influence sweep 
(OASIS) system provides high-speed influence mine 
sweeping capability by generating and imparting 
underwater magnetic and acoustic signature fields capable 
of sweeping a wide range of magnetic, acoustic and 
combination magnetic/acoustic influence threat mines at 
tactically significant water depths. The towed body measures 
its height above the bottom using a transducer and its depth 
using a pressure sensor in order to provide guidance and control signals to the towed body 
control surfaces [Anon, 2011]. 
UISS:  In its current development, the Unmanned Influence 
Sweep System (UISS) consists of a suite of systems: a USV 
which tows the Unmanned Surface Sweep System (US3), 
radios/comms equipment [Multi-Vehicle Communication 
System, VRC-99 (Future RT/1499) Radio, Iridium Radio 
(Back-up), and Antennas], and host ship software (Multi-
Operator Control Unit, Core System Controller, Payload 
Control Interfaces, Video, and Mission Planning) [Ashton, 
2010]. Since the host ship in this case is already unmanned, this system could be reduced to just 
Figure 17. Archerfish 
Figure 18. OASIS 
Figure 19. UISS 
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APPENDIX D – NAVIGATION TECHNOLOGIES 
Elbit Systems 
 
The Elbit Systems USV is designated for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) 
missions, force protection/anti-terror missions, anti-surface and anti-mine warfare, search and 
rescue missions, port and waterway patrol as well as electronic warfare. The system is designed 
to optimize the performance of low-level control activities such as optimal turning rate, optimal 
speed for fuel consumption, and accurate sailing and navigation with cruise sensors and 
stabilization systems. Here is a list of the ANS Main Characteristics: 
• Mission Range: 
o For Line of Sight (LOS) Communication: 60 km 
o Range at Wide Open throttle:   500 NM 
• Vessel length:      10.6 m 
• Vessel endurance:      24-36 hours  
• Max. payload (payload vs. fuel trade-off)  2,000 kg 
• Vessel overall weight:    6,500 kg 
• Max. speed:      45 knots 
• Propulsion:       Propellers 
• Engines:      2 x 315 HP (Diesel) 
• Dual use:      Manned-Unmanned Operation 
 
 
Autonomous Navigation System  
 
The AMN system is composed of various layers of perception, processing, and control. The 
AMN system uses a suite of sensors to perceive the environment of the vehicle that it is serving. 
AMN's initial sensors consist of RADAR, LIDAR, stereo optical cameras, GPS, AIS and a 360-
degree camera. Fusion algorithms are used to compile and correlate these data into a common 
tactical picture for the USV. This picture is passed to a module for autonomous decision making, 
which in turn yields control outputs to the USV control systems.  
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APPENDIX E – ASW TECHNOLOGIES 
U.S. Navy AN/SQQ-89(V) Anti-Submarine Warfare / Undersea Warfare Combat System 
(ASWCS / USWCS) 
 
The current system for ASW, the U.S. Navy AN/SQQ-89(V) Anti-Submarine Warfare / 
Undersea Warfare Combat System (ASWCS / USWCS), used on CG and DDG class ships, and 
provides the technical foundation for the system planned for the LSC and DDG 1000, is shown 
in Figure 20. The AN/SQQ-89(V) provides an integrated ASW capability. “The system presents 
an integrated picture of the tactical situation by receiving, combining and processing active and 
passive sensor data from a hull-mounted array, towed array and sonobuoys. The AN/SQQ-89(V) 
consists of a hull-mounted sonar (SQS-53 series), wideband omni-directional receivers 
supporting acoustic intercept, Towed Array Sonar (AN/SQR-19 or Multi-Function Towed Array 
(MFTA)), and integrates with the Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System (LAMPS MK III and 
Block II Upgrade) helicopter for sonobuoy signal processing. The AN/SQQ-89(V) series is the 
first integrated surface ship (ASW) combat system. It has a continuing development program, as 
well as an open system architecture to provide for future capabilities.”  
 
The AN/SQQ-89(V) ASW system is not autonomous but is highly integrated. In order to engage 
and launch weapons against a subsurface threat the AN/SQQ-89(V) interfaces with the Torpedo 








The three types of sonobuoys are described below: 
• Active sonobuoys emit sound energy into the water, receive the returning echo and 
transmit that information via UHF/VHF radio to a receiving ship or aircraft. Originally 
active sonobuoys pinged continuously after deployment for a predetermined period of 
time and then the device was scuttled. Later some sonobuoys, e.g., Command Activated 
Sonobuoy System (CASS) sonobuoys, allowed aircraft to trigger pings or scuttling via a 
radio link. This evolved into DICASS (Directional CASS) in which the return echo 
transmitted bearing as well as range data.  
• Passive sonobuoys emit nothing into the water, waiting for mechanically generated sound 
waves from ships or submarines, or other acoustic signals of interest, to reach the 
hydrophone that are then transmitted via UHF/VHF radio back to a ship or aircraft.  
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• Special purpose sonobuoys relay various types of oceanographic data to a ship, aircraft, 
or satellite. There are three types of special-purpose sonobuoys in use today. These 
sonobuoys are not designed specifically for use in submarine detection or localization.  
o BT—The bathythermobuoy (BT) relay bathythermographic or salinity readings, 
or both, at various depths. This information is then utilized to process acoustic 
data since the propagation of sound waves is affected by both temperature and 
salinity. 
o SAR—The search and rescue (SAR) buoy is designed to operate as a floating RF 
beacon. As such, it is used to assist in marking the location of an aircraft crash 
site, a sunken ship, or survivors at sea.  
o ATAC/DLC—Air transportable communication (ATAC) and down-link 
communication (DLC) buoys, are intended for use as a means of communication 
between an aircraft and a submarine, or between a ship and a submarine. 
The three lightweight torpedoes considered for USC use are listed below. 
 
US Mk 54 
The Mk 54 Lightweight Hybrid Torpedo (LHT) offers shallow water capability for surface 
launches in water as shallow as 25m and air launches in 35m. The LHT is a hybrid design with 
the warhead, fuel tank and afterbody of the Mk 46, sonar and thermal battery of the Mk 50, 
signal processing and speed control valve of the Mk 48 Mod6, and software components from 
both the Mk 50 and Mk 48 ADCAP.  
 
Franco-Italian MU90 IMPACT 
The Franco-Italian MU90 IMPACT was developed from scratch with littoral threats in mind. It 
can be launched in depths limited to just 20m (shipborne) or 25m (airborne). The MU90 offers 
variable speeds from 29 to over 50 knots with continuous adjustment available and 
corresponding ranges from 25,000m to 15,000m. With its insensitive munition warhead, 
broadband sonar processing and tactical computer, high immunity to acoustic countermeasures, 
propulsion quietness and lack of wake, the MU90 provides today the performance envisaged for 
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the future Mk54 P3I. MU90 users included France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Denmark and 
Australia, with two South American and South-East Asian countries likely to follow soon. 
 
UK Sting Ray  
The Mod 1 Sting Ray is believed to have a maximum speed of about 45 kt with an estimated 
endurance of some 8 minutes at that speed. Maximum operating depth is believed to be about 1 




APPENDIX F – SELF DEFENSE TECHNOLOGIES 
SELF DEFENSE CURRENT TECHNOLOGIES 
 
ARGC-2400 
A long range camera (ARGC-2400) is available from Canada which offers long range imagery in 
complete darkness and adverse weather, and records them with the appropriate parameters.  The 
camera uses range-gating technology with the DALIS (Diode Array Laser Illumination System), 
slaved to the field-of-view of a color CCD camera (with a FoV ranging from 2° to 45°) with a 
motorized continuous zoom, offering magnification up to ×240.  The camera can rotate 360° and 
has a radar interface allowing faster pointing to targets of interest.  This camera also has internal 
sensors to remotely monitor camera status.  Camera visual record can be transmitted back to 
controlling unit for ID of hostiles and intent of suspect craft. 
 
 
Figure 21. ARGC-2400 long-range night-vision camera [Anon, 2011] 
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Video Image Retrieval and Analysis Tool (VIRAT) 
 
VIRAT is a DARPA project which relies on video matching.  The system can be shown a video 
clip of interest (in this case perhaps images of known pirate ships or pirates with guns), and it 
will look for similar video in the ISR imagery.  It can also match a behavior of interest, given an 
example of the same [Peck, 2010]. This software is still in the early development phase and is 
not currently focused on marine uses. 
 
Figure 22. VIRAT Concept Diagram [Anon, 2011] 
 
 
LONG RANGE ACOUSTIC DEVICE (LRAD) 
 




APPENDIX G – DAMAGE CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES 





Electric power 100 kW  
Voltage 400 VAC  
Frequency 50 Hz  
Heat recovery ~ 50 kW at 55 ° C  
~ 50 kW at 90 ° C 1  
Energy efficiency ~ 82%  
Fire Protection 50 m 3 room size up to several 1,000 m 3  
Energy Natural gas / biogas  
Operating mode Fully automatic, network operation  
Dimensions 2.2 m (W) x 5.6m (L) x 3.4m (H)  
Weight 15.5 t in operation 
 
Simple principle - complex effect.  
quattro generation in detail. 
 
 
Natural gas comes in, fire comes out.  
You also get heat, air conditioning and electricity 
 
 








An Office of Naval Research (ONR) autonomous underwater vehicle, which can maneuver 
under ships to detect explosives, is closer to reality following the awarding of a production 
contract in March. 
 
Since that award, ONR researchers have been preparing for a demonstration of the Explosive 
Ordnance Disposal Hull Unmanned Underwater Vehicle Localization System (EOD HULS) in 
June at Naval Surface Warfare Center Panama City, Fla. 
That test will be the last with the full system, said Dr. Thomas Swean an ONR research scientist. 
"This will be a big demonstration of our capabilities. The system will go into the water to survey 
a ship," he said. "ONR developed an unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) that could maneuver 
in very tight and complex areas.” 
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On March 2, Massachusetts-based Bluefin Robotics was awarded a $30 million contract to 
produce EOD HULS. The goal is to develop a small and affordable autonomous vehicle that can 
inspect ships for anomalies. 
Previously, teams of divers had been required to carry out inspections of hulls. That work often 
took hours to complete on vessels that could be as large as container ships, Swean said. 
HULS evolved from the Hovering Autonomous Underwater Vehicle, an ONR initiative awarded 
to Bluefin and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in 2002. Bluefin designed the 
vehicle while MIT developed the control systems. 
The EOD program office then turned the idea into the EOD HULS program with initial funding 
that started in 2006. 
Three bids were received for the initial development phase, and the Bluefin team was selected. 
Under phase two, Bluefin developed prototype systems. Those UUVs passed all testing, leading 
to the March contract award for procurement of EOD HULS. 
Besides the platform itself, ONR is also involved in developing many of the sensors being used 










“Because the face recognition system is used to distinguish faces according to the color, intensity 
or other facial features, the 2D seems to be functioning more appropriately to provide the 
required information. The conflict can be seen in the 3D recognition system that discriminates 
only the shape of the features. Despite being deemed to be more reliable and accurate, much 
improvement is still needed to apply the 3D system in real.” 
http://technology.ezinemark.com/compare-2d-to-3d-face-recognition-system-17204e7f144.html
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APPENDIX H – NOTIONAL USC CONCEPT BASED ON CONSTRAINTS 
  A. TOP LEVEL PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE 
 
Hull form – Monhull Length – 300 ft Energy Conversion – Fuel Cell 
Hull Material – Glass Reinforced Plastic Beam – 6o ft Propulsor – Podded Propulors 




  B. TECHNOLOGY DECISIONS 
 
In the main body of the report, technology gaps for fulfilling all of the USC functional areas 
were discussed.  As a further step towards advancing the idea of a USC, suitable technologies 
have been selected for a notional USC concept based on non-rigorous, but rational comparative 
assessments. Most, if not all, of these technologies require further work in software and hardware 
development in order to integrate and provide full autonomy.  The selections for each functional 
area are discussed below, and the rough level of work required to provide full autonomy is 
discussed in Section C of this appendix. Again, the purpose of this notional concept is not to 
provide a rigorous design of a specific USC for explicit requirements, rather it is to provide a 
possible USC concept that can enable further discussion and exploration of the USC idea. 
 
1) USC Central Control Architecture 
 
Technologies for Central Control Computing Center  
The Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE) under development for the DDG 1000 is a 
promising option which can provide the basis for the USC 4C.  The TSCE is “an advanced, open 
systems architecture that provides a scalable platform for cost-efficient delivery of new mission 
capability while capitalizing on the reuse of millions of lines of code from existing Navy 
programs. The system delivers an unprecedented level of Mission Systems Integration and 
automation. As such, it is a primary driver for the 60 percent reduction in manning for the 
Zumwalt-class destroyer versus the requirement for today's Arleigh Burke-class destroyers” 
[Anon, 2006:1].  Development of the 4C will be based on zero manning and therefore will 
require a great deal of programming, system automation development, and artificial intelligence 
on a level that has not yet been accomplished. 
 
The Command and Control function of the USC will be an integral part of the 4C.  The Global 
Command and Control System, Maritime (GCCS-M), “provides maritime commanders at all 
echelons with a single, integrated, and scalable Command and Control system. GCCS-M fuses, 
correlates, filters, maintains, and displays location and attribute information on friendly, hostile, 
and neutral land, sea, and air forces.  GCCS-M also integrates this data with available 
intelligence and environmental information to support command decisions [SPAWAR, 2011:1].”  
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This system is currently designed for a man in the loop implementation so it will require 
significant modifications to enable it to be used on the USC.   
 
Technologies for Ship Control 
This system is composed of 4 major sub functions that perform a wide variety of tasks.  These 
tasks include Bridge and Navigation Control, Damage Control, Internal Ship Sensing, and 
Machinery Plant control.  All of these control functions will require significant modifications and 
additions to existing systems to make them function on the USC.   
 
Technologies for External Communication Control  
The technologies that are currently used for combatants will be used on the USC but significant 
automation will be necessary to enable the communication systems to receive and transmit 
automatically.  This will be a subset of the 4C system development.  To accomplish external 
communications, the USC will require systems that allow communication with assets that are 
nearby (line of sight) and over the horizon.  Over the horizon includes satellite capability so 
command authority can provide tasking / situational awareness information and allow the USC 
to provide information from any onboard sensor to other networked assets as well as 
organizations that provide monitoring functions.  To accomplish the external communication 
control, the USC will require similar systems that are on other combatants.  These include the 
following: 
 
• VHF Line of Sight (LOS) - Navigation,  USC Control Link, 
• UHF Line of Sight - USC Remote Control  
• Ku-band - Data distribution  (including fire control, imagery, tactical control net) on the 
OPAREA level of ship location  
• Ku-band SATCOM - High data rate (transmit and receive for real time communication  
• L-band Line of Sight - Tactical Communication with joint forces (includes own service)  
• L-band SATCOM - Navigation - GPS  
• S-band  - Data transmission, including imagery, video.  Interoperable with DHS to 
support close in US coastal defense and emergency relief (need to check is this is listed as 
a USC mission) 
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• Electro Optical Line of Sight - Precision Launch and Recovery of UUV an UAV  
 
Technologies to accomplish External Sensor Control (ISR) 
The above-water sensor may consist of an EW suite similar to the ‘AN/SLQ-32 ECM (Electronic 
Countermeasures) system which uses radar warning receivers, and in some cases active 
jamming, as the part of ship’s self defense system. The SLQ-32 provides warning of incoming 
attacks, and is integrated with the ship’s defenses to trigger Rapid Blooming Offboard Chaff 
(RBOC) and other decoys, which can fire either semi-automatically or on manual direction from 
a ship’s ECM operators’ [Anon, 2011]. 
 
Technologies to accomplish Weapons Control 
The USC will be armed with a variety of offensive and defensive weapons.  The software to 
analyze sensor data and determine friend or foe, when the use of weapons is warranted, and 
which weapon is ideal for each situation, will reside in C2.  Some of the intelligence data may be 
provided by the weapon systems themselves; however, decisions will be made within C2 as to 
when to fire the weapon or when to put the weapon on auto mode. 
 
2) Anti-Submarine Warfare 
 
Anti-Submarine Warfare trade-offs were made based on maturity, autonomy, and performance.  
ASW specific performance characteristics included: 
• COTS – properly executed this implies rapid delivery of increased capabilities and 
performance to the fleet 
• Signal Processing – this is key to much of the ASW problem.  Future ASW capability 
will likely be found in new algorithms that provide more actionable information in the 
data currently provided. Also, the capability of sensors, the amount of data, and the 
number of devices provided will increase, requiring increased bandwidth, greater 
processing speed and more computing power. 
• Interoperability – how likely these systems will be able to operate with existing systems 
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Table 14. ASW Package Decision Table 
 
 
Decision Table Results 
Only two systems were considered because no other deployed systems had the high level of 
interoperability required. Each system is detailed in APPENDIX E – ASW TECHNOLOGIES.  
The selected system, Integrated Sonar Suite, is highlighted in green above.  This system was 
selected because it shows the most promise for further development and implementation on a 
USC, but there are still areas that have to improve in order for this system to work on a USC.  
Reasons why this system was preferred over the AN/SQQ-89(V) and specific shortfalls which 
still exist are discussed below: 
 
Hull Mounted Sonar 
The AN/SQQ-89(V) HMS was designed for deep ocean use and is too large and heavy to meet 
USC constraints. The nominal Ultra Integrated Sonar Suite (Ultra – ISS) provides a smaller dual 
frequency sonar that performs ASW, mine avoidance and object avoidance capability. The dual 
frequencies allow the HMS to be used for both ASW and mine hunting in deep ocean and the 
littorals.  Despite a high degree of automation the Ultra ISS will still need to be fully automated 
and interfaced with the other sonar, navigation, weapons, and ship control systems. 
 
Towed Array 
The AN/SQQ-89(V) towed array requires a large handling system that is prone to maintenance 
issues and can sometimes damage the array. The Ultra – ISS provides linear towed array and 
VDS functionality in a single towed array.  The VDS is not a “hard body” design so it does not 
require a large handling system. The array requires only two men to fully deploy and recover in a 
Sea State 6 and involves a single winch. This system uses less manpower and less complicated 
machinery and therefore would be much easier to fully automate than a standard VDS handling 
system.  
score total score total score total score total score total
AN/SQQ-89 3 3 2 6 2 2 2 4 2 6 8 17
Integrated Sonar Suite 3 3 2 6 3 3 3 6 3 9 12 21
Integrated Anti-Submarine Warfare / Undersea Warfare Combat System (ASWCS/UWCS)
Total 
Score
COTS (1) SignalProcessing (2) Interoperability (3) Perf 
Total
ASW Equipment





Both systems are compatible with sonobuoys. Ultra is a sonobuoy manufacturer. Sonobuoys are 
currently either launched or dropped by hand over the side on surface ships. A USC would either 
need to have an automatic launcher or a simple mechanism to allow the sonobuoys to drop over 
the side of the ship.  
 
ASW weapons 
Both systems are compatible with ASW weapons systems.  The AN/SQQ-89(V) has external 
interfaces to the MK 331 Torpedo Setting Panel (TSP), MK 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS), 
and the AEGIS Weapon System (AWS).  Ultra – ISS processes data across all sensors so the 
system is able to execute both bi-static and multi-static processing between the HMS and VDS 
not only on a single vessel, but also between vessels, creating a Force ASW capability.  This 
capability should allow for quicker transition from detect to engage. 
 
There are three categories of weapons available for surface combatants to use against 
submarines: projectiles, torpedoes and missiles.  Projectiles refer to bullets and similar armament 
and imply no “smart” capabilities.  These devices are largely ineffective against a submarine. 
Torpedoes are the weapon of choice against submarines because they are effective and compared 
to missiles relatively cheap.  Missiles can be used to rapidly deliver torpedoes closer to a target.  
To do so, however, requires the addition of both the required missile infrastructure, such as 
missile control panels, launch containers and resulting increased cost.   
 
Three lightweight torpedoes were considered for USC use.  All three are currently in production.  
Based on the limited data available and the desire for extremely high reliability, the US Mk 54 
torpedo was selected - it is a hybrid design that uses parts from several earlier torpedoes.  The 
Franco-Italian MU90 IMPACT would be a close second choice - it was developed from scratch 
for littoral use, has very long range, and can vary its speed to exceed 50 knots.  Pending the 
availability of more information, especially reliability data, the MU90 IMPACT could become 
the preferred choice. 
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Design Table Results 
The selected weapon is highlighted in green below.  This weapon was selected because it 
currently shows the most promise on a USC, but there are still areas to investigate.  The range 
information was classified and unavailable but the unclassified ranges are adequate for all littoral 
and most deep ocean use. Specific decision table results are listed below: 
 
Table 15. ASW Weapon Decision Table 
 
 
3) Mine Warfare 
 
In addition to maturity and autonomy, several mine hunting specific characteristics were used to 
judge relative performance. These included: 
• System weight, including the means of deployment, i.e., a UAV if required 
• Mechanism to deploy – this is the current deployment mechanism which will need to be 
altered when deployed from a USC.  The weighting factors indicate perceived ease of 
shifting from the current method to a fully autonomous method 
• Mission time – how long it will take to complete the mission with one of these systems 
• Safety, i.e., safety to any people who might be involved in that operation today, and 
• Capability, or ability to complete the task successfully. 
 
score total score total score total score total score total
UK Stingray 3 3 2 6 1 1 1 2 1 3 4 13
MK54 3 3 2 6 2 2 2 4 2 6 8 17
MU90/IMPACT 3 3 2 6 3 3 3 6 3 9 12 21
Lightweight Torpedoes
ASW Weapons




Range (1) Versatility (2) Effectiveness (3) Perf 
Total
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Table 16. Mine Warfare Decision Table 
 
Decision Table Results 
Current systems are highlighted in green above.  Though these systems have been selected 
because they show the most promise for further development and implementation on a USC, 
there are still many areas that have to improve in order for these systems to work.  Specific 
shortfalls are listed below: 
 
Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) – The ALMDS is a high performance system, 
and while time required to complete the mission is significantly better than the AN/AQS-20 
because its swath is wider, it will need to be mounted to an airborne vehicle such as the VTUAV 
which will increase weight, cost, and complexity.  In addition, it suffers from the general 
autonomy deficiencies described in section III.A.c) – Mine Warfare. 
 
Archerfish – Four Archerfish are carried in a pod which means that less launch and recoveries of 
the system are required to complete the mission.  However, it will need to be adapted to launch 
and deploy from a USC, and it needs autonomy in place of the human guidance system to 
targets. 
 
Unmanned Surface Sweep System (US3) – The US3 system is already deployed from a USV so 
deployment from the USC should not be much of an issue.  The fact that a sweeping system is 
still used so often in missions is a testament to the mine warfare challenge.  In a future with 
advanced autonomy and better identification of mines amongst bottom clutter, perhaps the mine 
sweeping role will be further reduced. 
score total score total score total score total score total score total score total Perf Total
Human 3 3 1 3 3 3 USC (3) 6 1 3 1 3 2 8 6 12
AQS-20 2 2 3 9 2 2 RMS/MH-60 (2) 4 2 6 3 9 2 8 8.4 19.4
ALMDS 2 2 3 9 1 2 MH-60 (1) 2 3 9 3 9 3 12 8.8 19.8
Human 3 3 1 3 3 3 USC (3) 6 1 3 1 3 1 4 6 12
AMNS 2 2 2 6 2 2 MH-60 (1)/USC 4 2 6 3 9 2 8 8.4 16.4
Archerfish 2 2 2 6 2 2 MH-60 (1) 2 3 9 3 9 3 12 8.8 16.8
Human 3 3 1 3 3 3 USC (3) 6 1 3 1 3 1 4 6 12
OASIS 2 2 3 9 2 2 MH-60 (1) 2 3 9 3 9 2 8 8.8 19.8








Weight (1) Mechanism to Deploy (2) Mission Time (3) Safety (3) Capability (4)






The following technologies were considered as candidates upon which more research and 
development could lead to full autonomy for use onboard a USC.  The performance criteria on 
which they were evaluated are listed below: 
• Portability, since no autonomous system currently exists this was based on the perceived 
ease with which the technology demonstrated can be ported to another vessel. 
• Collision avoidance was evaluated based on the robustness of the programming and 
demonstrated real world effectiveness. 
• Data fusion was an assessment of the capability of the technology to integrate the various 
pieces, and demonstrate a rapid and efficient method of processing the data generated, 
then transforming it into a navigation response. 
Table 17. Navigation Decision Table 
   
Decision Table Results 
The performance characteristics specific to Navigation included portability, collision avoidance, 
and data fusion and are shown in Table 18.  
 
Five separate manufacturers of navigation technology were considered..  Three integrated Bridge 
and Navigation manufacturers: Kongsberg, Sperry Marine, and Raytheon, were considered. A 
fourth manufacturer, Elbit Systems, a company that designs and builds UAVs and Unmanned 
Ground Vehicles (UGV), was also considered.  The final manufacturer, a consortium of 
companies led by Spatial Integrated Systems (SIS), Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL), and Naval Surface 
Warfare Center Carderock Division (NSWCCD) has designed a portable, Autonomous Maritime 
Navigation (AMN) system to provide autonomy independent of platform. 
 
Portability: Only one of the five systems, AMN was designed from the start to be portable to 
other ships.  Each of the others was designed specifically for the ship on which it was installed 
score total score total score total score total score total
Raytheon 1 1 1 3 2 2 3 6 2 6 9.33 13.33
Kongberg Maritime 1 1 1 3 2 2 3 6 2 6 9.33 13.33
Sperry Marine 1 1 1 3 2 2 3 6 2 6 9.33 13.33
Elbit Systems 3 3 3 9 2 2 3 6 2 6 9.33 21.33
Autonomous Maritime Navigation (AMN) 3 3 3 9 3 3 3 6 3 9 12 24
ASW Weapons




Portability (1) Collision Avoidance (2) Data Fusion (3) Perf 
Total
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and in the case of the three Integrated Bridge and Navigation systems the objective was to reduce 
the number of operators, not to eliminate them altogether.  
 
Collision avoidance: All five systems (ANS, AMN, Kongsberg, Sperry Marine and Raytheon) 
have demonstrated collision avoidance as a fundamental component of the navigation systems. 
 
Data Fusion:  Only AMN was designed from the start to operate exclusively autonomously by 
leveraging a sophisticated control system design used by the Mars Rover and implementing open 
system architecture to ease the process of adding additional capabilities and sensors. 
 
AMN was chosen as the best base technology to build from.  SIS, JPL, NSWCCD, and others 
developed the AMN program.  AMN combines advanced 3D imaging technology, LIDAR, 
RADAR, multi-sensory data fusion, multi-dimensional processing algorithms, and state-of-the-
art NASA Mars Rover artificial intelligence into an advanced sensor suite that is platform 
independent.  The AMN design demonstrates a high degree of autonomy, while being tested at 
sustained speeds up to 30 knots and under severe weather conditions.  AMN has demonstrated 
the ability to consistently detect and avoid buoys, channel markers, and range markers, at speeds 
up to 25 knots.  The AMN is shown in Figure 24. 
 
 
Figure 24. AMN 
However, there is still more work to be done. AMN has demonstrated a novel autonomous 
product but not on a vessel of the size and complexity of a USC and scaling up the technology to 
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a corvette/frigate sized vessel will present many challenges.  In fairness to all the other 
manufacturers, except SIS, full autonomy was not their objective so they may be capable of a 
formidable product if given the opportunity. 
 
5) Self Defense 
 
Detect to Engage – Combat Systems Software 
There are various software packages available for the integration and central management of 
sensors and weapons.  Combat Management Systems (CMS) main functions include surveillance 
and picture compilation for situational awareness using the on-board sensors and tactical data 
links, evaluation of threats, and automatic sensor and weapon assignment and kill assessment. 
Some CMS available for consideration are Terma’s C-Flex, Thales’s Tacticos, and Saab’s 9LV.   
Other systems such as Raytheon’s Ship Self-Defense System (SSDS) and Lockheed Martin’s 
COMBATSS-21 are not considered at this time due to current known reliability problems (on 
LPD-17 and LCS-1 respectively), but may be considered at a later date when problems have 
been corrected. 
 
Terma’s C-Flex  
C-Flex is currently used on various Royal Danish Navy classes of ships and on the Romanian 
Navy Marasesti Frigate.  The C-Flex system is configured around a fiber-optic 1000/100 Mbit 
Ethernet LAN and is based on the T-Core Common Operational Environment.  The system 
consists of COTS-units with Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS) protection. Sub-System 
Interface Units (SSIU) replace the standard interface units with containerized weapons and 
peripheral sensors and perform the necessary conversion and adaptation of data formats and 
transmission protocols between subsystems and the C-Flex. This allows for subsystems to 
function independently in the event of damage or malfunction. Radar and video information is 
digitized at the sensor and transported on a parallel, separate TCP/IP network. Routing is carried 
out by the system if a degradation of the system occurs.  Functionality includes picture 
compilation with unlimited tracks (up to 1,000 tracks with no performance reduction), AAW 
Threat Evaluation and Weapon Assignment (TEWA) - hard and soft kill, Link 11, Link 16 and 




Tacticos is used by 15 Navy’s worldwide on more than 150 vessels, including on LCS-2 as 
ICMS.  The system is comprised of command and control, command support and fire-control 
facilities for anti-air, surface, anti-submarine and electronic warfare as well as naval gunfire 
support.  TACTICOS is based on a distributed computer architecture, applying a multinode, 
multiprocessor concept for battle damage-resistant configuration.  Software is written in Ada and 
C++, and includes the SPLICE distributed database and data communication software that 
operates alongside a real-time version of UNIX. The console hardware is based on unmodified 
commercial off-the-shelf workstations, and hardware is linked through a redundant Local Area 
Network (LAN) formed by Ethernet, Fast Ethernet or ATM.  There is a compact version of this 
system with limited functionality. [Anon, 2011] 
 
Saab’s 9LV  
The 9LV is installed in numerous ships around the globe (114 systems delivered) and comes in 
different variants (Mk1, Mk2/2.5, Mk3).  Of primary interest is the 9LV 350, a command and 
weapon control system with electro-optical sensors and added ASW.  It can engage two air 
targets simultaneously and, for surface engagements, it features a track-while-scan capability 
when using surface-to-surface missiles.  The ASW subsystem can show sound path propagation 
data.  It uses the ship sonar system for search and tracking, presents and evaluates the data, 
predicts the target's position, calculates the control data for the ASW weapons and calculates the 
ship's course. The system is designed to control ASW rockets and torpedoes but can be adapted 
for use with depth charges.  9LV Mk-3E is to be installed in the Swedish Visby-class stealth 
corvettes. [Anon, 2011] 
  
Figure 25. Combat Systems Software Decision Table 
score total score total score total score total
C-Flex 2 2 3 9 2 6 3 6 2 2 9.3 20.3
Tacticos 3 3 3 9 3 9 3 6 3 3 12.0 24.0
9LV 2 2 3 9 2 6 3 6 3 3 10.0 21.0











Features (3) Survivability Weight (1)
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Decision Table Results 
The three systems evaluated have all been installed and used on numerous ships and been 
improved through many iterations.  They all have open architecture with data redundancy for 
survivability, and improvement in weight, footprint and usage of COTS.  The ratings are fairly 
equal as a result.   
To fully automate the ship, modifications will need to be made.  Software logic will need to 
replace humans for fire authorization, and a proven method needs to be incorporated into the 
software intelligence to only target real, imminent and confirmed threat.  Also, remote override 
of controls or remote authorization would need to be incorporated for the theater commander to 
make use of the ship’s assets if and when necessary.  Both hardware and software reliability, 
redundancy and recoverability need to be improved for an ideal autonomous system.  
Operation with USC’s will need to be incorporated into the Navy’s existing methods, procedures 
and training. 
Identification of Targets – Identification of friendly forces can be aided by current systems such 
as AIS (Automatic Identification System) and LRIT (Long Range Identification and Tracking 
system).  AIS can provide unique identification, position, course, and speed.  The greatest 
limitation of AIS is that craft under 10 tons are not required to have AIS and the small boat 
attack is the most likely threat when operating in the littorals.  AIS can also be easily 
reprogrammed to ID merchant vice naval vessels.  Ships outside of radio range can be tracked 
with LRIT with less frequent transmission.  Friendly aircraft are identified using IFF.   
 
Identification of hostiles can be done using long range video cameras similar to the ARGC-2400 
long range camera, and interpretation systems such as Video Image Retrieval and Analysis Tool 
(VIRAT).  The system can be shown a video clip of interest (in this case perhaps images of 
known pirate ships or pirates with guns), and it will look for similar video in the ISR imagery.  It 
can also match a behavior of interest, given an example of the same [Peck, 2010].  With further 
research and higher degree of confidence, this technology could be used by a USC to effectively 
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identify foes. USC employment should be less data intensive since there should be a smaller set 
of data for known threats at sea. 
 
Air Threat Evaluation and Weapon Choice – Aside from a gun or missile system, the ship should 
also be equipped with electronic support measures (ESM), electronic counter measures (ECM), 
chaff, and decoys.  ESM, ECM, chaff and decoys can elude, confuse, and direct the attacking air 
threats into harmless directions or prevent an enemy from attacking.  According to P. Huang and 
P. Kar, “The costs of operating these soft kill systems are a fraction of that for hard kill weapon 
systems. Replenishment of soft kill systems such as chaff and decoys can be performed easily 
compared with replenishing hard kill systems. In contrast, hard kill systems are expensive, 
difficult to maintain, and each ship can carry only a limited number of them. The cost to operate 
ESM and ECM is almost negligible and the resources are almost unlimited [Huang, 1994].”  
Huang and Kar present a coordinated AAW engagement algorithm by which the threat is 
assessed against defense resources to generate a set of threat/weapon pairs and selects the 
optimal choice based on combat doctrines and resources using standard mathematical 
procedures.  “A combined soft kill/ hard kill engagement simulation tool that was based on 
Naval Research Laboratory's Full Engagement Demonstration Simulation (FEDS) model was 
used to test this algorithm. The results confirmed that this algorithm has potential to be used as 
an add-on or new development item for naval ship AAW weapon control and other resource 
allocation applications.”   
 
Since this is an unmanned ship with limited pre-loaded rounds, the use of decoy and chaff is a 
sensible option.  Combat doctrines will have to be set prior to deployment or remotely 
communicated while underway.   Doctrine will be different utilizing soft kill systems while 
operating independently as opposed to in close proximity to other shipping and manned naval 
assets.    
 
Lethal Weapons - Existing lethal weapons (guns and missile launchers) can operate without 
manning, though they are normally manned for safety and ethical reasons.  There are numerous 
CIWS which are autonomous with the exception of weapons loading.  A decision table was used 
to compare various US and Allied models of CIWS with remote capability, with the scores 
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favoring those with longer range and those which are already used on US ships.  The SeaRAM 
missile is a good choice based on those characteristics, as well as having the same footprint as 
the current CIWS and the future Laser weapon (LaWS).  Percent kill (Pk) was not used in this 
comparison but should be employed in an engagement analysis before a design decision is made.    
Table 18. CIWS Decision Table 
 
Manpower is required to load all of the above weapons (minus the laser).  They can be preloaded 
to a certain point prior to departure and reloaded as needed, but an automated method of loading 
would be required for use on a USC.  The AGS on DDG1000 is fully automated but is too large 
for a smaller USC.  The ideal weapon which would not require reloading is the Laser Weapon.  
Various laser weapons (such as the Laser Weapon System (LaWS) or Maritime Laser 
Demonstration (MLD) are in development and should be ready for deployment in a couple of 
years.  LaWS has been tested successfully in a sea environment.  However, it still needs a lot of 
integration before becoming usable on a Navy platform as the next weapon system, and will 
require a huge power plant to operate, which needs to be evaluated against USC cost and needs.  
The table below provides an assessment of power needs. 
 
score total score total score total score total score total score total
Phalanx 3 3 3 9 1 3 3 6 3 6 1 1 8 20
SeaRAM 3 3 3 9 3 9 3 6 2 4 1 1 10 22
Goalkeeper 2 2 3 9 2 6 3 6 3 6 1 1 9.5 20.5
Millennium 3 3 2 6 2 6 3 6 3 6 1 1 9.5 18.5
Typhoon 3 3 2 6 3 9 1 2 1 2 2 2 7.5 16.5
Seahawk 2 2 3 9 3 9 2 4 2 4 2 2 9.5 20.5
Rheinmetall MLG 2 2 2 6 2 6 2 4 1 2 2 2 7 15
Marlin 2 2 2 6 3 9 2 4 2 4 2 2 9.5 17.5
Narwhal 2 2 2 6 3 9 2 4 2 4 3 3 10 18
LaWS 1 1 3 9 3 9 3 6 3 6 1 1 11 21
*Maturity: usage on US Ships









Range (3) Firing Rate (2)
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Figure 26. Power Requirements for Laser Weapon Systems [Hoffman, 2010] 
 
Non-Lethal Weapons – There are some non-lethal weapons such as noise guns which can be 
adapted to a mount to enable aiming at a target (see camera example in APPENDIX F – SELF 
DEFENSE TECHNOLOGIES) with a noise or voice generator.  The Long Range Acoustic 
Device (LRAD) is a noise gun currently used on Navy ships with a range of over 3000 meters. 
The device can be programmed to issue warning messages in multiple languages.  The intensity 
of the LRAD sound waves can be adjusted to cause pain to unprotected eardrums as a non-lethal 
alternative. The LRAD would need to be designed to be guided and aimed by radar and sound 
delivery would need to be automated. 
 
Other non-lethal weapons (such as tear gas or slippery surface sprays) and weapon detection 
devices (such as are used for explosive and small object detection and avoidance) would need to 
be used at much closer range and would have to be automated to provide further protection for 
the ship should hostile forces/divers attempt to board her. 
 
6) Damage Control 
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The following damage control methods that are currently in use (or soon to be available) would 
provide an appropriate starting point for a notional USC: 
Table 19. Damage Control Technologies 
Damage Control Function Technology 
Fire Prevention Inboard  N2 Fuel Cell Exhaust (Reduce 
compartment O2 levels) 
Fire Control Water Mist and Primary Damage Area 
(PDA) Cooling, AFFF (spaces with fuel) 
Flooding Control Smart Valves 
Damage Mitigation Automated Damage Assessment & 
Decision Support Program 
 
Fire prevention and control – Fire prevention is addressed by using Inboard N2 Fuel Cell 
Exhaust.  This is a very effective way to prevent a fire by reducing the oxygen level in the ship 
with the addition of nitrogen enriched air, which is produced by fuel cell exhaust. The 
N2telligence fuel cell could be used to generate the nitrogenated air, though hydrogen fuel cells 
are not currently in the US Navy stock.  Another option would be to use the Wagner Corp 
method which extracts nitrogen from the outside air and feeds it into the space.  Spaces would 
need to be sealed prior to pumping in the nitrogen, and this would be in line with normal 
protocol where any bulkheads are usually closed (autonomously in this case) once smoke or fire 
is detected.  Since the ship is unmanned, low oxygen content is not a concern, and a fuel cell 
propulsion plant, if selected, would complement this approach.  According to PC World (2007), 
wood stops burning when oxygen content falls to 17% and plastic cables between 16-17%.  A 15 
percent oxygen level is safe for humans without allowing a fire to start.  This method is used by 




Figure 27. Burn down behavior [Wagner, 2011] 
 
This technology is currently used by Wagner and N2telligence for data centers, but can easily be 
adapted for use on the USC, or at least all areas with critical equipment.   
Fire detection will be automated with smoke and heat or flame detectors.  Monitoring 
applications (cameras and backup sensors) will need to distinguish between sensors randomly 
failing and those being systematically destroyed by hazardous events.  Fire control is addressed 
by the use of high pressure water mist and Primary Damage Area (PDA) systems or boundary 
cooling which are the latest systems used on US Navy Ships.  High pressure water mist has been 
successfully demonstrated to snuff out fires and cool spaces in very little time, and has been 
installed on numerous platforms including LPD and LCS.  A PDA cooling system is a bulkhead 
division water spray which provides cooling in each level of a watertight subdivision to prevent 
fire spread to other subdivisions, and is planned for installation on DDG1000.  These systems are 
automatic and just need an adequate water source. 
 
Flooding Control - Flooding control will be addressed by using watertight bulkheads and doors, 
automated dewatering pumps and automated transferring of fluids (using smart valves) to 
maintain ship stability.  Doors can be permanently closed at ship sail away since there are no 
personnel onboard.  Bulkhead valves will need to be automated. 
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Ship damage recognition and prediction – The most important aspect of unmanned damage 
control is restoration of the plant.  Response to system damage such as broken or leaky pipes can 
be accomplished by the rerouting of fluids using pre-programmed smart valves.  Smart valves 
are being used currently on the DDG 51 class starting with DDG 108 for chilled water, and on 
DDG 1000 for all pipe systems. 
 
Ship damage prediction should be programmed into USC situational awareness for quicker 
response to damage control needs (such as starting of backup equipment or moving fuel to tanks 
opposite of possible flooding zone).  When an attack is encountered, the software would compute 
weapon attack (incoming missile) coordinates, calculate possible damage, flooding and fire 
spread zones, and determine appropriate response or dynamic preparation [Hou, 2010].  This 
software is not a mature technology but should be ready for a 2020 IOC if it is invested in now.  
Inbound missiles tracking has already been included in self defense considerations. 
 
 




Figure 29. Damage Assessment/Decision Support Program [Varela, 2007:60] 
 
Figure 29 shows a simplified compartment and ventilation arrangement in a military ship, with 
containers and connectors identified.   Logic is programmed for automated control (closure) of 




It is important that adequate sensors are in the prediction/monitoring systems to record timely 
equipment health status, and that IR cameras are mounted in strategic locations so that, if needed, 
remote operators can see damage areas in order to assess the ship’s capabilities and intervene 
effectively.  Sensor data which should be recorded on the USC  includes operating temperatures, 
fluid levels, differential pressure, flow, vibration, particle counter, stress levels, etc. to enable the 
ship to do self-diagnosis, take automated corrective action if available, and provide accurate 
information to remote operators. 
  
Power Management – An automated optimal network configuration that restores the power 
system network without violating power system operating constraints should be implemented on 
the USC to enable the ship to remain operational after a casualty. Some development to date uses 
dynamic formulation and a static implementation of a new damage control method at the DC 
zonal integrated fight through power system level.  Current research involves developing a 
dynamic implementation of the damage control method.  Researchers at the Power System 
Automation Laboratory (PSAL) at Texas A&M University are developing dynamic solutions for 
various power management functions, including damage control, to implement on Next 
Generation Integrated Power System (NGIPS) Shipboard Power Systems [Amba, 2009]. 
 
Under Hull Monitoring – Under hull monitoring can be accomplished using available sonar or an 
AUV such as Cetus II with a Miris Sonar or a Hovering Autonomous Underwater Vehicle 
(HAUV) in remote mode via a tether [Anon, 2011].   Launch and recovery of this vehicle will 
need to be included in the USC design for operation especially while in hostile ports, and may be 
able to service both hull monitoring and MIW. 
  
Intrusion Control - Security at the pier, if necessary, can be augmented using cameras and facial 
recognition technology such as is used at airports for screening of potential suspects/terrorists in 
foreign ports.  2D images work better under low lighting conditions and this method is less 
expensive than 3D.  One such system is Smartgate. 
 
Gangways would be remotely operated by maintenance crew as needed.  All access doors can be 
cipher locked or smart card accessed and protected with alarms and non-lethal weapon sprays 
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such as tear gas, should a confirmed intrusion attempt be made.  Museum style security can be 
used in secured spaces.  Once a breach occurs of a secured area, possible use of lethal weapons 
may be considered, or equipment/data self destruction. 
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C. NOTIONAL CONCEPT 
The USC notional concept is a possible ship configuration based on the constraints, 
considerations, and relevant technologies that allow an unmanned autonomous USC to perform 
the primary missions of MIW and ASW. Table 21 summarizes the technologies, systems and 
characteristics chosen for the USC.   





4500 nm @ cruising speed
0 Officers, 0 Enlisted Hardware Software
Length 250 -300 ft. N/A N/A
Beam 40 - 60 ft. N/A N/A
Draft 10 - 15 ft. N/A N/A
Hull form Glass Reinforced Plastic Monohull N/A N/A
Propulsion Podded Electric Propulsor
Power Plant Fuel Cell
Auxiliary Systems Modular Design
Mine Hunting ALMDS
Mine Neutralization Archerfish
Mine Sweeping Unmanned Surface Sweep System (US3)
Hull Mounted Sonar Ultra ISS - HMS
Towed Sonar Ultra ISS - VDS
Sonobuoys Ultra ISS - Sonobuoys
Torpedo Mk 54 Lightweight Hybrid 
NAVIGATION Autonomous Maritime Navigation (AMN) System
Flooding Control Smart Valves
Ship Control System Central Computing Control Computer







INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY Modification Level 









DAMAGE    CONTROL
Fire Prevention
Damage Mitigation
Fire Control Mist and Primary Damage Area (PDA) Cooling
Inboard  N2 Fuel Cell Exhaust (Reduce 
compartment O2 levels) 
USC CONTROL External Communications
UHF LOS, Ku-band, Ku-band SATCOM, L-band 
LOS, L-band SATCOM, S-band 
ECM / SELF DEFENSE




Green - Requires Minimal Design Modifications 
Yellow - Requires Moderate Design Modifications 
Red - Requires Significant Design Modifications 
 
 Some of these capabilities will be accomplished by systems that are ready for inclusion into the 
USC while others require moderate to significant development.  These technologies, systems and 
characteristics were identified as the best alternatives that are currently available or development 
is estimated to be complete to meet the 2020 IOC date. Additionally, each of these technologies 
has been assigned a color code that indicated the amount of modification required for full 
autonomy.  The modification level has been divided into a hardware and software category to 
further refine the level of work necessary to make the system or function fully autonomous. 
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D. SUGGESTED CONCEPT ALTERNATIVES 
 
The notional USC concept technologies and systems presented earlier were suggested based on a 
number of factors including maturity, autonomy, and performance.  Autonomy was weighted the 
highest since the main purpose of the project was to investigate an unmanned surface combatant, 
and the other factors were weighted less heavily.    That said, Navy developers may have other 
competing priorities which would change weighting factors and potentially result in different 
baseline technologies for a USC.  An attempt was made to look at some of these trade-offs in the 
categories of cost and technical performance in order to more thoroughly understand the problem 
and further explore the potential solution space. These constraints were thought to have 
significant impact on the USC’s capabilities, and they were varied in order to produce a low cost 
and a high performance alternative. 
 
Low Cost Alternative 
Development of the suggested baseline USC technologies requires a significant budget, which 
may not be supportable in a declining economic environment.  The preferred notional concept is 
expected to be a multi-mission combatant fully capable of operating with a Strike Group and 
performing independent missions.  The low cost alternative would be a reduced capability 
combatant that would be built with less expensive materials and systems, and might trade off 
large numbers of missiles in favor of cheaper weapons such as chaff and decoys.  The systems 
which changed based on the cost evaluation are highlighted in the following table: 
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4500 nm @ cruising speed
0 Officers, 0 Enlisted
Length 250 -300 ft.
Beam 40 - 60 ft.
Draft 10 - 15 ft.
Hull form Steel Monohull
Propulsion Controllable Pitch Propellor
Power Plant Diesel Engine
Auxiliary Systems Modular Design
Mine Hunting AN/AQS-20
Mine Neutralization Archerfish
Mine Sweeping Unmanned Surface Sweep System (US3)
Hull Mounted Sonar Ultra
Towed Sonar None
Torpedo Mk 54 Lightweight Hybrid 
NAVIGATION Autonomous Maritime Navigation (AMN) System
Flooding Control Smart Valves
Ship Control System Central Computing Control Computer












USC CONTROL External Communications
UHF LOS, Ku-band, Ku-band SATCOM, L-band 
LOS, L-band SATCOM, S-band 
ECM / SELF DEFENSE
MINE WARFARE
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
DAMAGE    CONTROL
Fire Prevention
Inboard  N2 Fuel Cell Exhaust (Reduce 
compartment O2 levels) 
Fire Control Mist and Primary Damage Area (PDA) Cooling
Damage Mitigation
Automated Damage Assessment & Decision 
Support Program
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High Performance Alternative 
The suggested notional concept was selected with systems that were capable of adequately 
performing their intended function, and with systems that were able to be automated for 
inclusion in the USC.  The high performance alternative would include the systems that were 
capable of significantly increased performance regardless of investment.  Some technologies 
which would be very beneficial for the USC had been ruled out prior to development of the 
decision tables due to very immature technology or lack of information about the systems.  
Therefore, the team approach to the high performance alternative was to interview the team 
researchers in each area and list the best technologies which could enhance USC performance.  
These technologies are highlighted in   
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Table 23 and some additional thoughts are described in more depth below:  
• Some general thoughts on a craft with significantly increased performance would be to 
design a unique hull form specifically suited for ASW and MIW missions, as well as 
increased weapons for ASW and self defense missions. 
• A MIW system which can detect, classify, identify and engage all in one pass is in the 
very early stages of development – this would be the best performing system because it 
would take the least amount of time.   
• A laser gun with updated electric plant was favored instead of the SeaRAM for the close 
in weapons system.  This system requires more power than the SeaRAM but should be 
available by 2020 and fits in the current CIWS mount.  
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Table 22: High Performance Alternative 
2020
30 Knots
4500 nm @ cruising speed
0 Officers, 0 Enlisted
Length 250 -300 ft.
Beam 40 - 60 ft.
Draft 10 - 15 ft.
Hull form Glass Reinforced Plastic Monohull
Propulsion Podded Electric Propulser
Power Plant Fuel Cell
Auxiliary Systems Modular Design
Mine Hunting
Mine Neutralization
Mine Sweeping Unmanned Surface Sweep System (US3)
Hull Mounted Sonar Ultra
Towed Sonar ISS - VDS
Torpedo MU90 IMPACT
NAVIGATION
Autonomous Maritime Navigation (AMN) 
System
Flooding Control Smart Valves
Ship Control System Central Computing Control Computer












USC CONTROL External Communications
UHF LOS, Ku-band, Ku-band SATCOM, L-
band LOS, L-band SATCOM, S-band 
ECM / SELF DEFENSE




DAMAGE    CONTROL
Fire Prevention
Inboard  N2 Fuel Cell Exhaust (Reduce 
compartment O2 levels) 
Fire Control
Mist and Primary Damage Area (PDA) 
Cooling
Damage Mitigation












1.0 DESIGN PHASE     
1.1 System components 
cannot be modified for 
full autonomy 
Medium Medium Medium Investigate alternative tech 
option.  Consider redesign to 
allow autonomous operation 
1.2 Systems are not 
sufficiently redundant 
Low Medium Low 
 
Redesign to allow for sufficient 
redundancy 
1.3 Systems are not 
sufficiently distributed 
Low Medium Low Redesign to allow for sufficient 
system distribution 
1.4 Systems chosen are 
insufficient to meet 
requirements 
Low Medium Low Investigate alternative system or 
system of systems to meet 
requirements.  Or seek reduction 
in system requirements 
1.5 System cost exceeds 
estimates 
Medium Low Low Use conservative methods for 
cost estimation especially when 
cost data is not current, accurate, 
and representative 
2.0 ACQUISITION PHASE     
2.1 Sub-systems do not 
integrate with USC 
system 
Medium High High Allow for extended programming 
time to ensure proper system 
integration 
2.2 System components do 
not interoperate with one 
another 
Medium High High Allow for extended programming 
time and testing to ensure 
interoperability 
2.3 C3 programming is more 
extensive and complex 
than planned 
Medium High High Allow for extended programming 
time  and testing to ensure 
adequate C3 programming 
2.4 C3 programming is Medium High High Allow for extended programming 
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insufficient time and testing to ensure 
adequate C3 programming 
2.5 Composite Hull size too 
large for industry 
Medium Low Low Allow for extended 
manufacturing time to build hull 
to design size 
3.0 OPERATIONAL 
PHASE 
    
3.1 USC loses 
communications w/ 
command 
Medium High High Build in fail-safe return to base 
program if system communication 
is lost for X amount of time 




Medium High High Develop a multitude of system 
tests to ensure system can process 
data received by sensors 
correctly.  Identify basic actions 
for USC to take when data is 
conflicting 
3.3 Data rate too fast for 
USC to cope 
Low Medium Low Implement data reduction 
techniques for data transmission.  
Implement “safe mode” of data 
gathering and processing when 
data overload occurs.  Add 
programming for data read while 
writing capability and data 
interpolation should segments of 
data become corrupted 
3.4 Incorrect IFF and 
subsequent action 
Low High Medium Thorough programming and 
testing of IFF and lethal weapon 
use.  Have two systems 
independently process the data 
and fire only when analysis 
matches.  Limit lethal weapons to 
human operator override for all 
non defensive uses 
3.4 Insufficient recovery 
after failure or damage 
Medium Medium Medium Ensure systems are as distributed 
as possible.  Additional testing of 




3.5 Issue with refueling 
while underway 
Low Medium Low Thorough refueling concept 
development and testing.  Plan for 
refueling at non-emergency level 
to allow USC to travel towards a 
depot if unsuccessful refueling 
underway.  Incorporate tow 
cables into design if USC runs out 
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